



BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE

XXV*

B

14

NAPOLI





XXIVx

A

12

2122

2122



OF THE
ORIGIN AND PROGRESS
OF
LANGUAGE.


*Gratis ingenium, Gratis dedit ore rotundo
Musa loqui.——*

HORAT,

V O L. V.



EDINBURGH,
PRINTED FOR J. BELL, EDINBURGH,
AND
T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND, LONDON.
M,DCC,LXXXIX.



THE CONTENTS.

B O O K I.

Ch.	Page.
<u>I.</u>	<u>Of the Roman history, and the excellence of the subject of it above that of the subject of any other history, even of that of Herodotus.—The two compared together.—The progress of the Roman State from the smallest beginnings.—Difference in that respect betwixt Rome and the kingdoms of Asia.—The beginnings of the kingdoms whereof we know not, we learn from the Roman history.—The institutions and manners by which they became so great:—also the vices by which they fell.—Comparison betwixt the Roman history and the history of modern na-</u>

iv The C O N T E N T S.

Ch.	Pag.
	<i>tions in later times.—Passage from Milton on that subject.—Of those who have written the history of Rome, beginning with Livy.—His plan very extensive.—His preface shows that he knew the fruit that was to be reaped from the study of the Roman history.—The character of Livy, as he has exhibited himself in his history, is very amiable.—He has done this not improperly.—He particularly shows himself to be religious by the reflections he makes upon the religion of the Romans;—extraordinary examples of their regard for the religion of an oath.—One reward he mentions of his labours in writing his history, that it turns his eyes from the miseries of his own times;—application of this to the present times.—His observation upon the depopulation of Italy, even in his time;—much greater in after times.—Of the free spirit which Livy has shown in the representations he has given of the miseries of his time.—This compared with the</i>

The CONTENTS.

Ch.	Pag.	
		<i>representations given of those times by the poets and flatterers of Augustus.</i>
		<i>—Of the faults in Livy's history ;—</i>
		<i>and first as to those of the matter.—</i>
		<i>His history of the first ages of Rome under the kings very deficient, particularly as to the reign of Romulus and his great war with the Veientes.—Enlarges upon nothing but what he can adorn with speeches and descriptions ;—example of this in the case of the war betwixt the Romans and the Sabines, and the union with which it was concluded.—His account of that transaction compared with the Halicarnassian's.—Material circumstances omitted by Livy, but which are supplied by the Halicarnassian, in the story of the Horatii and Curiatii.—No story altogether feigned by Livy, tho' circumstances of embellishment may be added.—Scrupulous in examining the evidence of facts.—Difference in that respect betwixt him and Hector Boece, the Scotch historian.—Of the stile of Livy.—A</i>

Ch.

Pag.

fault common to other Latin writers ;
and the defects of the language not to
be imputed to him.—The defect of the
want of an article supplied by Livy
in such a way as to make the sen-
tence not intelligible to a mere La-
tin scholar.—Instances of this kind.—
Of the the short cut, and obscurity of
the stile of Livy.—This he learned in
the School of Declamation, where ob-
scurity was studied, as well as short
smart sentences.—Instances of his short
abrupt stile :—not in his narrative
only, but in his harangues :—so fond
of it, that he gives up the gravity of
the historic stile, and falls into smart
familiar conversation.—Progress of
the corruption of the Roman taste of
writing, begun by Sallust, carried on
by Livy, and compleated by Tacitus.
—The imitation of Tacitus and some
French writers very fashionable in
Britain some time ago.—But it is to
be hoped, from a better example
shown, it will be entirely disused.—
Of the obscurity of Livy's stile.—Two

Ch.	Pag.
	<i>or three examples of that.—His stile compared, in point of perspicuity, with those of the Halicarnassian, and of Julius Caesar.—The stile of his speeches is not good, the matter of them is excellent.</i> - - - 1
2.	<i>Of Julius Caesar's Commentaries.—The subject of them of great importance.—The character of the Man.—His military actions, the greatest that ever were.—The stile of his Commentaries, the best historical stile among the Romans;—wonderful considering how hastily it must have been written amidst such great occupation.</i> 74
3.	<i>Of the Roman histories of the Halicarnassian and Polybius,—if they had not been preserved to us, the Roman empire would have appeared to have been the work of chance, not of wisdom and virtue.—And first of Dionysius.—He as well prepared for writing his history as any man could be;—learned the Latin language for that</i>

Ch.

Pag.

purpose ;—his account of that language.—The first book of the Halicarnassian, the best piece of archeology extant.—The authors diligence in collecting from so many different authors Greek and Latin.—Of the Aborigines,—the Latins,—and Romans ;—all the same people under different names, and originally from Arcadia.—The Pelasgi also,—and the colony that came with Evander, likewise from that country.—Of those that came with Hercules ;—an account of that hero.—The sixth and last migration into Latium from Greece, was that of the Trojans under the conduct of Æneas.—The Trojans also originally from Arcadia.—Of the genealogy of Æneas.—His voyage from Troy to Latium very well traced by our author ;—proved by the universal belief of the people of Rome, and 50 Trojan families still existing when our author wrote.—The Romans, mixed as they were of different colonies, all originally Greeks.—So noble a descent gi-

The CONTENTS. ix

Ch.	Pag.	
		<i>ven to them by Dionysius, makes his history credible.—Livy's account of the Romans, compared with that of the Halicarnassian:—For any thing Livy has said, they might have been all originally barbarians, fugitives, and slaves.—Some of them, according to his account, were really slaves.—The noblest descent not sufficient, without good education, laws, and institutions.—The Romans bred as well as born to be masters of the world.—Of the institutions of Romulus.—1st, The Patronage and Clientship he introduced.—The happy consequences of this institution.—Next, The form of government instituted by Romulus; not so democratical as it became in after times, but well mixed and poised;—the most antient and best of all governments.—The best of all Romulus's institutions was the family-government, which he established.—This the chief cause of the Roman grandeur.—The happy consequences of it:—Vain-</i>

Ch.	Pag.
	<i>ly attempted by other nations, even by the Spartans.—Livy mentions but one of Romulus's seven institutions, and that very shortly.—Of the religious institutions of Romulus.—The state of religion in Latium in his time;—a good system of Theism, without the mixture of those impious fables, which disgraced the Greek religion in the days of our author.—This pure religion not introduced by Romulus, but imported by the Greek colonies that had settled in Latium before his time.—Romulus instituted religious festivals, and sacrifices, and many priesthoods.—Livy not more full upon the religious institutions of Romulus than upon the civil;—wonderful that he should have said so little of so great a King and the founder of Rome;—one of the greatest men that ever existed;—an altar erected to him by an Italian in later times.—Livy fuller upon the religious institutions of Numa;—but not so full and distinct as the Halicarnassian; o-</i>

Ch. Pag.

mits one of the civil institutions of Numa of great importance.—Dionysius, a most religious historian, but not superstitious, because he believes in demons and extraordinary interpositions of divinity.—The people of Rome, the most religious people in the world;—more religious than the Greeks or Egyptians;—lived with their Gods, and consulted them upon all occasions public and private.—The wonderful effect that this must have had upon their lives and manners.—In their degenerate state they neglected religion.—This a certain proof of degeneracy in all nations.—Apology of the author for insisting so much upon the subject of the Halicarnassian's history in a work which professes only to treat of stile.—Of the Stile of the Halicarnassian's history;—the greatest beauty both in the narrative and rhetorical part of it;—not so figured as the stile of Thucydides, nor so plain as that of Xenophon.—His speeches all speeches of business,—neither Sophisti-

xii The C O N T E N T S.

Ch.	Page
	<u>cal nor declamatory.—Photius's judgment of the Halicarnassian's stile, ill founded ;—no obscurity or perplexity in his stile, except where the MS. is faulty.—Of the Halicarnassian's critical works ;—a new edition both of these and of his history, recommended to the Scholars of Oxford.—Faults in the present edition that may be corrected ; one of them mentioned.</u>
	85

4. The history of Polybius may be considered as a continuation of the Halicarnassian's history.—These two histories the most valuable in the world ;—but have come down to us sadly mutilated.—Some excerpts from them preserved.—What Polybius calls his history, comprehends only a period of 53 years, beginning with the second Punic war, and coming down to the conquest of Macedonia.—His two first books are only preparatory and introductory to his history.—His history takes in the most glorious period of Rome.—Description of their glory at

Ch.	Pag.
	<i>that time.—The moderation they showed in the use of their power, and their clemency to those that had offended them.—The grandeur of the Roman senate at that time,—when ambassadors from all parts of the earth, and even Kings in person, attended them.—Their virtue still preserved, and not impaired either by power or wealth.—The history of the later and more glorious part of this period, not preserved to us in what we have of Polybius ;—but this supplied by what we have of Livy.—What we have left of Polybius, shows us more of the distresses and calamities of the Romans than of their triumphs.—Their losses both by sea and land in the first Punic war very great ;—and their losses in the second Punic war, such as brought them to the brink of ruin.—That war the finest subject of history, on account of the variety of great events in it, and the wisdom and virtue there shown.—The great difficulties that Hannibal</i>

Ch.	Pag.
-----	------

had to encounter before he got into Italy, and the prodigious force that was there to oppose him.—The subject therefore of Polybius's history the noblest that can be imagined;—very proper for enforcing what he recommends so much, viz. submission to the Roman government.—No man fitter to write upon such a subject than Polybius;—a man of business, and who had been employed in great affairs, both civil and military.—The difference betwixt him and the Halicarnassian in this respect, and also in respect of his being much better informed of the facts which he relates.—The subject of Polybius's history more comprehensive than that of the Halicarnassian, in respect it takes in the affairs of other nations, as well as of the Romans.—Of the digressions in Polybius, which, though contrary to the laws of history, are very instructive, particularly with respect to the military affairs of the Romans.—His descriptions of battles wonderfully

xv The C O N T E N T S.

Ch. Pag.

clear and lively.—The value of such a body of history as that of the Halicarnassian and Polybius, if it were all preserved, or if it could be yet recovered ;—some chance for that ;—a MS. of Livy discovered to be in the Emperor of Morocco's library.—Of the stile of Polybius ;—much inferior to that of the Halicarnassian.—Idiotisms of Polybius ;—not an obscure writer, but his sense sometimes mistaken both by his translator Casaubon and Livy.—His Greek not elegant, but very intelligible and perspicuous ; very little of the rhetorical stile in his speeches ;—no affectation or labour to write ill.—General observations upon the Greek historians compared with the Latin. - - - 151

5. *Of modern historians, particularly Buchanan.—His history of Scotland written in very good Latin.—In his learned age the Latin was a living language among the learned.—In the next age Milton wrote Latin perfect-*

Ch.	Pag.
-----	------

ly well.—Buchanan's stile of narrative better composed than that of Livy, and not so obscure.—His speeches also good, but few of them.—Most of them indirect ;—one direct and of considerable length, against female government ;—an heroic speech he puts into the mouth of a woman.—The speech of David I. King of Scotland on the death of his son, containing a topic of consolation not common.—Of Milton's English history.—It is an abridgement of history ;—therefore the composition of it not so fine as might otherwise be expected.—Of Lord Littleton's history of Henry II. :—Not an abridgement like Milton's history ;—therefore still more copious ;—the best stile of history that has been written in this age.—His account of the Norman invasion fuller and better than that of Milton.—Of the histories of modern times :—The actions of barbarous nations, such as those who made themselves masters of the provinces of the Roman Empire

Ch.	Pag.
-----	------

in the middle ages, not a fit subject for history.—The subject of history concluded with an advice to authors to form their stile upon the antient models;—to imitate these and to translate from them;—but from the Greek rather than from the Latin;—to translate as Queen Elizabeth did.—The advantages of this practice.—The uniform sameness of arrangement in the modern languages ought to be avoided as much as may be.—Examples of the common order of words being changed with elegance and without obscurity.—The connection betwixt the relative and its antecedent ought to be well marked, sometimes by the repetition of the word.—There may be a classical repetition of a word, as well as an ellipsis.—Where there are cases in our language formed by a change of the word, advantage should be taken of that to alter the common arrangement:—Example of this.—By such transpositions

Ch.	Pag.
	<i>the stile of Thucydides may be imitated.—Of variety in the composition of periods, and their several members :—In this the Halicarnassian excels wonderfully.—Milton the best composer in English, both in verse and prose.—Of his verse both blank and rhymed :—Stile of his polemical writings more composed in periods than that of his history.—Examples of some periods from those writings :—Wonderful variety of matter in them.—Dr Johnson's censure of Milton's stile.—The Doctor, not being a Greek scholar, no judge of it.—His preference of the Paradise Lost to the Iliad absurd and ridiculous.—Dr Johnson's attack upon Milton's Latin, as ill founded as upon his English.—Apology for what the author has said of Dr Johnson.—Recommendation to historiographers and all authors to form a good taste of writing before they begin.—If their taste be bad, the more they labour their composition, the worse it will be.—Example of that.—But the mo-</i>

The CONTENTS. xi

Ch.	Pag.
	<i>derns very deficient in it.—Of the necessity of forming a good taste before one begins to write.—If not, the stile, the more it is laboured, the worse it will be.</i>
	226

B O O K II.

Of the Didactic Stile.

Ch.	Pag.
1.	<i>The Didactic Stile plain and simple, the most necessary of all stiles, being that by which all arts and sciences are taught.—It is of two kinds:—That by which a man is taught to know that he does not know; and that by which he is made to know, or is instructed.—The first method extremely offensive.—Socrates put to death, and Epictetus beaten, for prac-</i>

Ch.	Pag.
-----	------

tising it.—The Socratic dialogue a good way of instructing ;—practised both by Xenophon and Plato.—An account of Xenophon's dialogues in the Memorabilia.—In that work we have the genuine philosophy of Socrates pure and unmixed.—Socrates a most extraordinary man.—In the Memorabilia both methods of instruction practised.—Difference in that respect betwixt Xenophon and Plato.—One remarkable conversation of Socrates with Euthydemus, recorded by Xenophon, which ended in Euthydemus being instructed, and becoming a follower of Socrates.—Socrates in Xenophon not only asks, but answers questions.—A conversation of that kind with Hippias.—Though the philosophy of the Memorabilia be not perfect, it is a most useful work.—Of the Economics of Xenophon.—The difference betwixt it and the Memorabilia ;—more a piece than the Memorabilia.—Socrates, instead of instructing, as in other conversations,

Ch.	Pag.
	<i>is himself instructed.—Oeconomy of two kinds, within doors and without.</i>
	<i>—Of each in its order.—The first depends most upon the wife;—the instructions proper to be given to a wife.</i>
	<i>—Of the oeconomy without doors,—which in this case was the management of a farm.—This depends upon the right choice of an overseer.—Of the operations of farming.—An eulogium upon that art.—The lessons which Socrates receives in this art, the best example of the Socratic method of teaching by asking questions.</i>
	<i>—An account given of that method of teaching in this dialogue;—the conclusion of it very fine.—It is a piece invented by the author, not a real conversation like those in the Memorabilia.—Of the third and last dialogue of Xenophon, the Hieron,—more poetical than any of them, having a kind of peripeteia in it.—The conclusion of this piece translated from the Greek.</i>
	<i>—Observations upon the stile of Xenophon's dialogue-writing.—A per-</i>

xxii The C O N T E N T S.

Ch.	Pag.
<i>fect model of the stile of Attick conversation.—When he departs from that stile in one instance, the writing not good.</i>	293

2. *Plato the greatest dialogist of antient or modern times.—His dialogues reckoned by Aristotle Pieces of poetry.—He has imitated Homer in two things, of never appearing himself in his works, and in mixing the narrative with the dramatic.—His dialogues therefore very properly divided into dramatic, narrative, and mixed.—Great variety in his narrative dialogues.—Some of his dialogues have only the form of dialogues, but not the nature ; such as the ten books de Republica, and the twelve de Legibus.—The Protagoras, the finest of all Plato's dialogues, considered as a poetical composition.—A particular account of it.—The scenery in it, and the various turns and incidents in it, particularly fine.—It concludes with a change of the opinions maintained*

The CONTENTS. xxiii

Ch.	Pag.
<p><i>by the two disputants, which may be called the catastrophe of the piece.—The next most beautiful dialogue in Plato, is the Gorgias.—Not necessary to give so particular an account of it.—Of the manner of teaching of Plato in his dialogues.—It is for the greatest part only refutation.—This more agreeable to the character of Socrates than plain teaching.—Of the matter of the dialogues of Plato.—It is chiefly moral and political, but with a great mixture of the doctrines of the Eleatic and Pythagorean philosophy, and of the philosophy of ideas, which he brought from Egypt, as well as the doctrine of the Trinity.—The two last mentioned, the most valuable part of the philosophy of Plato.—His philosophy of morals defective, in not knowing that the principle of morals was the το καλον, and in not defining what the το καλον is, though he has mentioned it so often.—His logic and dialectic, too imperfect, compared with those of Ari-</i></p>	

xxiv The C O N T E N T S.

Ch.	Pag.
<p><i>Astotle.</i>—His philosophy of Nature likewise not so good as the Pythagorean work from which he has copied it.—His system of government not so good neither as that which the Jesuits actually put in practice in Paraguay.—The Theology therefore of Plato, the best part of his philosophy.—This exalts the mind above human affairs and all things on earth.—This philosophy should be most cultivated in a degenerate state of a nation:—This practised by the Alexandrine school.—Of the style of Plato.—This immoderately praised by Cicero, but with a proper distinction by the Halicarnassian.—His chief beauty of style is in the numbers of his composition, of which we have no perception.—His works upon the whole are very valuable and ought to be carefully studied.—They are the best preparation for the philosophy of Aristotle, and particularly for his logic. - -</p>	321

Ch.	Pag.
3.	<p><i>The philosophy of Aristotle quite complete ;—the several parts of it enumerated.—Observations upon the matter of it, beginning with Logic.—The subject of Logic is to let us know what science is.—The necessity of this.—No man can truly understand any science without knowing what science is.—Mr Locke's account of science, compared with Aristotle's.—It is altogether imperfect and deficient.—Mr Locke says, that the division of things into genus and species is artificial, and has no foundation in nature ;—the consequence of this, that truth has no foundation in nature.—It subverts also the fundamental doctrine of Theology.—Of the Dialectic of Aristotle,—first reduced by him to an art ;—not demonstrative reasoning, such as that taught by his Logic ;—neither is it an art of sophistry, but a way of reasoning that is very useful.—Of the Morals of Aristotle ;—he is very full upon that subject ;—has written four several treatises upon it.</i></p>

Ch.	Pag.
	— <i>His system of Morals, much better than that of Plato, in two respects,—first, that he has given us the true principle of moral actions ;—and, secondly, that he makes the proper distinction betwixt our intellectual and animal natures.—This distinction serves to explain a fundamental doctrine of Christianity, viz. the Incarnation.—It serves also to explain that paradox of the Stoics, that the pulchrum and the honestum is the only good of men.—Every thing relating to the happiness of human life is treated of in these Morals of Aristotle.—He is particularly full upon the subject of Friendship.—A new edition of these books should be given,—Of the political works of Aristotle.—Morals and Politics among the antients, branches of the same science.—Aristotle's political system not founded upon visionary systems like that of Plato, but upon fact and experience.—Aristotle wrote also two books upon Oeconomy.—The history of these</i>

The CONTENTS. xxvii

Ch.	Pag.
	<i>books very singular.—Of the Physics of Aristotle.—The philosophy of Nature is there to be found.—No philosophy of Nature among the moderns ; —nothing but facts of natural history, calculation, and computation.—Our attempts to philosophise upon nature have led to very gross errors.—Great and important truths established by Aristotle in his books of Physics ; —very justly, therefore, celebrated by the schoolmen on account of his natural philosophy.—Of the Metaphysics of Aristotle.—The nature of this science.—It is the Science of sciences, as it demonstrates the principles of all sciences.—Without Metaphysics we cannot be perfectly learned in any science.—Example of this in Geometry and Arithmetic.—Another example in the case of Logic,—also of natural philosophy.—Theology, the highest part of Metaphysics.—The Theology of Plato more sublime than that of Aristotle.—The Theology of Aristotle, so far as it goes, a pure</i>

xxviii The CONTENTS.

Ch.	Pag.
<i>system of Theism, but defective in two great points ;—first, the Providence of God over all his works not asserted:—He is represented as passing his whole time in contemplation.—This a kind of Epicurean God.—Rejects the popular religion of his country.—The other respect in which his Theology is deficient, is, that he does not make God the Author of the material world, but only the Mover of it,—does not derive from him even the minds that animate this world.</i>	352
4. <i>Queries concerning Philosophy.</i>	419
5. <i>The Halicarnassian's treatise of Composition is confined to the sound of the Greek language.—In this a great variety.—Of the vowels in Greek.—All the vocal sounds possible, in that language.—That not the case of every language.—How there came to be 7 vowels reckoned by the Greek grammarians.—Of the variety of consonants in Greek ;—the syllables con-</i>	


Ch.	Page
	<i>frequently very various.—Of the Greek accents upon syllables ;—these believed by some not to exist ;—proof from fact of their existence.—Of long and short syllables in Greek ;—some long syllables, longer than others, and some short syllables, shorter than others.—The Halicarnassian's account of long and short syllables, that is, of the rhythm of language, more distinct than Cicero's account.—Of syllables words are made, and of words sentences, with all the variety of periods and members of periods.—Of the wonderful variety and beauty of the composition in Greek.—That beauty was still greater when Homer wrote, and when greater liberty was used with words.—The variety of arrangement, which the syntax of the Greek language permits, adds wonderfully to the beauty of sound in the Greek composition, and also to the sense.—Of what is called the natural order of words ;—that does not make the beauty of composition.—Of</i>

xxx The CONTENTS.

Ch.	Pag.
	<i>the wonderful beauty of the Orations of Demosthenes pronounced by himself.</i>
	<i>—Two things required to make a perfect stile ;—that it should be both beautiful and pleasant.—Of the difference betwixt the two.—Four things required to make a stile both beautiful and pleasant, so far as concerns the sound, viz. melody, rhythm, variety, and what is decent and proper.—Of each of these in order.—The Rhythm much insisted upon ;—examples of good and bad rhythm.—Also much said upon the το πρεπον, and illustrated by examples from Homer.—Of the Melody of speech,—how distinguished from the melody of music,—not reducible to rules.—Of the three different characters, the austere, the florid, and the middle.—Examples of these from different authors.—Two curious problems :—1mo, How prose is to be made like to verse.—2do, How verse is to be made like to prose.—The first a mystery in his time,—yet to be conceived even by us.—Examples from</i>

The CONTENTS. xxxi

Ch.	Pag.	
		<i>Demosthenes.—This can only be done in a language which has the rhythm of long and short syllables;—not therefore in English, except the diction be poetical.—Of making prose of verse.—This explained by the Halicarnassian in a passage translated from him.—Milton's verse the perfection of that stile in English.—Next to Milton's is that of Dr Armstrong.—Mr Pope's verses very different.—Objections to Milton's versification answered.—This work of the Halicarnassian, the most elegant composition in the didactic stile.—Many errors in the text to be corrected.</i>
	437	- - -




ERRATA.

Pag. 42. line	19.	Seneca, <i>lege</i> Quintilian
—	22.	<i>εὐστύλις lege εὐστύλιος</i>
100.	2.	in the Note <i>Lugubinae lege Eugubinae</i>
—	10.	in the Note <i>Lugubinae lege Eugubinae</i>
162.	ult.	1700 <i>lege</i> 700
265.	19.	to <i>lege</i> too
325.	3.	De L'Argent, <i>lege</i> Dargens.
339.	1.	in the Note lib. 2. <i>lege</i> lib. XI.
381.	12.	<i>magnitude lege magnitude,</i>

TO THE BINDER.

Cancel pages 173, 174, 261, and 262.



OF THE
ORIGIN AND PROGRESS
OF
LANGUAGE.

VOL. V. BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

Of the Roman history, and the excellence of the subject of it above that of the subject of any other history, even of that of Herodotus.—The two compared together.—The progress of the Roman State from the smallest beginnings.—Difference in that respect betwixt Rome and the king-
VOL. V. A

doms of Asia.—The beginnings of the kingdoms whereof we know not, we learn from the Roman history.—The institutions and manners by which they became so great ;—also the vices by which they fell.—Comparison betwixt the Roman history and the history of modern nations in later times.—Passage from Milton on that subject.—Of those who have written the history of Rome, beginning with Livy.—His plan very extensive.—His preface shows that he knew the fruit that was to be reaped from the study of the Roman history.—The character of Livy, as he has exhibited himself in his history, is very amiable.—He has done this not improperly.—He particularly shows himself to be religious by the reflections he makes upon the religion of the Romans ;—extraordinary examples of their regard for the religion of an oath.—One reward he mentions of his labours in writing his history, that it turns his eyes from the miseries of his own times ;—application of this to the present times.—His observation upon the depopulation of Italy, even in his time ;—much greater in after times.—Of the

free spirit which Livy has shown in the representations he has given of the miseries of his time.—This compared with the representations given of those times by the poets and flatterers of Augustus.—Of the faults in Livy's history ;—and first as to those of the matter.—His history of the first ages of Rome under the kings very deficient, particularly as to the reign of Romulus and his great war with the Veientes.—Enlarges upon nothing but what he can adorn with speeches and descriptions ;—example of this in the case of the war betwixt the Romans and the Sabines, and the union with which it was concluded.—His account of that transaction compared with the Halicarnassian's.—Material circumstances omitted by Livy, but which are supplied by the Halicarnassian, in the story of the Horatii and Curiatii.—No story altogether feigned by Livy, tho' circumstances of embellishment may be added.—Scrupulous in examining the evidence of facts.—Difference in that respect betwixt him and Hector Boece, the Scotch historian.—Of the stile of Livy.—A fault common to other Latin writers ; and the

defects of the language not be imputed to him.—The defect of the want of an article supplied by Livy in such a way, as to make the sentence not intelligible to a mere Latin scholar.—Instances of this kind.—Of the short cut, and obscurity of the stile of Livy.—This he learned in the School of Declamation, where obscurity was studied, as well as short smart sentences.—Instances of his short abrupt stile:—not in his narrative only, but in his harangues:—so fond of it, that he gives up the gravity of the historic stile, and falls into smart familiar conversation.—Progress of the corruption of the Roman taste of writing, begun by Sallust, carried on by Livy, and compleated by Tacitus.—The imitation of Tacitus and some French writers very fashionable in Britain some time ago.—But it is to be hoped, from a better example shown, it will be entirely disused.—Of the obscurity of Livy's stile.—Two or three examples of that.—His stile compared, in point of perspicuity, with those of the Halicarnassian, and of Julius Caesar.—The stile of his speeches

is not good, the matter of them is excellent.

I PROCEED now, according to the method proposed in the end of the last volume, to speak of the history of Rome, and of several authors Greek and Latin, who have written that history, the subject of which I think is still more excellent than that of Herodotus' history. The subject indeed of Herodotus is so far more various that it takes in the history of many nations, all that were known in his time, and down to the age immediately before that in which he lived, and it concludes with a war, which, for the works preparatory to it, the number of men employed in it, and the importance of the success of it, is the greatest event in the history of man. But the history of none of those many nations is so well known, or so interesting as the history of Rome, which produced the greatest empire that ever was on earth. And as to the great event which is the catastrophe of Herodotus's history, it was but a single war decided by

three sea-fights, and one battle at land, (for the defence of Thermopylae by the 300 Spartans cannot be called a battle); whereas in the Roman history we have numbers of great wars and famous battles not easy to be counted; and there is no history so distinguished, and adorned with illustrious characters, that shine like lights in the dark, and throw a splendor upon it, which illuminates this history more than any other.

But what makes the Roman story a more instructive and entertaining subject of history than that of any other people, is, that we can trace this mighty empire back to as low a beginning as that of any state we read of. It was originally a small colony from no great city, namely, *Alba Longa*; and its territory at first was not of the extent of many a private estate in Great Britain. Of this territory each citizen had for his share *two jugera*, that is, about an acre and a half. Their first wars, as Valerius Maximus tells us *, were within seven

* De Animi Moderatione, lib. 4. cap. 1. sect. 10.

miles of their city. And the force with which they waged those wars was no more than 3000 foot, and about 300 horse *; a much less force than many Scotch barons could have brought to the field, one of whom, the Earl of Douglas, used to travel thro' the country in time of peace with a retinue of 2000 horse. Now the empires of Asia, of which Herodotus speaks, namely, the empire of the Assyrians, the Medes, and the Persians, we cannot trace from such small beginnings, tho', no doubt, there was a time when there were as small states in Asia as the Roman; but we have no records of Asia, till arts and civility were far advanced in that part of the world, nor consequently till there were wars and conquests, by which great kingdoms are formed. And, accordingly, all we know of Asia, in very antient times, is, that a great king of Assyria conquered a great part of it; then the Medes conquered the Assyrians; and, lastly, the Persians the Medes. Whereas we know, that the Romans, from the small beginnings I have

* Dionys. Halicarnas. lib. 2. cap. 16.

mentioned, rose to be a great state in the midst of many warlike nations, more powerful than they, with whom they had to contend for some hundreds of years, not for glory and dominion only, but for life and liberty, and the means of subsistence. During that time, they experienced, as was necessary, great vicissitudes of fortune; once their army was totally defeated, and their city taken, all except the rock upon which they had a citadel, that they called the Capitol. And, when they came to contend with the Carthaginians for glory and dominion, they lost three great battles; and, in the last of them, had 70,000 of their citizens killed upon the spot, and 10,000 taken prisoners*.

But what instructs us more than all these various events, is, that we learn from this history by what laws, by what institutions, and by what manners, the Romans became the greatest people that ever existed in the great arts of government and arms. Without this knowledge, we might

* Polybius.

believe, as we find some of the Greeks did *, that those barbarians, as they called the Romans, were by the mere caprice of fortune raised to the empire of the world. But their history, if diligently studied, must convince every intelligent reader, that, by their wisdom and their virtues, they merited that empire; and particularly, by that greatest of all virtues, piety, in which, as Cicero has observed, they excelled all the world: ‘For,’ says he, ‘the Spaniards exceed us in numbers, the Gauls in the glory of war, and the Greeks in arts: But we surpass all nations in that *prime wisdom*, by which we have learned, that all things are governed and directed by the immortal Gods †.’

Nor is the fall of this empire less edifying than the rise of it. Neither should we have understood so well by what arts it rose, if we had not likewise known by what change of manners, and what vices

* Plutarchus, *De fortuna Populi Romani*.

† *Oratio de Haruspicum Responsis*: ‘Sed pietate ac religione, atque hac una sapientia, quod Decorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique perspeximus, omnes gentes nationesque superavimus.’

it fell. But, even in their fall, we must admire this great people; for the vices of the Romans, as well as their virtues, seem to be something above humanity *.

From all these considerations, I think we may conclude, that the world has never furnished such a subject for history as the Roman state. And, what may convince the reader, more perhaps than any thing I have said, of the excellency of this subject of history, let him compare the Roman history with the history of some modern nations in Europe for these last 50 or 60 years, which is such, that I am persuaded no man of genius or learning will deign to write it: And then we may apply to it what Milton says of the want of records in the barbarous ages: ‘Perhaps,’ says he, ‘disesteem and contempt of the public affairs then present, as not worth recording, might partly be in cause. Certainly, oftentimes, we see, that wise men, and of best abilities, have forborn to write the acts of their own days, while they beheld, with a just loathing and disdain,

* See what I have said of the Romans in the last chapter of vol. 3. of this work.

‘ not only how unworthy, how perverse,
 ‘ how corrupt, but often how ignoble, how
 ‘ petty, how below all history, the persons
 ‘ and their actions were, who, either by
 ‘ fortune, or some rude election, had at-
 ‘ tained, as a fore judgment and ignominy
 ‘ upon the land, to have chief sway in
 ‘ managing the commonwealth *.’

I come now to speak of the historians
 Greek and Latin, who have treated this so
 excellent subject. And I will begin with
 the Roman historian Livy, whose plan was
 more extensive than that of any other I
 shall mention ; for he intended, and did
 actually write the whole history of Rome
 for the space of above 700 years, from the
 foundation of the city down to the age of
 Augustus, in which he lived. In his pre-
 face, which is a piece of admirable compo-
 sition, he praises, I think most justly, the
 people whose history he is to write : ‘ *Gae-*
 ‘ *terum aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit,*

* Milton’s *Preface to his History of England*, the
 whole of which I would advise every reader to peruse,
 who has any taste for the elegance of antient composi-
 tion, and desires to know how far it may be imitated
 in English.

‘*aut nulla usquam respublica nec major, nec
sanctior, nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit :
Nec in quam civitatem tam sera avaritia
luxuriaque immigraverint : Nec ubi tan-
tus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimoniae
honos fuerit. Adeo, quanto rerum minus,
tanto minus cupiditatis erat.*’ And he
knew perfectly well the fruit that was to
be reaped from reading the history of the
fall, as well as the rise of such a people ;
for, in the same preface, there is the fol-
lowing passage : ‘*Ad illa mihi pro se quis-
que acriter intendat animum, quae vita,
qui mores fuerint : Per quos viros, quibus-
que artibus, domi militiaeque, et partum et
auctum imperium sit. Labente deinde pau-
latim disciplina, velut desidentes primo
mores sequatur animo ; deinde ut magis
magisque lapsi sint ; tum ire coeperint prae-
cipites : Donec ad haec tempora, quibus
nec vitia nostra, nec remedia pati possumus,
perventum est. Hoc illud est praecipue
in cognitione rerum salubre et frugiferum,
omnis te exempli documenta in illustri po-
sita monumento intueri : Inde tibi tuaeque
reipublicae, quod imitere, capias : Inde foe-
dum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vites.*’

Here we have the moral of his history, the chief thing to be considered in every work, very well set forth.

The character of this historian, I think, is most amiable; for, in the course of this history, he has shown himself religious, a lover of virtue, and who had sense and philosophy enough to prefer the first ages of Rome, and the ancient parsimony and simplicity of manners, to all the wealth and luxury, the pomp and grandeur of Rome in the days of Augustus, (who boasted, that of a brick he had made it a marble city *) and to their wide extended empire at that time. The rule of writing history, no doubt, is, that an historian should not appear in his own work any more than an epic or a tragic poet. It is the business of an orator to exhibit himself as a good man, and friendly to those to whom he speaks; for the character of the orator, as Aristotle has told us, is one topic of persuasion †: Whereas the reader has nothing to do with the character of the historian.

* Suetonius, in *Vita Augusti*.

† Aristot. *Rhetoric*.

Nevertheless, if an historian can naturally, and without affectation, introduce observations upon men and manners, and compare the times of which he is writing with better or worse times, and thereby show his own sentiments and opinions to be such as a good man ought to have, I think he is not only pardonable, but commendable. Now, this Livy has done, more, I think, than any other historian I know.

And first, as to his sentiments upon religion, he has given us a very fine reflection comparing the manners of the Romans in antient times with those of the same people in his time ; and he has introduced it very properly upon occasion of the tribunes endeavouring to persuade the people, that they were not bound by their military oath to follow the consul *Quinctius Cincinnatus* to the field, because he was a private man, when they took that oath. This argument from their own magistrates, and tending too to persuade them to follow their own inclinations, by not doing what they were very averse to do, one should have thought, could not have failed of success. But such was the reverence at

that time for the religion of an oath, that they had no regard to this cavil of the tribunes, as Livy very properly calls it: Upon which he says, *‘Nondum hæc, quæ nunc tenet seculum, negligentia Deum venerat: Nec interpretando sibi quisque jusjurandum et leges aptas faciebat, sed suos potius mores ad ea accommodabat *.’*

In another passage † he gives us an example of their reverence for their military oath, and of the severity of the discipline of their armies, such as I believe is not to be found in the history of any other nation. In the 283 year of Rome there happened a most violent contention betwixt the patricians and plebeians, upon the subject of the election of the tribunes of the people. Before that time, they had, from their first institution, been always elected in the *comitia centuriata*, the same in which the consuls were elected; and where the patricians, by their property and their influence with their clients and dependents, had a great weight; so that they had commonly one or more of the tribunes in their inte-

* Lib. 3. cap. 20.

† Lib. 2. cap. 59.

rest. To prevent this, the plebeians insisted, that a law should pass, ordering the election of tribunes to be by the *comitia tributa*, where every free citizen had an equal vote, without regard to his fortune. This law the patricians opposed most vehemently. And, at the head of the opposition, they set Appius Claudius, whom they procured to be named consul. Accordingly, he opposed the passing of this law with so much vehemence, that, if it had not been for the wisdom of the senate, and the moderation of his colleague, things would have come to extremity; and there would have been violence and bloodshed even in the *comitia*. But the spirit of the people was raised to such a height, that the patricians were obliged to yield, and the law was passed; and indeed there seemed to be some reason that the people should have the election of their own magistrates. After this, Appius Claudius, the consul, was sent at the head of an army into the country of the Volsci, who were then at war with the Romans. There, being a man of a most violent and imperious disposition, full of the hereditary hatred his house bore to the plebeians, and in-

flamed besides by the animosity which the people and their tribunes had shown against him in the business of the law, he exercised military discipline with the greatest severity, and in such a manner as to show plainly that he was more guided by passion and hatred to the plebeians, than by that prudence which became a general. The consequence of this was, that, in a battle which he had with the Volsci, the Romans yielded the victory, and shamefully fled to their camp, and made no resistance till the Volsci attacked their intrenchments, which they defended, not chusing to submit to the shame and loss of having their camp and their whole baggage taken. The next day Appius was persuaded by his lieutenants and the tribunes of legions to leave the enemy's country, and to retire to the Roman territories. As they were retiring, the Volsci attacked them: And the Romans, instead of defending themselves, ran away shamefully, and threw down their arms. The consul, after having in vain tried to make his troops stand, when he had got out of the enemy's country called them together, and, asking what was

become of their arms and standards, all the standard-bearers he whipt and cut off their heads; and the rest of the army he decimated. To which punishment they quietly submitted*. That with such military discipline the Romans should conquer the world, is not to be wondered.

What he says in his preface shows that he had the opinion I have mentioned of the state of Rome in his own time, splendid and magnificent as it then appeared to be, compared with its antient state. It is where he speaks of one fruit he should reap from his labours in the great work he had undertaken: '*Ego, contra hoc quoque laboris praemium petam, ut me a conspectu malorum, quae nostra tot per annos vidit aetas, tantisper, certe dum prisca illa tota mente repeto, avertam, omnis expers curae, quae scribentis animum, etsi non flectere a vero, sollicitum tamen efficere possit.*' And it is certainly one fruit, which every man of genius and learning, who studies antient history, reaps, that he turns his eyes from

* Livy, lib. 2. cap. 59.

the misery and futility of modern times, to better ages and nations where he can live and converse with the heroes and sages of antient times. For my own part, I think I can say of myself, while reading the Roman history, what Livy says of himself while writing it, that *my mind some way becomes antient* * ; besides enjoying the pleasure above mentioned, I flatter myself, that, by reading the actions and studying the characters of those great and good men, I become a better man myself, and feel a disposition to imitate them as much as my inferior abilities and lower rank in life will permit †.

* Lib. 43. cap. 13.

† I heard the late Lord Chatham say in the House of Commons, that the most instructive book he ever read was Plutarch's Lives: And I am persuaded, that it was by studying and admiring those Lives that he became the greatest man of his age, and was enabled by his councils to raise the glory of the British arms to such a height, and to make of one of the smallest kingdoms in Europe a great empire, as great as the Roman even in extent of land-territory; for it comprehended, besides Britain and Ireland, several West India islands, a great part of the Continent of North America, and,

I could dwell with pleasure much longer upon the virtues of this *princeps terrarum populus*, as they are very properly called by their historian, who excelled all the people that ever existed in arms and government, and I may add in laws; for they were the only nation of antiquity, which

greater than all the countries I have named, (as great as one half of Europe), our possessions in India, to which the arms of the Romans never reached. And, when to such an extent of land-territory we add our dominion by sea, which extended from pole to pole, it may be said to have been an empire very much greater. What the state of the nation is now, after it came to be governed by other men and other councils, it would be invidious and unpleasant to mention, as well as foreign to the purpose of this work. I will only add, that I hope his son, Mr Pitt, who has inherited his virtue, genius, and eloquence, will retrieve our affairs as much as is possible; considering our loss of territory, of military glory, and reputation in Europe, and the almost bankrupt state of our finances, which he has already reestablished beyond what could have been believed in so short a time. I will say no more on this subject, except to give an advice to those who oppose him, in a line of Virgil;

‘ Hunc saltem everso juvenem succurrere facclo
‘ Ne prohibete.’

compiled a system of the laws of private property. This they did upon the principles of Greek philosophy, after that philosophy was introduced among them; and upon these principles have made a code of laws, so justly admired by all the nations of Europe who study it, and which it is the boast of Scotland to have for their *common law*. But reflections of this kind would carry me too far from my purpose; and I return to Livy.

There is another passage concerning religion which I will mention. It is, where he relates the prodigies that preceded the last Macedonian war, for which he thought it was not improper in the age in which he lived to make the following apology: 'I am not ignorant,' says he, 'that all this will be thought vain and trifling in an age when such events are quite neglected. It is from the same spirit which makes men to believe that the gods take no care of human affairs, that these prodigies are not publicly noticed and recorded. For my own part,' continues he, 'I do not know how it happens, but while I write of antient

‘times my mind some way becomes antient. And besides I make it a matter of conscience not to refuse a place in my history to those prodigies which our ancestors, the wisest of men, entered into the public records, and expiated with much trouble and expence *.’

I have elsewhere observed †, that it is the duty of every historian to inculcate that prime virtue of piety, without which no other virtue can be perfect, nor can there be any real happiness among men. And I have shown, that not only the historians, but the great poets, epic and tragic, among the antients, have made it the moral of their pieces, that the Gods govern the affairs of men, and direct the events of human life. When I compare, in this respect, such religious historians as Herodotus and Livy with some of our later historians, I am disposed to believe (and I am afraid I am not much mistaken) that these

* Lib. 43. cap. 13.

† Vol. 4. p. 441.

do not believe that there is a God, or that his providence superintends and directs the affairs of men, as well as the operations of nature. Such authors, who have formed this unfortunate opinion, I would advise, if they will write, to apply themselves to some work of less gravity or dignity than history. They may write copies of verses, political pamphlets, magazines, and reviews; or, if they will attempt to rise to any work of genius, may write *comedy*, which, as it is only a representation of common life, and of the *ridiculous* of that life, which is commonly the case of our modern comedy, has nothing at all to do with religion, and is only fitted

——— *rifu diducere rictum*

Auditoris; ——— *

* Horat. sat. 10. lib. 1. v. 7. — In the comedies of Terence, which are imitations of those of Menander and other writers of the later Greek comedy, there is not any one passage, as far as I remember, that can move a laugh. They are all natural and instructive imitations of common life, without any mixture of the ridiculous. See what I have said upon the subject of modern comedy, vol. 3. of this work, p. 346. The

but, to give up altogether the attempt to write any poetry of a higher kind, or even prose, such as history or philosophy.

In confirmation of what I have said of his preferring the antient state of Rome to its then state under Augustus *, I will quote here a passage which shows what he thought in general of the state of the country of Italy in those antient times, compared with what it was in his time. The passage is in his sixth book, cap. 12, and I think it the more remarkable that it confirms the truth of what Pliny, the elder, has observed of the desolation of Italy in his time. He says, that in antient Latium,

fable, which is the chief part of every dramatic work, is very much laboured in these comedies. And it is reported of Menander, who wrote above a hundred of them, that he used to say, that, after he had invented and arranged the fable, the sentiments and versification cost him very little trouble. How defective our comedies as well as our tragedies are, in the fable, every man, who has the idea of a *piece* or *whole*, and who has studied the philosophy of poetry in Aristotle, must know.

* P. 13.

a country of only 50 Roman miles in length, and of no great breadth, there were no less than 53 nations, of which in his time there was not a vestige *. Livy in this passage tells us, that none of the antient authors, whom he had consulted, could account how the Volsci and Equi were able to recruit their armies so soon, after being so often defeated by the Romans, tho' they were all agreed as to the fact. He gives three different accounts of it ; the last of which, and, I take, the true account, is a fact, that he must have known: *' Innumerabilem multitudinem liberorum capitum in iis fuisse locis, quae nunc, vix seminario exiguo militis relicto, servitia Romana ab solitudine vindicant.'* So that the fruit of all the great conquests of the Romans, and of all their wealth and power, was the desolation of their country, which in later times was so entirely depopulated, that Constantine, in order to repeople it, settled in it 300,000 Sarmatians †.

* Nat. Hist. lib. 3. cap. 9.

† Vol. 4. of Ant. Metaphysics, lib. 2. chap. 5. p. 155.

And here let me observe, that nothing can show more the noble free spirit of our author than those things which he has said of the state of Rome and of Italy under Augustus Caesar, especially when we compare it with what the poets and flatterers of that Emperor, such as Virgil and Horace, have said of the prosperity which the Romans enjoyed under him, who, if we believe them, restored the golden age in Italy, and was acknowledged to be the greatest man they ever had, or ever were to have,

*Nil oriturum alias, nil ortum tale, fatentes *.*

The character of this historian is so amiable, that I am unwilling to find any fault with his history. But, as my business is not with the man, but with his writings, I must be excused to observe some things in these, that I think faulty, both with respect to the matter and the stile.

As to the matter, I must do him the justice to say, that I do not believe that he

* Horat. lib. 2. epist. 1. v. 17.

willingly falsified, or omitted to relate any one fact thro' favour or enmity to any man or party of men. And, when he came down to later times, and related the civil war betwixt Cæsar and Pompey, (a part of his works that is now lost), tho', living under the reign of Augustus, he might be suspected of partiality to Cæsar and his party, yet, it is said, that his history had so much the appearance of a bias to the other side, that Augustus said he was a Pompeian. But, what chiefly I find fault with, with respect to his matter, is, that it is defective, and that he has given us not so much the history, as the abridgement of the history of the first ages of Rome, and particularly of the reigns of the kings. This observation must strike every one who compares Livy's history of that period with the Halicarnassian's history of the same period, particularly as to the reign of Romulus, which the Halicarnassian has made the subject of a whole book; whereas Livy has despatched it in a few pages, passing over some most important transactions of his reign very slightly, particularly his war with the *Veientes*, or inhabitants of *Veii*,

the greatest war in which he was engaged ; and which was not decided without three great pitched battles, the first of which was fought the whole day without a victory upon either side. This war the Halicarnassian has related at considerable length *. But Livy has dispatched it in one short chapter †, and speaks only of one battle, and which was nothing extraordinary according to his account of it. It is only stories, which he can adorn with descriptions or speeches, that he chuses to dwell upon in this part of his history ; and, to make them a better subject for rhetoric and description, he has added circumstances to some of them, which, I am persuaded, had no foundation in truth. Thus, for example, in the account he has given of the war of the Sabines against Romulus, he has made the women, in the very heat of the conflict, interpose betwixt the two armies, and, with tears and supplications, and a very fine speech, which he puts in-

* Lib. 2. cap. 54. et seq.

† Lib. 1. cap. 15.

to their mouths, addressed to their fathers and husbands, put an end to the battle, and make an immediate peace and union betwixt the two nations. The narrative is so rhetorical, and even poetical, that, if it were true, it is not like truth: ‘Tum
 ‘Sabinae mulieres, quarum ex injuria bel-
 ‘lum ortum erat, crinibus passis, scissaque
 ‘veste, victo malis muliebri pavore, ausae
 ‘se inter tela volantia inferre, ex trans-
 ‘verso impetu facto, dirimere infestas a-
 ‘cies, dirimere iras: hinc patres, hinc vi-
 ‘ros orantes, *Ne se sanguine nefando soceri*
 ‘*generique respergerent: ne parricidio ma-*
 ‘*cularent partus suos, nepotum illi, liberum*
 ‘*hi progeniem. Si affinitatis inter vos, si*
 ‘*connubii piget, in nos vertite iras: nos*
 ‘*causa belli, nos vulnere ac caedium viris*
 ‘*ac parentibus sumus. Melius peribimus,*
 ‘*quam sine alteris vestrum viduae aut or-*
 ‘*bae vivemus.*’ Then he relates how, in consequence of this interposition of the women, the peace betwixt the two nations was concluded*.

* Lib. I. cap. 13.

On the other hand, the Halicarnassian has told us a very plain and probable story, without any tragical peripeteia, such as that of Livy, relating how the thing took its rise from the council of one woman, whom he names, calling her *Cherficleia*, who, he says, was a Sabine of no obscure family. She, having proposed the thing to Romulus and the senate, and having met with their approbation, went in procession to the camp of the Sabines, with other Sabine women and their children; and, as both parties by that time were weary of the war, having suffered nearly equal losses, they persuaded the Sabines, as they had done the Romans, to make peace †. And, as he relates this story without mentioning any difference of opinion among his authors, I think there is not the least reason to doubt the truth of it.

There is another story during this period of the reign of the kings, which he has told at great length, but has omitted some material circumstances, which the

† Lib. 2. cap. 45.

Halicarnassian has related. The story I mean is the fight of the Horatii and Curiatii. In the beginning of this story Livy has not mentioned a thing, which I have no doubt happened, and which ought not to have been omitted, as it shows how well the family government and discipline established by Romulus, which I think was one of the best of his many excellent institutions, was then kept up. The Horatii, before they would undertake the combat, desired leave to consult their father. And it was not till they got his consent and approbation that they would fight with their cousins-german, who in the language of the country were called their *brothers*, and with whom they had always lived as brothers. And he has omitted another circumstance very moving, that, before they engaged, they embraced and shed many tears. And as to what happened after the combat, when Horatius killed his sister, he has told the story very much to the disadvantage of Horatius, and made it, I think, not probable; for he makes him kill his sister only for lamenting the man who was her cousin-german, and was to have been

her spouse : Whereas the Halicarnassian says that she not only lamented him, but reproached her brother with the most opprobrious language; and in general it may be observed, that the narrative of the Halicarnassian, by being so much more circumstantial than that of Livy, is not only more connected, and more entertaining, but is really more probable. Nor can I believe, that, tho' the *speeches* be no doubt all of his composition, as well as those of Livy, he has feigned *facts*, or related any material circumstance that he did not find in some one author or another.

But, tho' Livy may have added circumstances to his stories by way of embellishment, or omitted others that he ought to have mentioned, I do not believe that he has feigned any one story altogether, or even that he deserves the censure of Caligula of being negligent in his history * ; but, on the contrary, I see him in many passages stating the different relations of the same fact, and studious to discover which of them is most probable, as in

* Suetonii *Caligula*, cap. 34.

book 8 chap. 26. And in the end of that book he confesses very freely the uncertainty of history as to some points, and that there was no contemporary historian of those times, by whose authority these controverted points might be determined. In this respect, we may compare him with our Scotch historian, Hector Boece, who, like him, has adorned his history with many speeches, tho', as the reader will easily believe, not near so good, but, as to the facts, is little better than a mere fabulist, of which the intelligent reader will desire no other proof than this, that, tho' he tells us he took his history from three antient authors, viz. Campus Bellus, Verimundus, and Cornelius Hibernicus, whom no body but himself ever saw or heard of, yet these authors perfectly agree in their accounts of facts which are said to have happened in a remote and barbarous country, more than three hundred years before Christ. And he gives you a full and circumstantial history of the country from the earliest times, without intimating the least doubt of any fact

that he relates. And so much for the *matter* of Livy's history.

As to his *style*, I think it would be unjust to charge upon him in particular that general fault, which I have observed in the Latin composition*, rhetorical as well as historical, of concluding so frequently the periods or sentences, or members of sentences, with a verb, but which I do not observe is more frequent in Livy than in other Latin writers. And it would be still more unjust to charge him with the defects of the language in which he writes, such as the want of a present participle passive, or a past participle active, which makes the composition in Latin much more disjointed, incoherent, and often obscure, than in Greek. Neither should we charge to his account that greater defect still of the Latin, and indeed the greatest defect almost that any language can have, the want of an Article; the consequence of which is, that, when two words are joined together in a proposition, we cannot tell

* Vol. 4. p. 227. et seq.

which is the subject, and which the predicate. Of this I have elsewhere observed one example in Livy, in the case of the two names *hister* and *ludio* for a *stage-player**. There perhaps the ambiguity was unavoidable. But he has used expressions such as I do not find in any other Latin author, which, for want of the article, are not intelligible to any man who does not understand Greek. Now, I think it is a fault in an author to write so in any language that he cannot be understood without the knowledge of another. Of this I will give two or three instances out of many that might be given.

The first I shall give is from the end of the third book, where, speaking of the judgment that the people of Rome gave in their own favour, in a question concerning the property of some lands betwixt two neighbouring nations, he says, the judgment was in the main right, as the land was truly theirs, if it had been given by other judges. Then he adds, '*Nunc haud sane*

* Vol. 4. p. 92.

‘*quicquam bono causae levatur dedecus
 ‘judicii.*’ Where, if the Latins had an article to prefix to *bono*, and could have said, as the Greeks would have said, τῷ ἀγαθῷ or τῷ δίκαιῳ τῆς δίκης, there would have been no obscurity in the passage; whereas, I say, that, as it stands in Livy, there is a very great obscurity in it, so that it is not intelligible to the mere Latin scholar. And the obscurity is greater in this case, that a neuter adjective is made to govern a substantive in the genitive, which is common in Greek, but very unusual in Latin. Another instance of the same kind is, where, giving a character of Tarquinius Superbus, he says, ‘*Nec ut injustus
 ‘in pace rex, ita dux belli pravus fuit;
 ‘quin ea arte aequasset superiores reges,
 ‘nī degeneratum in aliis, huic quoque de-
 ‘cori offecisset **.’ Where the reader, in order to understand the passage, must know that the Greeks are in use, by joining the article to a participle in the neuter gender, as well as to an adjective, as in the

* Lib. i. cap. 53.

preceding case, to make a substantive of it. In these two examples, the article is wanting only to a single word: But I will give an example where it is wanting to a whole member of a sentence. It is in the speech of the Campanian ambassadors to the senate of Rome, where they say, ‘*Fuit quidem apud vos semper satis justa causa amicitiae, velle eum vobis amicum esse, qui vos appetores* *’. Where the article is wanting, not to a single word or thing, but to the whole last part of the sentence. And it must be understood to be prefixed to the infinitive *velle*, according to the elegant use of it in Greek, by which of the infinitive they make a noun, with the addition of expressing time, and governing a noun in the accusative, or whatever other case is the regimen of the verb. Now this, I say, is still more unintelligible than the former examples to the mere Latin scholar, who will understand *velle* to be nothing more than an infinitive; and will try in vain to construe it with some other word in the sentence. And here we may

* Lib. 7. cap. 30.

observe one great use of the article in Greek, besides that principal one already observed of distinguishing the *subject* in a proposition from the *predicate*. And this is the making a whole sentence, or member of a sentence, one thing or one word, as it may be called, which may be made the subject of a proposition; as in this case the *το velle eum vobis amicum esse, qui vos appeteret*, is affirmed to have been among the Romans a sufficient cause of friendship. This must give a wonderful perspicuity to the discourse, as it often happens not only in reasoning but in narrative, that several ideas are considered but as one, and make either the subject or predicate of a proposition. I will give another instance of the same kind from book 7. cap. 8. where the Roman dictator had delayed fighting on account of the entrails of the victim not being favourable: ‘*Diu non perlitatum tenuerat dictatorem, ne ante meridiem signum dare posset.*’ Where the Greek article *το* would have made the sense perfectly clear, but which without it is not intelligible to a man who is not a Greek scholar; and therefore such a form of ex-

pression ought to have been avoided by a Roman author *.

* Horace is an author who has used many Greek idioms, but in such a manner as to produce no obscurity. I will mention one that I think very elegant. It is in the story of Europa, where he makes Venus say to her,

Uxor invicti Jovis esse, nescis. (Od. 27. lib. 3. v. 73.)

Here he adopts that elegant Attic conciseness of sparing the repetition of the pronoun, where the person of the governing verb in the sentence is not changed. According to the common Latin idiom it should have been, *Nescis te esse uxorem invicti Jovis.*

But I say the other phrase is much more elegant, and equally clear and unambiguous. And there is nothing in the Latin language any more than in the Greek that hinders it from being used, tho' it be not at all of common use among the Latin writers. This common Greek idiom, however, Doctor Clarke does not appear to have known, otherwise he would have found as little difficulty as Eustathius has done in that passage of the first Iliad, where Achilles says to Agamemnon,

οὐδὲ σ' εἶμι

Ἐπὶ δ' ἄτιμος εἶμι, ἀφίτος καὶ πλουτοῖ ἀφύξει.

Iliad I. v. 170.

Here we may observe an example of both constructions: viz. of the Greek, when, the person of the

Neither would I impute to Livy the want of those connecting particles, such as *μεν, δε, μιν, δη, 'ουν, τοι* and *τοιγαρουν*, which, besides giving a flow to the Greek composition, such as is not to be found in Latin, connect the sense and give an emphasis to it, which it wants in Latin; and must have had still greater effect in speaking than in writing, and, I am persuaded, contributed not a little to give that *rotunditas oris*, which Horace com-

verb not being changed; the following noun or participle agrees with it in case, as *την ουν εις ισταδ' αττας ιεν*; and also of the common Latin construction, where the person of the verb is changed, as *ουν εις εις απιρος και πλουτος αφυζειν*. This passage therefore appears to me as clear as it did to Eustathius. The Doctor, however, it seems, thought it very difficult; and has given us a long note upon it, which is, no doubt, thought to be very learned and ingenious by those who admire the Doctor's Greek learning, and think that he has made great discoveries in that language, particularly with respect to the tenses, of which he has given us a system quite different from that of all other grammarians antient or modern; and has found out one tense in Greek, such as is to be found in no other language, by which a past action is denoted to be quickly performed. See vol. 2. of this work, p. 153. and 156.

mends in the Greek speech *. And indeed, tho', without the use of such particles, the words may be connected together, the sentences never can be connected so much as they ought to be. And of this defect, both in the Latin and the modern languages, every man who has read much Greek, and studied the beauties of composition in that language, must be sensible †.

The only way of remedying this defect, is by composing in periods, or sentences of some length, which will make the composition appear less broken and disjointed. But Livy, instead of applying this remedy, has aggravated the defect of his language, by cutting his stile into short, abrupt, unconnected sentences, and affecting a brevity, and with it a point and a turn, which very often produces a great obscurity. Both these faults of stile the Romans acquired in their schools of declamation, which

* *De Arte Poetica*, v. 323.

† See what I have said on this subject, vol. 4. p. 63. and following, also p. 95.

were so much in fashion among them in later times, that every man who was bred to speak or write frequented them, and there formed his taste of stile and composition. That Livy was taught in one of these schools, I think, is evident from the the whole colour of his stile, and from some particular passages that I have already quoted. And I will here quote some more to show that he learned there both the short cut of stile, which he affects so much, and also that obscurity which those declaimers studied: For they thought that their smart, pointed sentences, the *vibrantes sententiolæ*, as Petronius calls them, were the better for their meaning not being obvious, which they imagined was more striking, if it took time and thought to find it out. And Seneca mentions one of them, who recommended it to his scholars, to cloud or darken their conceits as much as they could, ($\sigma\chi\omicron\tau\iota\zeta\epsilon$ was the word he used): And he commended one of them very much for being so obscure, *ut ne vel ipse intelligam.*

I will first give some examples from this author of a stile so cut into short sentences, as not to deserve the name of composition. After the speech above mentioned, which he puts into the mouth of the Sabine women, he describes the effect of it in this manner: 'Movel res tum multitudinem; tum duces. Silentium et repentina fit quies; inde ad foedus faciendum duces prodeunt: nec pacem modo, sed et civitatem unam ex duabus faciunt: regnum confociant; imperium omne conferunt Rómam *.' The relation of so great an event, one of the greatest in the Roman story, ought not, I think, to have been cut and broken, and minced down in this manner; but should have been narrated, if not in a full well turned period, at least not in an unconnected disjointed stile, very different from the manner in which the Halicarnassian relates it †.

And not only in his narrative does he use this short, abrupt stile, but even in his

* Lib. 1. cap. 13.

† Lib. 2. cap. 46.

speeches, where it is still more improper ; for nobody speaking in that way in a public assembly could be heard with any patience, or attended to. However Livy has used it in his speeches ; and, (what is singular in his style, and distinguishes it even from that of Tacitus, or any other author I know), more in them than in his narrative. After the expulsion of the kings, he makes the violent republicans speak against one of the consuls, who had the misfortune to be called Tarquinius, in this manner : ‘ Nimium Tarquinius regno affuisse. Initium a Prisco factum.’ Then, a little after : ‘ Pulso Superbo, penes Col- latinum imperium esse. Nescire Tarquini- os privatos vivere : Non placere nomen ; periculosum esse libertati *.’ Then, in a speech which his colleague Brutus makes in an assembly of the people, he persuades him to go into voluntary exile, in the following pretty little sentences : ‘ Regium genus, regium nomen, non solum in civitate, sed etiam in imperio esse. Id of-

* Lib. 2. cap. 2.

‘ficere, id obſtare libertati. Hunc, tu,
‘tua voluntate, L. Tarquinì, remove me-
‘tum. Meminerimus, fatemur, ejeciſti re-
‘ges. Abſolve beneficium tuum. Aufer
‘hinc regium nomen *.’

* Lib. 2. cap. 2. In this ſpeech we have the ſtile of Portius Latro and the other declaimers of his age very exactly imitated; for they frequently addreſſed thoſe to whom they ſpoke in ſuch ſentences as, ‘*Abſolve beneficium tuum. Aufer hinc regium nomen.*’ And there is another ſpeech, which he puts into the mouth of the father of Horatius in defence of his ſon for the murder of his ſiſter, (lib. 1. cap. 26.) which, if poſſible, is ſtill more like to the ſtile of Portius Latro. In this ſpeech the father turns from the people, to whom he was ſpeaking, and addreſſes himſelf to the Liſtor: ‘*I liſtor, colliga manus, quae paulo ante armatae imperium populo Romano pepererunt. I, caput obnube liberatoris urbis hujus: arbore infelici ſuſpende: verbera, vel intra pomoerium, modo inter illa pila et ſpolia hoſtium; vel extra pomoerium, modo intra ſepulcra Curiatorum. Quo enim ducere hunc juvenem poteſtis, ubi non ſua decora eum a tanta foeditate ſupplicii vindicent?*’ And indeed, whoever reads the *Suaſoriae ac Controverſiae* of Seneca with any attention, muſt be convinced that the two ſtyles reſemble one another as much, I think, as any ſtyles can do. See what I have written upon the ſubject of the ſchools of declamation, cap. 13. of vol. 3. of this work, p. 56. et ſeq.

Many examples may be given from this author of speeches of like composition, such as the speech of Mucius Scaevola to Porfena the Etruscan King, *in lib. 2. cap. 12.* the speeches of the people against the Patricians upon occasion of the sudden death of a Tribune, who was suspected to be murdered by the Patricians, *ibid. cap. 55.* And there is a speech against the Decemviri, *lib. 3. cap. 52.* consisting almost intirely of short, pungent interrogations, after the manner of the school of declamation, no less than eight of them in a string. It may be observed, that these are only short speeches, introduced occasionally, and made part of the narrative, and which ought to be considered rather as reflections on what was passing than as speeches: But in his most formal harangues there is more or less of the same colour of stile, nor can I find any thing in them like the composition of Demosthenes, upon which, and the orations of the Halicarnassian in his history, who has imitated Demosthenes so well, I have formed my taste of a rhetorical stile. At the same time I must do Livy the justice to acknow-

ledge, that there is a great deal of matter and good argument in his speeches; for which reason I think they should be carefully studied by those who would form themselves to be speakers upon public business.

Livy seems to be so fond of this neat, trim stile, as some people think it, that, for the sake of it, he sometimes gives up the gravity and dignity of the historical stile, and falls into the stile of familiar smart conversation. As where he describes Collatinus, the husband of Lucretia, drinking with the sons of Tarquin, when the conversation turned upon their wives, each commending his own. To decide the preference, Collatinus proposed that they should get upon horseback, (for they were then in the camp before Ardea), and go to Rome to see what his wife Lucretia was then doing. Livy adds: ‘*Incaluerant vino. Age sane omnes. Citatis equis advolant Romam* *.’ This is certainly more

* Lib. i. cap. 57.

the stile of comedy than history: And many similar passages might be quoted from Terence.

That this short cut of stile came from the schools of declamation, is evident from the samples of the declamations preserved to us by Seneca, where there is nothing like composition in periods, but the whole consists of short unconnected sentences. It was these schools that gave rise to this stile of writing among the Romans, quite unknown to the Greeks, among whom there were no such schools; for, tho' they had schools of rhetoric, such as that of Isocrates, it does not appear that in those schools they declaimed upon fictitious subjects, but were only taught the precepts of the art; or, if they practised it, it was upon some real subjects, which might be agitated at the time. Sallust was the first author who wrote in this stile. After him came our author, who added to the short sentences of Sallust the smart turns, and what may be called quaint conceits, as well as the obscurity of the declaimers of his age, neither of which is to be found in

Sallust. Then came Tacitus, who lived at a time when the Romans began to give over the study of the Greek authors, and to form themselves upon models of their own. He imitated Sallust and Livy; but has made his stile much worse than that of either of them, and, in my opinion, completed the corruption of the taste of Roman writing; for he has added to the abrupt, disjointed stile of Sallust, and to the smart, short sentences of Livy, an affectation of saying every the most common thing in a way uncommon and surprising, and thereby has made a riddle, where is nothing at bottom, but plain and ordinary sense. And, from this oracular obscurity of expression, he has acquired among some people the reputation of oracular wisdom. And thus it appears, that Tacitus has verified Horace's observation, *decipit exemplar vitii imitabile*. And indeed there is nothing more natural than to make a bad pattern worse in the imitation, as it is much easier to imitate what is bad in any pattern than what is good.

This is the progress of the corruption of stile among the Romans: And the question

is, whether we moderns are to imitate such authors as the three I have mentioned, or the great authors of antiquity, such as Demosthenes, Herodotus, Thucydides, and the Halicarnassian, who never formed their taste of writing or speaking in a school of declamation; for it is of absolute necessity, that we should learn from some of the antients to speak or write, as well as to paint or make statues. Now, if we study and admire such Latin authors as the three writers I have mentioned, it is impossible we can have a good taste in writing, as impossible as, to use a simile of Petronius, that a man who lives in a kitchen, (he might have said in a house of office), should smell sweet. And our taste will be so much formed to their taste and manners, as not to be able to speak or write in any other, nor indeed, as I have observed elsewhere *, to understand very well what is written or spoken in a better stile. It was some years ago the fashion in Britain to imitate Tacitus, and the French writers, such as Montesquieu, that is, Tacitus at second hand. And it was imagined that the sense was more condensed, and

* Vol. 4. p. 239. 249.

more forcibly conveyed in that way, than when diffused into periods and long sentences: Whereas I hold the contrary to be the truth; and that, as an argument cannot be apprehended, unless the propositions of which it consists be all under the view of the mind at once, it is better that they should be all comprehended in one period, than that they should be minced down and frittered into short, unconnected sentences. This, I hope, will soon be the general opinion, and the taste of the nation reformed both by the study of the best antient authors, and by the example of our Minister, who speaks in periods with such universal applause, and who was trained, as I have heard, to speak in that way by his Father, much in the same manner as I have said the Duke of Wharton was by *his* Father *; for it is only by example and imitation that the taste or ear can be formed to that kind of composition.

From the same fountain Livy has derived the obscurity of his stile. And indeed

* Vol. 4. p. 244.

it is necessary, if I write or speak in short sentences, and affect to give a point and a smart turn to the thought, that I should study to be very brief; the consequence of which is, that I must be often obscure. It is therefore not without reason that Petronius has accused the declaimers of having ruined eloquence, and every kind of writing. I will only give one or two instances of the obscurity of Livy out of very many that might be given; for, to say the truth, I think that there is an obscurity, greater or less, that runs through his whole history. The first I shall mention is, where he makes Mettus the general of the Albans, in a conference which he desired with Tullus the Roman king, before the armies should engage, speak to him in this manner: ‘Injurias, et non redditas res
‘ex foedere, quae repetitae sint, et ego regem nostrum Cluilius, causam hujusce
‘esse belli, audisse videor: nec te dubito,
‘Tulle, eadem prae te ferre*.’ Where neither the construction nor the sense can be made out without supplying an ellipsis,

* Lib. i. cap. 23.

altogether uncommon and without example, as far as I know. The words wanted to make the sentence intelligible, are *prae se ferre*, after the words, *regem nostrum Cluilius*; and with this addition the meaning is, That 'I think I have heard that
' our King Cluilius pretends that the cause
' of the war is injuries for which indemnification is refused. And I doubt not,
' Tullus, but that you pretend the same.' Where, if the concluding clause *prae te ferre* could have applied to the preceding part of the sentence, the ellipsis might have been endured; but, as it cannot, but must be changed into *prae se ferre*, it is a perfect riddle, which I believe I should never have been able to have solved without the assistance of an ingenious friend of mine, Mr John Hunter Professor of Humanity in the university of St Andrews, whom I had occasion to mention before in the course of this work, and I think it is a much more natural interpretation of the passage, than to supply, as Crevier does, the words, *quum dixit*; which is an ellipsis without example.

To the same friend I owe the expounding of another riddle of Livy, where speaking of the creation of the first dictator, he says, 'In hac tantarum expectatione rerum sollicita civitate, dictatoris primum creandi mentio orta. Sed nec *quo anno*, nec *quibus consulibus*, quia ex factione Tarquinia essent, (id quoque enim traditur), parum creditum sit, nec quis primum dictator creatus sit, satis constat *.'

Where, by using the common expression of *quo anno et quibus consulibus*, one should have thought that he only meant to state the doubt, *in what year, and under what consuls, the first dictator was created*. But then what is to be made of the rest of the sentence? This is a difficulty which upon due consideration makes us apply the expression *parum creditum sit* to the *quibus consulibus*. And then the sense is abundantly clear. But it certainly might have been expressed so as to leave no room for any difficulty, by removing the ambiguity in the expression *quibus consulibus* joined to

* Lib. 2. cap. 18.

quo anno. Of this passage Crevier takes no notice, except to observe, that there is a difference among authors as to the year in which the first dictator was created; from this I conclude, that either he did not see the difficulty of the passage, or could not solve it.

There is another passage, of which, with no assistance I have got, I am able to make sense. It is where speaking of the two daughters of Servius Tullius married to the two sons of Tarquin the last king, the one a Virago, of a fierce turbulent spirit, but married to a man of a mild and gentle disposition; the other of a peaceable gentle temper, but married to a man of a most fierce and violent spirit. Of the first mentioned lady, he says, ‘*Spernere sororem, quod, nacta virum, muliebri cessaret audacia* *.’ The master of the declaiming school above mentioned, if he had given out this story by way of text to Livy,

* Lib. i. cap. 46. Crevier corrects the text, and reads *muliebri audacia*, leaving out the word *cessaret*; but makes no sense of it unless we could suppose, that *audacia* was the characteristic of the female sex.

might have praised him as he did one of his scholars, by saying *ne vel ipse intelligo*.

There is another passage so remarkably obscure that the meaning of it can only be divined, not made out from the words. It is where he describes the stratagem which Hannibal used to pass the Rhone in opposition to an army of Gauls, who were upon the other side. It is to be found in his 21. book, cap. 27. It is too long to be here inserted. And I shall only add, that the obscurity of it may arise not so much from the intricacy and perplexity of the stile, as from his intire ignorance of military affairs, which he could not learn in the school of declamation, and which, it does not appear, he had ever any other opportunity of learning: It is therefore not to be wondered at, that we should think his accounts of battles so obscure, when we read those given us by Polybius and Julius Caesar, with whom compared, we may say, (to use a phrase of Shakespear), that Livy *knew no more of the division of a battle than a spinster*.

This censure may appear to many presumptuous, and much too severe upon an author of such reputation as Livy. I will therefore quote some passages from him in support of it: And I will begin with his description of the Roman legion and the division of their battle*, which he has prefixed to his account of the great and decisive battle with the Latins, and which is plainly intended for the instruction of those who were not military men, or at least were ignorant of the Roman manner of fighting. But let any man compare it with the account given us by Polybius of the Roman discipline and division of the legion, and he will soon be convinced that it does not at all answer that purpose. For it is much too short, and in many places obscure, particularly in his account of the *Triarii*, which I think is not intelligible, notwithstanding all the pains that Lipsius, in his work *De Militia Romana*, has taken to botch and mend it. And there is one order of men in the Roman army, whom

* Lib. 8. cap. 8.

he calls *accensi*, but of whom he tells us nothing, except that they were the weakest part of the army, and therefore thrown into the last line. But he should have told us a great deal more concerning them, as it was by bringing them up into the first line, that Manlius gained the battle he afterwards describes; for by this movement he made the Latins believe that it was his Triarii, whom he had brought up, which made them advance their Triarii, while Manlius kept his in reserve, and by that means won the battle*. On the other hand, the description given us by Polybius of the legion is full, accurate, and clear †;

* Lib. 8. cap. 10.

† It is contained in one of the excerpts from the sixth book of his history, p. 466. of Casaubon's edition. But the excerpt is not full; for we have in it only an account of the number of the legion, the divisions and subdivisions of it, the officers superior and inferior, and their manner of marching and encamping. But he says that he was to inform us also of their *ωαγαραξις*, or, *order of battle*, (ibid. p. 472. lit. E.) This however is wanting; but it is pretty well supplied, by what Livy has said upon the subject in his description of the

in short, it is such, that without it, and what he has told us in other places of the Roman manner of fighting, I, for my part, should have known very little of that art of war, in which they excelled all the world.

The next passage I shall quote, is from his description of the great battle of Zama, which decided the fate of Rome and Carthage, and put an end to the second Punic war. The account of this battle he has copied from Polybius, as indeed of all the battles in this Punic war. But in his description of this battle he has either misunderstood Polybius, or expressed his meaning very ill in one most material particular, upon which the fate of the battle appears to me to have depended. Polybius tells us, that Scipio ranged the *hastati* and *principes* in two lines, but not according to the ordinary manner of the Romans. For he did not place the *manipuli* of the second

legion, and which is by much the best part of that description. And Polybius himself, in his account above mentioned of the battle of Zama, has explained very well the ordinary form of their battle, by telling us the changes which Scipio made in it upon that occasion.

line opposite to the intervals of the first, but directly behind the manipuli of the first line, so as to give a clear passage to the elephants. This is most clearly expressed by Polybius; but observe how it is rendered by Livy. ‘Non confertas autem
‘ cohortes ante sua quamque signa instru-
‘ ebat, sed manipulos aliquantum inter se
‘ distantes, ut esset spatium quo elephantēs
‘ hostium accepti, nihil ordines turbarent*.’ Here there appears to be no error in the text; but what the sense of it is I am altogether at a loss to find out. And I think I may venture to affirm, that the military men even of his own time would hardly have guessed what he meant. One error in the passage is obvious, that he speaks of cohorts as a division of the legion then in use among the Romans; whereas it is certain, from Polybius’s account of the legion, and even from his own, which I have quoted, that no such division was then known. All we know of that matter is, that the legion was so divided in the time of Julius Caesar, but how long before we know not.

* Lib. 30. cap. 33.

What makes me imagine that Livy has mistaken altogether the meaning of Polybius, rather than expressed it ill, is, that in his description of another famous battle, which he has also copied from Polybius, he has plainly mistranslated him; and the error is so capital, that it makes nonsense of the whole account of the battle. The battle I mean is the famous one of *Cynoscephalai*, betwixt Flaminius the Roman consul and Philip King of Macedon, in the first Macedonian war. The error is where Livy tells us, that, when the right wing of the Macedonian army, where Philip commanded in person, got up to the top of the hill, Philip gave this order to his men: ‘Caetratos et Macedonium phalangen, hastis positis, quarum longitudo impedimento erat, gladiis rem gerere jubet*.’ Now, from Polybius’s description of the phalanx subjoined to his account of this battle†, which description Livy certainly ought to have studied and understood be-

* Lib. 33. cap. 8.

† Lib. 17. cap. 762. edit. Casauboni.

fore he gave an account of this Roman battle with that phalanx, it evidently appears that these spears, which Livy makes the Macedonians throw away as useless on account of their length, were no other than the *farissae*, the chief weapon of the phalanx, and which made it irresistible, where the ground was level and even, and it was opposed only in front. This weapon was 14 cubits long; and every man of the 16 in depth, of which the phalanx consisted, had one of them, which was laid over the shoulders of the men before him: And the weapon was so ponderous that it was wielded with both hands. A single spear of this kind must have had a great force against any man armed with lighter and shorter weapons; but, by the closeness of the men in the phalanx, and the looser order of the Romans, one of whom was by that means opposed to two Macedonians, the number of *farissae* that each Roman had to encounter, was, according to Polybius' calculation, no less than 10. So that he had this wood of spears to cut down or get thro' before he could reach the body of a Macedonian with his sword, which, as it is well known,

was the chief weapon of the Roman soldier. What the rest of the armour of the Macedonian phalanx was, Polybius has not told us; but Plutarch has supplied that defect in his life of Paulus Æmilius, where, describing his battle with Perseus, he tells us, that as soon as the Romans came to close with the Macedonians, by the means which he mentions, there was no match: For the Macedonians had nothing that could avail them in a close encounter except little swords, which he calls *εγχειρidia*, and light targets, which he expresses by the diminutive *πελταρια*; whereas the Romans had strong heavy swords, against which the Macedonian light target was no defence; and, in place of that target, they had great shields that covered their whole body. But the Macedonians, he says, while the order of the phalanx was preserved, and they at liberty to use their *sarissæ*, made such an impression with them, that neither the heavy shields of the Romans nor their coats of mail could resist them, but they pierced thro' all into their bodies: And the Macedonians, he says, threw them over their heads

upon the points of their *sarissae*. This description of the battle with Perseus by Plutarch is the more to be trusted, that it is evident he took it from Polybius, whom he quotes in one part of it. And it is the more valuable, that the book of Polybius, in which it was contained, is now entirely lost: And it makes amends to us for the very short account Plutarch has given us, in the life of Flaminius, of the battle of *Cynoscephalai*.

From this account of the armour of the Macedonians, and the strength of their phalanx, it is evident that the order, which Livy makes Philip give to his men, was no other than that they should disarm themselves. Let us now consider the words of Polybius to which Livy has given so extraordinary a meaning. He tells us that Philip gave order to the right wing of his phalanx, where he commanded himself, to double their files. Then he adds: γενομένου δε τουτου, και των πολεμιων εν χειρσιν οντων, τοις φαλαγγιτοις εδοθη παραγγελμα καταβαλουσι τας σαρισσας, επαγειν: Where you will observe that Livy has translated καταβαλουσι τας σαρισσας *profitis hastis*, that is,

laying aside, or throwing away their spears, as if Polybius had said, ρίψαι τὰς σαρίσσας, (the expression which he uses when he describes the rout of the phalanx in this battle): And he adds, what Polybius certainly never thought of, that the *sarissæ* were useless on account of their length; and another thing also, that was very far from the mind of Polybius, viz. that Philip ordered them *gladiis rem geiere*, that is, to fight with daggers and light targets against the heavy strong swords of the Romans and their great shields.

But it may be asked, what then was the meaning of the order given by Philip, Καταβαλλειν τὰς σαρίσσας. This Plutarch will explain to us in the account above mentioned, of the battle with Perseus, taken, as I have said, from the same author. It is where, speaking of Æmilius the Roman general, he says, Επὶ δὲ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ Μακεδόνι τὰς τὴ πύλῃς ἐκ ὧν περικυκλῶντο, καὶ ταῖς σαρίσσαις ἀφ' ὧν συνίστατο κλισίαις ὑποσταντὶ τοὺς θυρίαφοροὺς ἰδί, τῇ τὴ ρωμαίων τοῦ συνεπισημοῦ καὶ τῇ τρεχύντῃ τῆς προβόλης, ἐκπληξίς αὐτοῦ ἔρχεται καὶ δῖος, ὡς οὐδὲ ἰδόντα

παρὰ τὸ εἶκμα φοβεραιτέρον*. Here you will observe that he has explained most clearly what Polybius means by the word καταβαλλειν, by using another word in place of it, viz. κλινειν; and the fact undoubtedly was, and I think must have been, that, when the phalanx was on its march, each soldier carried his pike upright, and not upon the shoulders of those before him; but when the signal was given them to engage, then they inclined them downwards, so as to be upon a level with the enemy: And then four *sarissæ* were over the shoulder of each man in the first rank, besides his own, according to the account that Polybius has given of their order of battle. That they should have marched in this manner, is absolutely incredible; but, as we have seen, it was the way in which they fought; and, when they gave over fighting and surrendered themselves prisoners, they held straight up their *sarissæ*, as Polybius tells us in his account of this battle, (p. 761.) and which Livy has

* P. 265. of the Paris edition in folio.

translated, and rightly translated, from him, (lib. 33. cap. 10). And Polybius has also observed the distinction that I have made, betwixt their manner of marching and their battle order; for he has told us that the left wing of the phalanx was immediately put into disorder by the Romans *διὰ το τοῖς ἀγωνίζουσι ἱπομνῶσι, πορείας ἔχουσιν διαθίσιν, καὶ μὴ παραταξίῃ;* *.

There is none of the editors of Livy, that has taken notice of this error of Livy in translating Polybius, except the last edi-

* In Polybius's description of the great battle betwixt Ptolemy and Antiochus at *Raphia* in *Coclo-Syria*, he uses the very expression that he uses in the description of this battle betwixt Philip and Flaminius, *καταβαλλοῦσι παραχρησάσας τὰς σαρίσσας οἱ περὶ τοῦ Ἀνδρομάχου καὶ Σωσιβίου ἡγόν.* Lib. 5. p. 426. Where one should think it was impossible to mistake the meaning, as the troops there are described as advancing to the combat with the greatest alacrity. Yet a translator before Casaubon, one *Perottus*, has mistaken it, and has translated it as Livy has done, making the men throw away their *σαρίσσαι*; but then he has added what makes his interpretation much more natural than Livy's, though it be the direct opposite of the text, that they run away. See what Casaubon has said in his observations upon the former translators of Polybius, contained in his preface to his edition.

tor Crevier; and even he talks somewhat doubtfully of it: And the only proof he gives of it, is Polybius's description of the phalanx; whereas, I think I have made it evident, both from other passages of Polybius and from Plutarch.

If all Polybius were extant, I believe many more inaccuracies would be found in Livy's translations from him, as I think we may reasonably conjecture from the passages I have mentioned, and particularly the last, where the error is so gross, as to convince me that we cannot absolutely depend upon what the Roman authors have translated from the Greek, much less upon what they have collected from them. And I am more and more confirmed in an opinion, which I had formed long ago, that even the history of the Romans themselves is best learned from the Greek writers, as well as their customs and manners. So that, in order to be perfectly acquainted with the *princeps terrarum populus*, (a most valuable part I think of the history of mankind, as they certainly were the greatest people that ever ex-

isted in arms and government, and in the variety of their history exhibit to us every scene of human nature, the best and the worst, the greatest virtues and the greatest vices, the greatest happiness and the greatest misery), it is absolutely necessary to be a Greek scholar.

As to the obscurity of Livy's style, of which I complain so much, it must be evident to any man who is a judge of writing, and will take the trouble to compare his style with that of the Halicarnassian, who writes upon the same subject, and of whom I propose to speak in this book, or with that of his countryman Julius Caesar, of whom I shall speak in the next chapter.

But although I cannot praise the *rhetorical style* of Livy any more than that of his narrative, I should not do him justice if I did not acknowledge that the *matter* of his speeches is admirable; nor do I know any better common place book for arguments on every political subject: And therefore I think his speeches should be diligently studied by all our parliamentary speakers, not for the

stile, which I would not have them imitate, but for the matter: For, as to the stile, I cannot help saying, though I know that many will think the opinion singular, that, when I compare it with the stile of Herodotus, or Dionysius the Halicarnassian in Greek, or of Julius Caesar in Latin, it appears to me the work of a Sophister, who bestows more labour upon words than upon things. This may be excused in a school of declamation upon fictitious subjects; but where the subject is, such as Livy's, the history of a great people, if the composition appear to be overlaboured, it very much offends a judicious reader: And with very good reason, because ornaments of that kind, if *they stick out*, and as Petronius very well expresses it, *extra corpus orationis eminent*, must divert his attention from the matter. The worst fault in stile, as I have elsewhere observed, is to labour to write ill. And I am afraid that is the case of Livy in many passages, where his short, smart, pointed sentences, the *vibrantes sententiolae* of Petronius, must have cost him a great deal of pains.

As from what I have written at such length upon this author, it appears that I have been pretty much conversant with him, I will subjoin by way of note some observations that have occurred to me upon his text as it stands in the printed editions *.

* Livy, lib. 9. cap. 15. *Gens dubiae ad id voluntatis?* Is not that a Grecism? *ad id* for *εἰς τοῦτο*—that is, *to this time*. Upon this passage Crevier has not thought it worth his while to bestow any note.

In the end of the preceding paragraph the reading in Crevier is thus: *Quin duces sicut belli, ita infatigabilis supplicii futuros fuisse*. I say the reading should be *infatigabiles*. No note of Crevier here neither.

In the 11th chapter of the same book, about the middle of it, it is printed, *Pacem sibi habeat* (scilicet *populus Romanus*), *legiones captas victori restituat*. Gronovius would correct this, and read *pacem ne habeat*; but I say the sense is much better as it is. And the meaning is: 'Let the Romans do with the peace what they will, ratify it or not as they please; but let them restore to us the legions, which we once conquered and had in our power.' It appears from a note of Crevier upon this passage, that neither he nor Gronovius understood it. He has no note at all upon the expression in the sentence that follows, *dignum erat*, which, I doubt,

he did not understand to be the same with *dignum esset*, the common Latin expression: Whereas *dignum erat* is a Greek idiom; for the Greeks would say *αξιον εστιν*, with the verb in the imperfect of the indicative. But that imperfect is also used in Latin, as where Virgil says, speaking of a tree in Media,

*Ipsa ingens arbor, faciemque simillima lauro ;
Et, si non aliam late jactaret odorem,
Laurus erat.*——*Geor.* 2. v. 131.

It is very true that this expression is obscure in the Latin for want of the potential particle *'εστιν*; but that was a defect in their language, which the Romans could not help. But I think that was a reason why they should have used, in such expressions, the common idiom of their own language rather than the Greek idiom.

Lib. 10. cap. 26. Fabius Maximus, in his speech to the people concerning a coadjutor to him in the war against the Etrurians, says, '*Caeterum si sibi adjutor rem belli sociumque imperii darent, quonam modo se obli-
'visci P. Decii consulis, per tot collegia experti, posse ?*' Where we may observe, first a very fine imitation of what Diomede in Homer says, when it was proposed to him to chuse an associate in his night expedition ;

Πως κεν επιστ Οδυσσεος ενωπιον λαβοιμεν.

In the second place, the meaning of the word *collegia* there is certainly extraordinary, and might have been taken notice of by Crevier. It denotes not what we

call *colleges*, but what we would call *colleagueships*, that is, offices in which before they had been colleagues, of which there were some, as appears from the preceding part of the history. Upon this passage Crevier says not a word. There is a passage in the end of the same chapter, where Crevier rejects an emendation of Gronovius, but does not make one himself, which I think is as easily made as it is necessary. It is where Livy says, that both the consuls went to this Etrurian war, *cum quatuor legionibus et magno equitatu Romano, Campanisque mille equitibus, delectis ad id bellum, missis, et sociorum nominisque Latini majore exercitu quam Romani*. Where I think we should read, in place of *Romani*, *Romanorum*; or otherwise there must be an ellipsis supposed, and we must understand *confecerant* or *emiserant*; but I would rather chuse the correction, because I think the ellipsis too violent.

C H A P. II.

Of Julius Caesar's Commentaries.—The subject of them of great importance.—The character of the Man.—His military actions, the greatest that ever were.—The stile of his Commentaries, the best historical stile among the Romans;—wonderful considering how hastily it must have been written amidst such great occupation.

I SHOULD think what I have said in the preceding chapter, upon the subject of the Latin historians, very imperfect, if I did not add something concerning Julius Caesar, the best of them all in my opinion in point of stile; and, for the subject of his history, tho' it take in but a small extent of time, and be not the history of a nation or kingdom, it contains events of such importance, and is treated by the au-

thor in such a manner, that he may be reckoned among the first historians of antiquity; for his Commentaries contain an account of the greatest military operations that are to be found in the history of mankind. He was at the head of the noblest army, in my opinion, that has been since the heroic ages, and more attached to him than I believe ever any army was to a general: And I think with good reason; for he was possessed of all the qualities that could gain the hearts of men. He was brave, magnanimous, most liberal in rewarding merit, and at the same time of a most merciful and forgiving disposition. Although there never was a general that showed more conduct, by which he sometimes conquered without fighting, as in his war against Afranius and Petreius, Pompey's generals in Spain, yet he ascribes the most of his victories to the valour of his soldiers; and generally concludes the description of his battles by telling us that the enemies *diutius virtuti nostrorum militum resistere non potuerunt*. And in one of his greatest battles, that with Ariovistus, he gives a great share of the glory of the victory to the

presence of mind and good conduct of one of his officers, young Crassus, who gave the signal to the body of reserve to advance and support one of his wings, which was overpowered by the multitude of the enemy, and was beginning to give ground. In short, he was so beloved by his officers and soldiers, that, when they happened to fall into the hands of his enemies, some of them rather than serve against him chose to be put to death *.

The martial exploits of Julius may be praised in the same way that Nestor praises the heroes that lived before him: 'They were the bravest of men,' says Nestor, 'and fought with the bravest of men †'. For Julius had not to deal with enemies such as some generals of late had to deal with, whom to conquer would have been no glory, tho' to be conquered by them

* De Bello Africano, cap. 44. et seq.

† Καρτεστοι δὲ κενὸι ἐπιχθονίῃ τρεφεῖν αἰδεῖται

Καρτεστοῖσι μὲν ἔα, καὶ καρτεστοῖσι ἐμάχηται.

Iliad i. v. 266.

was the greatest disgrace; but he had for adversaries a great nation, who at that time excelled all the nations of the world in the glory of arms, as the Romans themselves confessed*, and of whom, for that reason they were more afraid than of any other nation; I mean the Gauls;—also the Helvetii, who, for the love of glory and of conquest, did, what I believe no other nation did since the beginning of the world, left their whole country, with their wives and children, destroying their towns to the number of *twelve*, villages to the number of *four hundred*, and all other houses besides, in short, every thing they could not carry with them, even the corn that they did not take with them, in order to conquer Gaul, and make a settlement in some of its fertile provinces †. These I think he could not have conquered, his army not being either so numerous, or so well formed and disciplined when he fought with them as it was afterwards, if it had not been for very

* Cicero, who was a cotemporary of Julius Caesar, makes this confession. See p. 9. of this volume.

† Caesar. *De Bello Gallico*, lib. 1. cap. 5.

good conduct on his part, by which he destroyed one fourth of the Helvetii before he came to an engagement with them *, and great rashness and foolish confidence on their part, which made them attack him with all the advantages of ground. Then he fought also with a people still more fierce and warlike than the Gauls, or even the Helvetii, I mean the Germans; and, having overcome them in a great battle, drove them out of Gaul, and followed them even to their own country, being the first of the Romans that crossed the Rhine. And, last of all, he fought with his own countrymen the Romans, then the greatest people in the world, with one of the greatest generals at their head they ever produced, I mean Pompey, who was supported by all the authority of their state, and all the forms of their government; and who, besides a very great army, which he commanded himself in Thessaly, very much more numerous than the army of Julius, had a veteran army commanded by his Lieutenants, with which he occupied the province of Spain; and over and above all

* Cæsar. lib. 1. *De Bello Gallico*, cap. 12.

this, had the absolute command of the sea, which he covered with his ships.

I know it will be said in answer to all this praise which I have bestowed on Julius, that he overturned the constitution, and destroyed the liberties of his country. This indeed I should think a great charge, if it could be proved to my satisfaction, that the Romans were at that time capable of liberty, and fit to govern themselves, or that it was not the greatest good fortune which could befall them to have such a master as Julius. For my part, I believe it was true what he said, that the commonwealth at that time was nothing but a name without a substance*. But if it had

* Suetonius, in *Vita Caesaris*, cap. 78. His words are, *Nihil esse rempublicam, appellationem modo, sine corpore et specie*. Nor was this the opinion of Julius only, but also of Cicero, who was of the contrary party; for in his epistles to Atticus, where he speaks his sentiments of the state of the republic more freely than any where else, he thus expresses himself: *Amisimus, mi Pomponi, omnem non modo succum ac sanguinem, sed etiam colorem et speciem pristinam civitatis. Nulla est respublica, in qua delictet, in qua acquiescam.*——Lib. 4. Ep. 17.

been otherwise, I think he was not only provoked to do what he did, but it was in self defence ; for he must have been ruined and undone by the violence and injustice of his enemies, if he had not sought protection from his army. This was what he himself said in the field of battle of Pharsalia, when he saw so many of the Romans lying dead. ‘ *Hoc voluerunt : tantis rebus gestis, C. Caesar condemnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petiissem* *.’

Such was the man whose actions are related in these commentaries. The subject of them must be acknowledged to be great and noble : And, as to the manner of treating it, there is no author exceeds him. His descriptions of battles and other military operations are such, that he is equalled by none unless perhaps by Polybius. And even him he exceeds in explaining the councils by which they were conducted : Nor need we wonder at that, as they were his own councils ; tho’, to explain even them as he has done, is no common

* Suetonius, in *Vita Caesaris*, cap. 30.

merit in an historian, as Hirtius has well observed in his preface to the eighth book of the Gallic war.

Long speeches in memoirs would have been improper ; but he has short ones, as many as are proper, and these exceedingly well composed, all of them full of sense and matter, without the affectation of any ornament of words. And what he has given us, by way of digression, upon the subject of the manners of the Gauls and Germans, is very much to the purpose, and is extremely instructive, being the account, the most to be depended upon, of the manners of those two great nations at that time.

As to the stile of these commentaries, I think I need say nothing of it after the eulogium that Cicero has bestowed on it *.

* Cicero *de Claris Oratoribus*, cap. 75 : Where, speaking of Caesar's Commentaries, he says, That they are, '*nudi, recti, et venusti, omni ornatu orationis, tanquam veste, detracto.*' Here is a character of stile, which I think is the just reverse of the stile of Livy and Tacitus. Cicero seems to compare it to a fine naked Greek

which is to be the more regarded, for two reasons: *First*, That Cicero did not like the man, being of the opposite party in the state; and, *2dly*, Because the stile

statue, which, all Connoisseurs agree, could not be improved by any dress, but on the contrary disfigured. He adds: ‘*Nihil enim est in historia, pura et illustri brevitate dulcius.*’ Now the brevity of Livy and Tacitus is neither pure nor perspicuous. See what I have further said of Julius Caesar’s stile, in vol. 3. cap. 20. p. 383.

There are some, I know, pretending to be critics, who are offended with the repetition of words in these Commentaries, particularly with the repetition of the *noun* with the *relative*, which is very frequent in Caesar: But it gives, I think, a great perspicuity to the stile; and I have observed, for want of it, ambiguities both in Latin and English. Such critics find fault also with the same word occurring at the distance perhaps of two or three lines: But, for my part, I approve more of that than of a studied and affected change of the word, which, I know, some writers labour very much, tho’ I think it is what Terence calls *obscura diligentia*. I have heard of a Frenchman, who acknowledged that the *matter* of Caesar’s Commentaries was very fine; ‘But,’ says he, if I had been to write them, the *stile* ‘would have been very different.’ And I am persuaded it would have been so; and it is likely would have been more approved by our reviewers and such critics as I have been mentioning.

of them is very different from Cicero's own stile, which was disliked, as is well known, by several of his own contemporaries, as not altogether chaste and Attick, but having a good deal of Asiatic tumor. I shall therefore only say one thing more in commendation of Caesar's stile, that, if it be the greatest praise, as I think it is, of a stile, to draw your attention to Things more than to Words, there is no stile in that respect preferable to the stile of these Commentaries. When you sit down to read them, you attend so little to the words, and are so drawn on by the matter, that you dont know where to stop: Which I myself experienced upon this occasion; for, having begun to read them, that I might give a better account of the stile of them, I was so carried on by the matter that I could not stop till I had read them almost all over, tho' I had done so several times before, being the first book of Latin that was put into my hands, and a book that I always admired.

What Hirtius says of him, in his very elegant preface to the eighth book of the

Gallic war, is I think remarkable. 'Others,' says he, 'know how well they are written, but I know how quickly.' And indeed, when I consider what a wonderful deal of business he carried on, civil as well as military, I am persuaded that his Commentaries were little more than an extempory performance. Nor will this appear incredible to those who consider the wonderful acuteness and comprehension of his mind. He dictated, as Pliny informs us *, to four at a time, and, when he was doing nothing else, to seven. And even when he was riding he could dictate to two or more, as Plutarch, in his life, informs us †. A man therefore who was so much a man of business, and capable of doing so many things at the same time, might write Commentaries of his own actions as well as he has written, and as hastily, in the midst of the greatest occupations.

* Lib. 7. cap. 15.

† *In Vita Caesaris.*

C H A P. III.

Of the Roman histories of the Halicarnassian and Polybius,—if they had not been preserved to us, the Roman empire would have appeared to have been the work of chance, not of wisdom and virtue.—And first of Dionysius.—He as well prepared for writing his history as any man could be;—learned the Latin language for that purpose;—his account of that language.—The first book of the Halicarnassian, the best piece of archeology extant.—The author's diligence in collecting from so many different authors Greek and Latin.—Of the Aborigines,—the Latins,—and Romans;—all the same people under different names, and originally from Arcadia.—The Pelasgi also,—and the colony that came with Evander, likewise from that country.—Of those that came with Hercules;—an account of that hero.—The sixth and last migration into Latium from

Greece, was that of the Trojans under the conduct of Æneas.—The Trojans also originally from Arcadia.—Of the genealogy of Æneas.—His voyage from Troy to Latium very well traced by our author;—proved by the universal belief of the people of Rome, and 50 Trojan families still existing when our author wrote.—The Romans, mixed as they were of different colonies, all originally Greeks.—So noble a descent given to them by Dionysius, makes his history credible.—Livy's account of the Romans, compared with that of the Halicarnassian:—For any thing Livy has said, they might have been all originally barbarians, fugitives, and slaves.—Some of them, according to his account, were really slaves.—The noblest descent not sufficient, without good education, laws, and institutions.—The Romans bred as well as born to be masters of the world.—Of the institutions of Romulus.—1st, The Patronage and Clientship he introduced.—The happy consequences of this institution.—Next, The form of government instituted by Romulus; not so democratical as it became in after times,

but well mixed and poised;—the most antient and best of all governments.—The best of all Romulus's institutions was the family-government, which he established.—This the chief cause of the Roman grandeur.—The happy consequences of it:—Vainly attempted by other nations, even by the Spartans.—Livy mentions but one of Romulus's seven institutions, and that very shortly.—Of the religious institutions of Romulus.—The state of religion in Latium in his time;—a good system of Theism, without the mixture of those impious fables, which disgraced the Greek religion in the days of our author.—This pure religion not introduced by Romulus, but imported by the Greek colonies that had settled in Latium before his time.—Romulus instituted religious festivals, and sacrifices, and many priesthoods.—Livy not more full upon the religious institutions of Romulus than upon the civil;—wonderful that he should have said so little of so great a King and the founder of Rome;—one of the greatest men that ever existed;—an altar erected to him by an Italian in later times.—Livy fuller

*upon the religious institutions of Numa ;
—but not so full and distinct as the Halicarnassian ;—omits one of the civil institutions of Numa of great importance.—
Dionysius, a most religious historian, but not superstitious, because he believes in demons and extraordinary interpositions of divinity.—The people of Rome, the most religious people in the world ;—more religious than the Greeks or Egyptians ;—lived with their Gods, and consulted them upon all occasions public and private.—The wonderful effect that this must have had upon their lives and manners.—In their degenerate state they neglected religion.—This a certain proof of degeneracy in all nations.—Apology of the author for insisting so much upon the subject of the Halicarnassian's history in a work which professes only to treat of stile.—Of the Stile of the Halicarnassian's history ;—the greatest beauty both in the narrative and rhetorical part of it ;—not so figured as the stile of Thucydides, nor so plain as that of Xenophon.—His speeches all speeches of business,—neither Sophistical nor declamatory.—Photius's judgment*

of the Halicarnassian's stile, ill founded;—no obscurity or perplexity in his stile, except where the MS. is faulty.—Of the Halicarnassian's critical works;—a new edition both of these and of his history, recommended to the Scholars of Oxford.—Faults in the present edition that may be corrected;—one of them mentioned.

I COME now to speak of two Greek historians of Roman affairs, (and I shall mention no more, neither Greek nor Latin), Dionysius the Halicarnassian and Polybius. Without these two, tho' every other Greek or Roman writer upon the subject of Rome had come down to us entire, I should have been disposed to think, as many of the Greeks did at the time the Halicarnassian wrote *, that this great empire of Rome was either the work of mere chance, or rather, as I believe that nothing in the universe is produced in that way, of a supernatural and miraculous interposition of the divine provi-

* Dionys. lib. 1. cap. 4. et 5.

dence. But, from the study of these two authors, I have learned that their government, their institutions religious and civil, their military art, in which they exceeded all nations that are, were, or, I believe, ever will be;—and, lastly their manners, without which no people can be great, good, or happy, were such, that I no longer wonder they should become the greatest people in the world, especially when I consider how inferior all the other nations of the world were to them in these respects at the time they rose to universal empire.

I will begin with the Halicarnassian, who, I think, was as well prepared for the great work of history he undertook as any man could well be. For he tells us in his preface, that he was two and twenty years in Rome preparing materials for his history, during which time he learned the Latin dialect of the Greek, which he says was for the greater part Æolic * ; and, af-

* Dionys. lib. 1. *in fine*. Where he says that all that the Roman language had suffered by the mixture of so many people with them, was, το μὲν πλεον φθόγγων αὐθιγίων.—Here I think the Halicarnassian does full ju-

Chap. III. PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE. 91

ter having conversed with the most learned in Rome upon the subject of their history, and got all the information he could from them, and from the antient Roman historians he mentions, such as Porcius Cato, Fabius Maximus, Valerius Antias, and other respectable authors, he then, and not till then, began his work *. And it appears, that he not only consulted authors, and the learned men then living, but also records, such as the tables of the censors

stice to the Roman language, and more than justice; for, tho' I do not believe that there was a great mixture of barbarous words in it, and tho' I be persuaded that it was a dialect of Greek, having more of the *Æolic*, as the Halicarnassian tells us, than of any other, yet I hold it to have been a very antient dialect, (probably brought into Latium by *Cenotrus* and his *Arcadians*, 17 generations before the Trojan war), which came off from the parent language before it was completely formed. This, I think, is evident from its want of one of the parts of speech, and that a most material part, I mean the *article*, and from its deficiency in that greatest art of language, *flexion*. This deficiency is so great, that, besides its want of several tenses which the Greeks have, it has no present participle passive, nor past participle active. See what I have further said of the defects of the Latin language in the preceding vol. lib. 1. chap. 9. & 10.

* Dionys. lib. 1. cap. 7. et 74.

preserved in the several families who had enjoyed the honour of that office.

His first book I think the most curious book of archeology that is extant ; and the facts as well attested as we can expect facts so antient to be. The account he there gives of the antient inhabitants of Italy makes, I think, no inconsiderable part of the history of Man, as it tends to show that there has been a constant migration, from the most antient times, of men from the eastern parts of the world to the western : For I hold that man is one of those many animals, which were not originally in every part of the earth, but only in certain countries, such as horses, asses, oxen, buffaloes, and the like. I therefore think that his native land is certain countries of the east ; and that the great difference betwixt him and other animals is, that he is by nature destined to live in every country and climate of the earth. And, when he comes to be civilized and formed into societies, he in the beginning of that state multiplies so much, much more than any animal of the same size in the wild state,

that the produce of the country cannot maintain him. He therefore of necessity migrates from his native country to other countries, where he can find sustenance. The Halicarnassian in his first book mentions five several migrations into Italy, of which I shall speak more fully by and by. All these appear to have been occasioned by the want of sustenance in the country from whence they came, except that of the Trojans, who were driven out of their country by superior force. And as late as those migrations of the Goths and Vandals from the eastern parts of Europe and Asia, which overwhelmed the Roman empire, we are assured by a cotemporary historian, Procopius, that it was absolute want of the necessaries of life which obliged them to leave their country*.

* See Procopius, *De Bello Vandalico*, lib. 1. cap. 3. and in several other places.—See an extraordinary instance, which he gives of the multiplication of people in an island that he calls *Brittia*, lying betwixt Britain and Scandinavia; *Gothicæ Historiæ*, lib. 4. p. 467. The Romans, as Livy informs us, tho' they were engaged in almost continual wars, in some of which they suffered great losses, yet multiplied so fast, that, when

The first colony, which, as the Halicarnassian tells us, came to Italy from the east, were the people called *Aborigines*; for they were not, as many think the name implies, *αυτοχθόνες*, or *original inhabitants of the country*, but were originally from Arcadia, from whence they came under the conduct of CEnotrus, 17 generations before

their city was no more than 543 years old, they had sent out 30 colonies, (lib. 27. cap. 9.) Sigonius makes the number of them to be no less than 53; for he says, that Livy only reckons those colonies who were obliged to send recruits to their armies. But there were 23 more, that, by their original constitution, were free from that duty; and who, on that account, are said by Livy, *sacrosanctam vacationem habere*; (ibid. cap. 38.) And, notwithstanding their prodigious losses in the second Punic war, in which they lost four battles successively, the last of which was the great battle of *Cannae*, where, as Polybius informs us, 70,000 of them lay upon the field of battle, and about 10,000 were made prisoners, they, in less than 20 years after that battle, sent out five colonies, 300 families in each; (ibid. lib. 32. cap. 29.) And in more ancient times the multiplication of men in those small states of Italy was still greater; for *Alba Longa*, the *metropolis* of Rome, peopled Latium with its colonies, sending forth no less than 30 in a much shorter time than Rome sent out the same number. (Dionys. lib. 3. cap. 31.)

the Trojan war *. They possessed themselves of a part of the country, then occupied by the *Umbri*, and they were called *Aborigines* from their chusing to live in mountains, their native country of *Arcadia* being a mountainous country †. These *Aborigines*, he tells us, kept that name till the Trojan war: Then from their King *Latinus* they were called *Latins*; and, last of all, they took the name of *Romans*, from the city of *Rome*, which was built by *Romulus*, and called after his name ‡. With the *Aborigines* were mixed some *Pelasgi*, a people of whom we hear a great deal in the antient history of Greece. They were a very vagrant people, and inhabited sundry countries in Italy, in Thessaly, and even in Asia; for they are mentioned by Homer among the Trojan auxiliaries. These too our author derives from the same country of Peloponnesus; and I ima-

* Lib. 1. cap. 11.

† Lib. 1. cap. 13.

‡ Ibid. cap. 9.

gine they were originally an Arcadian people as well as the Ænotrians ; for he says they had their name from Pelasgus, the son of Niobe, an Arcadian woman, by Jupiter *.

The third Greek colony which came to Latium was also from Arcadia, which appears to me to have been the parent country of all the Greek colonies to the westward. The conductor of this colony was Evander, who, about 60 years before the Trojan war, settled with his followers upon the *Palantine*, or, as it was afterwards called, the *Palatine* hill, (for the Arcadians, as I have observed, loved hills), which was one of the seven hills of the city of Rome.

The fourth colony from Greece to Latium came with Hercules, who left there a considerable number of his followers. They, as our author tells us, were received in a friendly manner by the Greeks under Evander, being probably their countrymen,

* Lib. 1. cap. 17.

and settled near them upon the hill called *Saturnius* by the natives, and afterwards the *Capitoline hill* by the Romans *. Of this hero the Halicarnassian has given us the best history I believe extant, in which he distinguishes very properly the fabulous part from the historical †.

The fifth and last migration of Greeks into the country of Latium came with Æneas and the Trojans who had escaped from Troy ‡. That the Trojans were originally Greeks who came from Arcadia the parent country, as I have observed, of so many Greek colonies, our author informs us, had been proved by several writers before him ; which proof, however, he shortly, but very distinctly, states ; and assigns a very good reason for the migration, pointing out also the several stages of

* Lib. 2. cap. 1.

† Ibid. cap. 39. et seq.

‡ All these five migrations are reckoned up by our author in the beginning of his second book.

it, and accounting very well how they came to settle at last in Asia upon the Hellespont, where a part of them, under the conduct of a leader, named *Idæus*, settled upon the mountain from him called *Ida*, the Arcadians, as I have observed, loving to dwell in mountains. And here he gives us a very exact genealogy of *Æneas*, much the same, I think, with that given us by Homer*.

That *Æneas* came from Troy to Latium he proves at great length, bestowing many chapters upon it, as it was a point, he says, disputed. That he escaped from Troy, and came to Thracia, is related by *Helenicus* a very antient Greek writer †; and of this he seems to think there could be no doubt. But it was much questioned, whether he did not remain and die there, or at least in some place betwixt Thrace and Italy. But, I think, our author has traced his voyage all the way from Thrace to Italy by memorials,

* Ibid. cap. 61.

† Ibid. cap. 48.

some of which were remaining in his time, in such a manner, that, for my part, I have not the least doubt of the fact *. And indeed the universal belief of a whole people, I mean the Romans, and so many Trojan families as were existing among them even at the time our author wrote, (no less than 50 †, one of which was the Julian family,) put the thing out of all doubt.

It appears, that, before those nations from Peloponnesus came into Italy, there were other nations there, such as the Umbri, the Siculi, and the Tyrrhenians. From whence these nations came, we cannot tell; and indeed of the two first mentioned we hardly know any thing more than their names. We cannot therefore judge of their origin, otherwise than from what happened in later times; and, if we judge by that rule, we must suppose that they likewise came from the east. As to the Tyrrhenians,

* Lib. 1. cap. 49. et seq.

† Lib. 1. cap. 66.

Dionysius is of opinion *, that they were an indigenous nation in Italy ; which is no more than saying, that he did not know from whence they came. But it is now discovered that they spoke a dialect of the Latin, and used the antient Greek character as the Latins did †. We may therefore,

* Lib. 1. cap. 30.

† See the famous Etruscan monument called *Tabulae Lugubinae*, published by Johannes Baptista Passerius, with very learned notes ; from which it appears to me that the Tyrrhenians, a much more antient people of Italy than the Romans, spoke an antient dialect of the Greek or Latin, which I consider as the same languages, and also used the Greek character, which was also the antient Roman character. There are several other things concerning the Etruscan arts, published by this Passerius, along with the *Tabulae Lugubinae* ; and, in the volume containing these *Tabulae*, the reader will find a reference to every thing that has been published on the subject of this antient and great people, great not only in extent of territory, but in arts, being the people from whom the Romans derived all their arts till they became acquainted with the Greeks.

Herodotus makes the Hetrurians, or Tyrrhenians, a colony of the Lydians in Asia. This, I find, is doubted by some Italian antiquarians ; but, be that as it will, it is evident that they had the same language, the same

I think, reasonably presume that they were originally from the same country, tho' a colony, no doubt, much more antient than even the *Ænотrians* or *Aborigines*.

And here we may observe in passing, that the *Arcadians*, who sent out so many colonies into Italy, were not themselves indigenous in *Peloponnesus*, but came from Egypt, where there was a district and a city of the name of *Arcadia*. This is a very curious fact of antient history, of which we are informed by *Eustathius* in his *Commentary* on that part of *Homer's Catalogue* where he speaks of the *Arcadians*. And, if it be true also, what, I think, I have elsewhere proved *, that the *Athenians* were likewise a colony from Egypt, it appears, that not only arts and civility came from Egypt into Greece, but a great part of the people. And, as the *Arcadians* and *Athe-*

religion, the same arts and manners, that the *Greeks* had. It is therefore evident that they must either have been originally the same nation, or derived all the things I have mentioned from some other nation.

* Vol. 1. of this work, book 3. chap. 13. p. 632.

nians were the most antient people of Greece, I think it is not unreasonable to presume, that all the inhabitants of Greece have at different times come from that parent country of men, as well as of arts and sciences; for we are sure that the Egyptians sent colonies into many other countries, tho' there be no memory preserved of their sending any into Greece, except the two I have mentioned *.—But to return to Dionysius.

This part of the Halicarnassian's work must have cost him, as he himself tells us †, a great deal of labour; and he appears to

* The Italian antiquarians, who have published so many curious works upon the Etruscan monuments, have endeavoured to prove that the Etruscans came originally from Egypt. This opinion Bonorottus has maintained in his work, *De origine Etruscorum ex Egypto*; sect. 47. p. 103. & 104. of his appendix *ad Opus Demsterianum*. The same is maintained by another famous Tuscan antiquarian, Gorius, tom. 2. *Musæi Etrusci*, dissert. 1. See also what this last mentioned author has said of the Etruscan alphabet in his *Historia Etrusca Antiquaria*.

† Lib. 1. cap. 89.

have valued himself so much upon it, that from this part of his work he has entitled the whole history, *Roman Archeology*. He must, in composing it, have diligently perused a great many books Greek as well as Latin, from some of which he has given us extracts. And here I observe a great difference betwixt him and Livy, who does not appear to have read any one Greek book upon the subject of the Roman history or antiquities, Polybius only excepted *. And the older Roman historians and antiquarians, such as Porcius Cato, and Caius Sempronius, tho' they affirmed that the Aborigines were from Peloponnesus, yet produced no authorities from any Greek author †. But this defect our author has abundantly supplied ‡.

* He mentions him in three places, lib. 34. cap. 50.; lib. 36. cap. 19.; et lib. 39. cap. 52.; but without any eulogium, tho' from what is preserved of Polybius, it is evident he has taken from him almost his whole history, (particularly the military operations) during the period of which Polybius treats.

† Dionys. lib. 1. cap. 11.

‡ Ibid. cap. 12.

Thus Dionysius has shown that the people whose history he writes, tho' mixed of different colonies coming to Latium at different times, were all originally Greeks, and of the most antient and bravest people in Greece, with whom the wisdom of the oracle would not permit even the Lacedemonians to meddle, as Herodotus has informed us*. To show that the Romans were thus nobly descended, I think, was very well worth the pains he has bestowed upon it; since, otherwise, I could have hardly thought his history credible: For I so firmly believe that there is a difference of character in nations, as well as of families in the same nation, that, with the best institutions and manners, and in the best country and climate†, and with all other

* Herod. lib. 1. cap. 66.

† This the Romans enjoyed; and we have a description of the country and climate of Italy given by the Halicarnassian, (lib. 1. cap. 36. et 37.), of which the diction is fully as beautiful, for prose, as Virgil's praise of Italy in the Georgics is for verse, and the matter very much superior; for it contains a full enumeration of all the advantages that a country can enjoy from soil, climate, and variety of ground.

advantages that fortune could bestow, I do not think that any nation could have excelled so much in the great arts of life, arms, and government, and have produced such illustrious characters, and established such an empire over mankind, if they had not been of the race of the noblest people that ever existed, and the most eminent in arts, in arms, and in government.

Now, let us compare what Livy has done in this matter with what the Halicarnassian has done. Livy gives no account at all of the antient inhabitants of Italy before the Trojans landed there. He has indeed named the Aborigines as being there before the Trojans: But who they were, or from whence they came, he has not told us. Neither has he shown that the Trojans were originally Greeks. Nay, he has not proved that they came to Italy, but has taken it for granted, tho', as I have observed, it was a controverted point. For any thing, therefore, we can learn from Livy, the Romans might have been those barbarians, fugitives, and slaves, which some of

the Greeks supposed them to be*. And indeed, if we can believe Livy, a considerable part of them must have been originally slaves; for, he says, that in Romulus's asylum all were received, freemen and slaves without distinction†. Whereas the Halicarnassian has expressly told us, that only freemen were received‡. And indeed it is hardly credible, that Romulus would have done a thing so unjust, as to receive and protect fugitive slaves; for he must have made himself and his people detested by the whole neighbourhood, and considered as a public nuisance.

But as the noblest birth and best natural abilities will not make great and good men without a proper education and good laws and institutions, our author has been at pains to make his history probable also in this respect, by showing us that the Romans were bred and lived under laws and

* Lib. 1. cap. 4.

† Livy, lib. 1. cap. 8.

‡ Lib. 1. cap. 15.

institutions fitted to make them the governors of mankind. This he has done, first, in his account of the reign of Romulus, whose institutions both civil and religious, and particularly his civil institutions, he has explained at great length, and with very proper observations upon them, and comparisons betwixt them and the institutions of other nations*.

I will only mention a few of them, beginning with the first he mentions, namely, the connection Romulus established betwixt the nobles and the lower sort of people by the means of Patronship and Clientship, which our author very justly celebrates as an excellent contrivance for connecting together, as much as was possible, two orders of men, whose interest appeared to be directly opposite; and he observes, that it far exceeded any thing of the kind practised by other nations; and to it he ascribes what otherwise, I think, is unaccountable, that, for 630 years, in all the disputes that were during that time, betwixt

* Lib. 1. cap. 7. &c.

Patricians and Plebeians, there was no bloodshed, tho' some of them were very violent, and one of them went to the extremity of a secession of the Plebeians *.

2do, The form of government, or constitution as we call it, was the best of the mixed kind that can be contrived; for it was not so popular as it became at last, but was much more aristocratical, yet not wholly so; for, tho' it was only the nobles who governed, that is, held the great offices of state, it was not without the consent of the people; for the people had three great privileges, that of creating magistrates, enacting laws, and declaring war. But these they could not exercise, except under the controul of the King and Senate: So that, without their approbation, what the people determined was not effectual †.

* Lib. 2. cap. 9. 10. & 11.

† Livy, lib. 1. cap. 17. Where he tells us, that, tho' this was altered in after times, when the government became almost quite popular, the form was still kept up; for the judgments of the people were not valid, unless they were ratified by the authority of the senate. But, before the people determined, the senate became *auſtores in incertum eventum comitiorum*.

This form of government is much the same with the heroic government of the Greeks at the time of the Trojan war, as described by Homer ; and I hold it to be the most natural of all governments, by which the best men, who are by God and Nature destined to govern, do accordingly govern, but not without the consent and approbation of the people.

3tio, But, says our author*, tho' the form of the government be ever so excellent, and all public matters regulated in the best manner possible, yet if the private lives of the citizens are not such as they ought to be, it is impossible that such a state can be great and flourishing. Now, for that purpose, he says, two things were devised by Romulus, such as were not to be found in any other state ; namely, his law of marriage, which he made an indissoluble society among the Romans, whereof the husband was the absolute ruler ; and, 2dly, the power he gave to fathers over their children, even that of life and death. By these two, the

* Lib. 2. cap. 24.

domestic government, which is the foundation of the happiness and prosperity of every state, was better regulated among the Romans than among any other people, and was, in my opinion, the chief cause of the prosperity and greatness of the Roman people, tho' I do not observe that it is much insisted upon in what has been written on that subject in modern times; but the Halicarnassian, as I have observed, lays due weight upon it *. In a family so governed, men learned the two most important lessons in human life, to obey and to command: And they learned them in their proper order; first to obey while they were sons of the family, and then to command when they were masters. It was no wonder, therefore, that out of such families there came the best citizens, fit to discharge every office of the state civil or military; and to such an education must be ascribed what both Livy and the Halicarnassian tell us, that, tho' other nations in the neighbourhood of Rome might have better armies, there was none

* Lib. 2. cap. 24.

that had so many good generals. Of the necessity of such a domestic government many states, as our author observes*, seem-
ed to have been sensible; but they could not make it effectual: And, particularly, they could not contrive how to regulate the conduct of the women, upon which, however, it is apparent, that the happiness of a state in a great measure depends. And accordingly we are informed, that Lyscurgus, after regulating every thing else in the Lacedemonian policy, wanted last of all to lay restraints upon the women, and to prescribe a life for them as well as for the men; but he could not effectuate it, and so was obliged to leave one half of his citizens without manners or discipline. The consequence of which was, that the state of Sparta, the best formed of any, I think, next to that of Rome, was ruined by the luxury and vanity of the women, which introduced wealth among them, and by that means ruined the state, as the oracle had foretold †.

* Lib. 2. cap. 24. et 25.

† Ἄ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ὅλην, ἀλλὰ δὲ οὐδὲν.

The last of the political institutions of this great King was also mainly conducive to the power and the greatness of the Romans: And that was his forbidding the exercise of sedentary, mechanic, and money-making arts by his citizens, as illiberal and tending to impair both mind and body. These he left to be practised by slaves and strangers that happened to be in Rome. But neither did he confine his citizens entirely to the exercise of arms; but divided the business of their lives betwixt war and agriculture; esteeming, as our author says, each of these lives to be imperfect without the other. And in this respect he prefers, I think, very justly, the policy of Romulus to that of Lycurgus, whose citizens practised arms only, while the necessaries of life were supplied to them by the labour of others *. The consequence of this life of the Roman soldier must have been, that he was more able to endure all toils and hardships of living, better than the Spartan, and had the use of the spade and of other instruments of

* Lib. 2. cap. 28.

husbandry, without which it does not appear to me that they could have conquered the world *.

I come now to speak of the religious institutions of Romulus, upon which he enlarges as much as might be expected from so religious an historian, who every where inculcates that there can be no happiness in a state without religion ; for, says he, it is the favour of the Gods that makes every thing prosper among men †. He introduces his account of these institutions by informing us of the difference betwixt the religion of the Greeks in his time, and that of the Romans, which is really

* See what I have said upon this subject, vol. 3. of *Ant. Metaph.* p. 113.

† *Lib. 2. cap. 18.* See also *cap. 62.* of the same book, where he says, ‘ That the Gods are the guardians of men and the givers to them of all good things.’ And, in another passage of the same book (*cap. 68.*) he mentions those who profess that godless philosophy, ‘ if,’ says he, ‘ it can be called philosophy, which rejects all extraordinary interpositions of divinity in the affairs of men, with which they said the Gods took no concern.’

surprising, if we consider that they were the same people, and worshipped the same Gods: But, says he, the Romans did not admit into their creed those impious stories, told by the Greeks, of the castration of the Gods, and their destroying their own children, of their wars, wounds, bonds, and slavery, and such like things as are not only altogether unworthy of the Divine Nature, but disgrace even the Human. They had no wailings and lamentations for the sufferings of their Gods, such as the Greeks had, nor any Bacchic rites or vigils of men and women together in the temples. And if, at any time, for some particular reason, they admitted a foreign religion into their city, such as that of Cybele, or the Idean Goddesses, the rites were performed under the inspection of the Roman magistrate; nor, even in his time, he says, when the manners were so much changed for the worse, did any Roman disguise himself to act those ridiculous mummeries that were acted by the priests of Cybele*.

* Lib. 2. cap. 19. et 20.

From this account of the Roman religion, upon which he makes most judicious reflections, it appears to have been the purest religion, (and indeed the Halicarnassian says it was so), then known in the world. And, I think, it can hardly be denied, that it was a genuine system of Theism, if we only admit, that the business of Nature may be carried on, and the affairs of men directed by inferior intelligences, without the immediate interposition of the Supreme God: For, that the Romans, as as well as the Greeks, admitted that there was such a God, the Father of Gods and Men, and the Supreme Governour of the universe, is evident. Now, a man, who believes that there is the same gradation of intelligences, as we know there is of other natures animate and inanimate, and, consequently, that there are intelligences far superior to man, interposed betwixt him and the Supreme Being, can have little difficulty to believe, that those intelligences are employed to superintend the operations both of Nature and of man, which I can prove to be the doctrine of our Scripture as well as of philosophy, were this

the proper place for such an inquiry. So far, therefore, our theology and theirs agree: But they differ in this, that theirs was not derived from philosophy and the study of Nature, but came from Crete, (ultimately from Egypt); and their Gods were not immortal and immaterial beings, but mortal men born in Crete, to whom they ascribed all the powers of Gods.

But, be that as it will, (for neither is this a place for such inquiries), I cannot agree with the Halicarnassian, that this pure religion was first introduced into Latium by Romulus, and that he found there a religion such as that of the Greeks in the days of our author, which he rejected, and would not permit in his dominions. On the contrary, I believe that the religion of Latium, in the days of Romulus, imported into that country by the several colonies which came into it from Arcadia, was that same pure religion, not corrupted and disguised by the absurd and impious fables above mentioned, the inventions of poets, promoted by the craft of priests working upon the superstition and ignorance of the

people: For, that there was a great growth of the Grecian mythology in later times, which we can trace from the days of Homer and downwards, is evident to any man conversant in the writings of that poet. Now, it is in this way that I account for the difference betwixt the later Greek religion, and the antient Greek religion imported into Latium by the Greek colonies who settled there, one of them, and the principal, 17 generations before the Trojan war, when I am persuaded the Greek theology was much purer than it was in the days of Homer.

But, tho' I think the Halicarnassian is mistaken in supposing that Romulus introduced a new religion into Latium, I must believe what he relates of his instituting feasts and festivals in honour of the Gods, sacrifices, and priests, more, says he, than ever were in any new city or state, (no less than sixty, according to Terentius Varro, who presided over the public religion), besides those who took care of the private religion of families *; and whatever was

* Lib. 2. cap. 21.

added in sacred matters by Numa and succeeding Kings, was only building, he says, upon the foundation laid by Romulus *.

I have dwelt the longer upon the Halicarnassian's account of these institutions of Romulus, as I think it shows our author not only to have been a great critic, rhetorician, and historian, but a philosopher, and a man of great political knowledge. And as to Romulus, whom he praises so much, I think he must have been one of the most extraordinary men that ever lived; and I can almost forgive a great scholar, who lived soon after the restoration of letters, and who gave himself the classical name of *Pomponius Laetus*, for building an altar to him. And indeed, being so young when he formed the Roman state, I should have believed him something more than man, if the Halicarnassian had not told us that he consulted with his grandfather Numitor, and was guided by the wisdom of his age. Now, I have a high opinion of the wisdom of those antient times; and I believe

* Lib. 2. cap. 23.

that the philosophy of government was very well known long before the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was heard of.

Livy is as sparing upon the subject of the religious ordinances of Romulus as upon his civil; and he only mentions one temple that he dedicated to the God Fere-trius, where he hung up the first *spolia o-pima*, that he had taken from a King of a neighbouring nation whom he had killed in battle. This silence of Livy upon the subject of so great a King as Romulus, and the founder of the Roman state, we must think very extraordinary, unless we believe that the many particulars Dionysius mentions of him are mere fiction; and it must appear more extraordinary still, that one of the few particulars he mentions of the civil administration of Romulus, should be a fact not true, and which reflects such dishonour upon the origin of his nation;—I mean the making his asylum a sanctuary for fugitive slaves.

Livy is more full in the account he gives us of the religious institutions of Numa; but not so full and so accurate even there

as the Halicarnassian, who has told us that Numa divided the ministers of the Gods among the Romans into eight classes *, the office of each of which he has distinctly explained. And he has mentioned one of the civil institutions of Numa, which I think was of considerable consequence, but is omitted by Livy: For it tended to promote that, by which only a virtuous community can subsist; I mean agriculture. He divided the land possessed by the Romans into *pagi* †, which, as he has explained elsewhere ‡, were tracks of land appropriated to some kinds of fortification upon high places or tops of hills, which served as a refuge to the farmers in case of an invasion by an enemy. Over these he appointed rulers and inspectors, who took an account how every man belonging to the *pagus* cultivated his land, rewarding those that cultivated well, and punishing those that cultivated ill.

* Lib. 2. cap. 63.

† Lib. 2. cap. 76.

‡ Lib. 4. cap. 15.

From this account, given by the Halicarnassian, of the religious institutions of Romulus and Numa, it is evident that he himself was, as well as Livy, a most religious man, as appears from sundry particular passages which I have quoted above. Nor do I think that he was superstitious, because he believed in some extraordinary interpositions of divinity, such as that for the justification of a Vestal virgin, who was accused of having let the sacred fire go out through her fault *; nor for doubting, whether, as all things are mixed in Nature, there might not be a race mixed of divine and human natures, commonly called *daemons*, out of which race those called *heroes* were produced. This doubt he states when he relates the story of Ilia the Vestal virgin being impregnated by Mars †.

From what Livy, Dionysius, and many other authors have told us of the religion

* Lib. 2. cap. 68.

† Lib. 1. cap. 77.

of the Romans, it is evident that they were the most religious people that ever existed. They not only worshipped the great Gods who governed the universe, I mean the 12 Gods of the Greeks; but they had also tutelary Gods of their city, whom they called *Penates*. Further, each *curia* had its particular place of worship, and particular sacrifices which they performed there; and there was one general place of worship for them all *: Besides all these, each family had its tutelary Gods, or *Lares*, as they were called, to whom they were constantly making oblations. Now, of this kind of Deities neither Greeks nor Egyptians appear to have known any thing. Then the Romans did nothing of any moment, even in their private affairs, without consulting the Gods by augury or haruspicy; which does not appear to me to have been so constantly practised either by Greeks or Egyptians. The Romans therefore may be said to have lived with their Gods; and, if we believe that such a communication with Superior Beings is what

* Lib. 2. cap. 13. 65.

exalts our nature most, and bestows upon us the greatest felicity of which we are capable, we must suppose the Romans to have been the greatest and happiest people that ever existed. And, tho' we should suppose all their Deities to have been mere fictions, and that there were no Daemons or superior intelligences, with whom they had communication, and who revealed future events to them, and directed them in the management of their affairs, still the belief, *interesse rebus humanis coeleste numen*, as Livy expresses it *, and that they were under the guardianship and protection of superior beings, who had a fatherly care of them, rewarding them when they did well, and punishing them when they did otherwise, must have been of wonderful influence upon their lives and manners, especially when we consider what the Halicarnassian has very well observed, that they imputed nothing to those Beings, impure, wicked, flagitious, or any way unworthy of a Divine Nature. And one of the strongest proofs of their degeneracy in la-

* Lib. i. cap. 21.

ter times was the neglect of religion, as both Livy and the Halicarnassian have observed; and, in general, I think, we may conclude with the greatest certainty, that where there is little or no religion among a people, they must be in a most wretched state, and weak as well as wicked.

Nor is it only in the account he has given of the institutions of Romulus that the Halicarnassian has shown his political wisdom, but also in the ample Commentary he has made upon the institutions of Servius Tullius, the fifth King of Rome; who added every thing to the political system of Romulus, which the great increase of his citizens, and of wealth and possessions, made necessary. What I mean is his institution of the *Census*, and of the *Centuriata Comitia*, by which he contrived with wonderful skill to lay the burden of war and of taxes upon the rich, and, in return for that, to give them almost the whole power of the state in the election of magistrates and in making war or peace or laws, reserving at the same time the form of the popular government, tho' he took

away the substance. How the new *Comitia*, which he introduced, answered this purpose, Livy has sufficiently explained, tho' not so fully as the Halicarnassian. But he has not explained near so well the policy of the institution, which appears to me to have been a wonderful contrivance to satisfy the people by giving them a share in the government, but such a share as could not almost in any case be hurtful to the state ; which I must own, I think, a wonderful contrivance, and such as no legislator but himself ever discovered. And it reconciled in such a manner the aristocratic with the popular government, that the Roman polity might have lasted forever, if it had not been for that which sooner or later has been the destruction of all governments, and I may add of all nations as well as of Sparta, I mean money, from which arose all those disorders in the Roman state that ended at last in its ruin.

There was another of the institutions of Servius, contributing very much to what was the foundation of the Roman grandeur ;—the number of their citizens. This

was one of the things, as Dionysius has observed, that distinguished them from all the states of Greece, and particularly the Spartan, which, for want of a sufficient number of citizens, was ruined by the loss of a single battle *. And in this respect he commends very much the policy of Romulus, which he says ought to have been imitated by the Greek states, that, instead of putting to the sword, or making slaves of the people in the cities that he conquered, he transplanted them to Rome, and gave them the freedom of the city, or made Roman colonies of them. And by this means, and by the asylum which he opened, he increased the number of his citizens from 2000 foot, and 300 horse, their number in the beginning of his reign, to 46,000 foot, and very near 1000 horse, which was their number at his death †. The institution of Servius I now speak of was, I think, no more than carrying on and compleating the system of Romulus;

* Lib. 2. cap. 17.

† Ibid. cap. 16.

for, as Romulus received in his asylum, and gave the freedom of the city to all free men without distinction, whether they were born free or not ; so Servius thought it was proper to give the freedom of the city to those slaves who had been emancipated by the Romans themselves, as well as Romulus had given it to those who had been emancipated by the citizens of other states. It is in this way that Dionysius defends this new method of creating citizens, in his speech which he puts into the mouth of Servius * ; where we have excellent observations upon the advantages of such an institution, which, however, he observes, was in later times very much abused : And he recommends it to the magistrates of Rome, and particularly the censors, to take notice of the abuses committed in the exercise of that privilege by masters † ; and accordingly we find, that in later times some regulations were made for that purpose, which are to be found in the books of the Roman civil law.

* Lib. 4. cap. 23.

† Ibid. cap. 24.

But, however advantageous this institution was at the time it was made and for some ages after, it was undoubtedly a novelty introduced by Servius into the Roman state: And not only was it new in that state, but in every other state then existing; for it was a thing unknown in any of the cities of Greece, that a man by emancipating his slave, had the power of making a citizen of him *. This makes it the more

* In Sparta the privilege of the City was so much valued, that there is no instance of its having ever been bestowed, even by public authority, except upon two men for very particular reasons mentioned by Herodotus, (lib. 9. cap. 35.) ; much less was it in the power of any private citizen to bestow it upon his slave. And this, no doubt, was one reason among others why the number of citizens in Sparta was so much reduced at the time when Aristotle wrote his *Books of Polity*, compared with what it was in the days of Lycurgus: Whereas this institution of Servius in Rome, joined with other causes of population, had all the effects that I have mentioned in a preceding note (p. 93. & 94.). To which I have only to add, that, after the prodigious losses they had sustained in the second Punic war, and particularly in the fatal battle of *Cannae*, they carried on the war not only in Italy against Hannibal, and all the states of Italy that joined him after that battle, but in Sicily and in Spain, and against Philip of Macedon,

surprising that Livy, when he gives an account of the other novelties introduced by Servius, such as the *Census* and the *Comitia Centuriata*, should not have mentioned this institution, much more extraordinary than either of these, and unprecedented in any other state. And here, I doubt, he cannot be defended against Caligula's censure of him, that he was negligent in his history. That the fact really happened as the Halicarnassian has told it, I think, cannot be doubted ; for, in the first place, it cannot be believed, that so extraordinary a custom should have prevailed among the Romans without a particular law enacting it, which, it is not pretended, was made by any King

and with no less force than 21 legions of more than 5000 men each: And, after the second Punic war was at an end, they carried on war against the same Philip of Macedon, whom they reduced to the necessity of demanding peace ;—carried their arms into Asia against Antiochus the greatest King in that country ;—put an end to the kingdom of Macedonia, and led in triumph Perseus the last King of that country ; and during all that time were sending out colonies to different parts of Italy, as Livy informs us.

other than Servius Tullius. And, in the second place, there is not, I think, the least reason to believe that the Halicarnassian has, any more than Livy, forged any facts*. Nor do I believe, that he has adorned them so much with feigned circumstances and poetical descriptions as Livy has done: But, on the contrary, I see him examining facts with the greatest scrupulosity, where there is any difference among the historians about them; as in the case of the two daughters of Servius Tullius, who were married, some say, to the sons of the preceding King Tarquinius Priscus, others to his grandsons. Livy mentions this difference of opinion among the historians, but he unfortunately adopts the former of the two, as the most probable, being the opinion, as he says, of of the greater number of authors†. Whereas the Halicarnassian, examining the matter more nicely than it appears Livy did, has proved, I think, to demonstration, both from facts and dates, that they must have been the grandsons, and not the sons of

* P. 32. of this vol.

† Livy, lib. 1. cap. 46.

Tarquinius Priscus *. And, in other passages that might be quoted, he observes the difference of opinions of authors concerning facts, and gives us reasons why he prefers one opinion to another. This convinces me that he did not any more than Livy invent facts like our Scotch historian Hector Boece †, but related them as he found them in antient authors.

There are, I know, some French critics, who would make us believe, that the whole history of the first ages of Rome was little better than a romance. If it were so, I think it must be allowed to be a fine romance, and much better than any that has been written in modern times, and which deserves to be diligently studied for the fine lessons of morality and policy it gives us. There is a late French writer, *Mons. Gibelin*, who allegorises the whole antient history of Greece, and the history of Rome down even to the time of Romulus, whom he makes to be the Sun ; a very good hiero-

* Dionys. lib. 4. cap. 6.

† See p. 33. of this vol.

glyphic, I think, for so great a King and Legislator. Such conceits, I must confess, do not even amuse me.

After the expulsion of the Kings and the establishment of the commonwealth, the narrative of Livy, as well as of the Halicarnassian, is fuller and more circumstantial, probably because the authors they copied were more so. But still the narrative of Livy, compared with that of the Halicarnassian, is, as I have said *, rather an abridgement of history, than a history; for he seems to have been of the opinion of those readers he mentions in his preface, who had little curiosity about the first ages of Rome, being in haste to come to later times, when a state which proceeded from such small beginnings was grown to such a prodigious size, *ut magnitudine laboret sua*. But, for my part, I have much more pleasure in reading the history of wisdom and virtue in the first ages of Rome, than of vice and folly, faction and corruption, violence and bloodshed, in these later times,

* P. 27. of this volume.

when, as Livy tells us, the Romans *could neither bear their vices nor the remedies of them*. The meaning of which words, as I understand them, is, that the Romans were then so vicious and so much degenerated, that they were incapable of governing themselves, so that it was absolutely necessary they should have a master : But, tho' they had lost their antient virtue, they still retained so much of their antient spirit, that they would not submit to that remedy. This made them assassinate Julius Caesar, their first master, and the best they ever had : And it made the reign of Augustus very troublesome and dangerous, so that it is said he deliberated about resigning the government ; and the fear of the same spirit produced all the cruelties of Tiberius and the succeeding Emperors.

In so succinct a narrative, therefore, as Livy's is, of those best times of Rome, as I think them, it is no wonder that many important particulars are either altogether omitted, or but slightly touched. Of these I shall give some examples. And, first, with respect

to the creation of the first dictator Titus Lartius, a most important event in the history of the Roman government, by which they again established another despotic power not above fourteen years after they had got free of the tyranny of their Kings; this important event Livy has mentioned only in a few lines *, without telling us upon what occasion, or from what reasons of necessity, so great a change in the government was made: But of this the Halicarnassian has informed us at great length, telling us that it was upon occasion of the people refusing to enlist to fight against the Latins, unless their debts were discharged†; and the consuls could not compel them by any punishment they might decree against them, because from that decree there was an appeal to the people by the law proposed by Valerius Poplicola, and enacted after the expulsion of the Kings ‡. Upon

* Lib. 2. cap. 18.

† Lib. 5. cap. 63.

‡ See the account of this law given by the Halicarnassian, cap. 19. lib. 5.

this occasion there was great difference of opinion in the senate, and Dionysius has, I think, very properly given us the speeches made upon each side of the question. The debate ended in naming, with the consent of the people, a supreme magistrate, who was to be absolute and uncontrollable, but his authority to last only for six months. How prudently and wisely this magistrate exercised his power our author has related at some length, but of which Livy has hardly said a word. The Halicarnassian has also upon this occasion made some excellent political reflections upon the necessity of having recourse to such an expedient in all democratical governments: And accordingly, he says, it was practised not only by the Romans, but by the Lacedemonians and Thessalians; and he quotes an author, one Licinius, who relates, that it was practised also in Alba Longa, and under the same name of *Dictator* *. And, tho' such reflections be no doubt a digression, yet I think they were very proper upon so important an occasion.

* Ibid. cap. 73. et 74.

Another great event in the Roman government, and greater still in its consequences, was the institution of a new magistracy, unknown not only in Rome, but, I believe, in any other state antient or modern; I mean the tribunes of the people, which truly made two states of one, as Menenius Agrippa expressed his fears * that it would do, and entirely changed the form of the Roman government from aristocratical to democratical. Of this great revolution Livy has said a good deal more †, than of the choice of the first dictator; but his account is not near so full or circumstantial as that of the Halicarnassian, or as so great an event merited; for it was the greatest change that was made in the Roman government from the time of the expulsion of the Kings to the total change of the government under the Emperors; and it was produced by a division of the people, and a secession of the greater part of them, in such a hostile manner, from the rest, as

* Lib. 6. cap. 38.

† Livy, lib. 2. cap. 32.

threatened absolute destruction to the state. Of the whole progress of this great affair the Halicarnassian has given us a full and accurate account. And in very fine speeches he has given us the arguments on both sides at great length : And which, it may be observed, in passing, shows us the use of speeches in history ; for, otherwise, Dionysius could not have given us those arguments without a very long digression ; and which could not have been said with propriety to be a part of the work. Livy, however, who is abundant enough in speeches upon other occasions, has given us none upon this, unless you will call the fable of Menenius Agrippa a speech *. And of the facts that happened before the final agreement of the parties, he has given us a very short, and not very accurate account ; and, what is worse, he has related but a part of the terms of the agreement itself, upon which peace was restored ; for he has only mentioned the establishment of the tribuneship of the peo-

* Liv. lib. 2. cap. 32.

ple: Whereas the Patricians not only granted them that, but a remission of all the debts which the poorer sort then owed *. For money was the subject of this great quarrel betwixt the two orders, as well as of the former, which produced another change of the constitution, by the introduction of dictators: So that, in about 20 years after the establishment of the commonwealth, there were two remarkable changes of the government, both produced by wealth or money; and therefore Lycurgus, that his government might not be destroyed in that way, the only way in which the oracle said it could be destroyed, proscribed the use of money in Sparta.

The consequence of the establishment of this extraordinary magistracy in Rome, was, that the government of the best mixed form that ever was, being partly regal, (for I understand the consuls to have come in place of the Kings), partly aristocratical, partly popular, and, upon particular occa-

* Lib. 6. cap. 83. et 88.

sions, altogether despotic, became, in not much more than 40 years after the institution of the tribuneship, altogether democratical; for, in year 306 of the city, a law was passed, by which the people were allowed in the *Comitia Tributa* to make laws binding upon the whole people *. Now the *Comitia* of this kind were held without any previous decree of the senate, which was absolutely necessary both for the *Comitia Centuriata* and *Curiata*, and without the auspices which at that time were in the hands of the Patricians †. And in these *Comitia* every man had an equal vote whatever his rank or fortune was. And this popular government ended as it has always done and ever will do in all states, in tyranny or absolute government, first under the name of

* Dionys. lib. 11. cap. 45.

† Lib. 9. cap. 41. Where he explains very accurately the difference between the *Comitia Tributa et Curiata*, which were the same with respect to the voters, the poorest and meanest citizens having an equal vote with the richest and noblest, but differed in the two particulars mentioned in the text.

a perpetual Dictator, and then under the name of Emperors.

But, besides these consequences of the tribunitian power, which happened in process of time, there was one immediate consequence of it, that brought the Roman state to the brink of ruin, from which it was saved only by the prayers and tears of a woman,—the greatest disgrace that ever befell the Roman people. The event I mean was the banishment of a noble youth, Marcius Coriolanus, who, contrary to all the forms of justice that had been practised since the establishment of the commonwealth, was tried in the *Comitia Tributa**, and condemned for no other fault, but that he made a speech in the senate advising the senators not to lower the price of corn, which had been very much raised by the secession of the people, and the neglect of agriculture thereby occasioned†. The Halicarnassian has enlarged

* Lib. 7. cap. 59.

† Lib. 7. cap. 24.

very much upon this great event, and has given us many long speeches upon the occasion, and some of the best in the book, particularly that of Appius Claudius*: For the length of these speeches he makes an apology †, tho' I think it needed none, and gives very good reasons why an historian should be as particular and circumstantial in his account of such important civil transactions as of military operations: For, says he, if I had told simply, but shortly, that the Patricians had given up their privileges by submitting to have one of the most conspicuous of their order tried by the mob of Rome, it would have appeared a thing incredible. I have therefore, says he, given the reader in speeches all that was to be said both for the measure and against it ‡. On the other hand, Livy has given us a very short account of the facts, and no speeches at all, unless you will call a speech an invective of a few

* Lib. 7. cap. 48.

† Ibid. cap. 66.

‡ Ibid.

lines, which Coriolanus speaks against the people in some short, pointed sentences, and a shorter invective still, in the same stile, put into the mouth of the people against Coriolanus *.

And thus much for the subject of the Halicarnassian's history, upon which many of my readers will think, that I have bestowed a great deal too much time in a work which professes only to treat of stile; but as, in my reading, I can never separate the *words* from the *matter*, which I consider as principal in every writing, and which, if it be not of some value, the work itself can be of none, however elegant and fine the words may be, I have thought proper, after the example of both Livy and Dionysius in their preambles, to enlarge upon the importance of the subject of their history. If this were less to the purpose than I think it is, it has furnished matter for a comparison and criticism of those two authors, which, I hope, will not

* Liv. lib. 2. cap. 34. & 35.

be disagreeable or uninstru tive to the reader.

I come now to speak of what undoubtedly belongs to my subject, the *style* of the Halicarnassian, in which, I think, he excels Livy still more than in the *matter*. And indeed, I do not know any historical style in Greek or Latin, that I think equal to the Halicarnassian's, unless it be that of Herodotus, which, by the sweetness of the dialect in which he writes, and a certain rust of antiquity, and something of the grandeur of Homer in his manner, as well as a resemblance in his language, pleases me still more. But, I think, there can be nothing better in the Attick than the narrative of Dionysius; for it has all the sweetness and elegance of that dialect; and it is so adorned with different figures of composition, that there is the greatest variety in it that I know in any style, that of Demosthenes only excepted, and at the same time the greatest perspicuity; for his figures are not so many, or so violent as those of Thucydides, yet sufficient to give a cast and colour to his style, that distin-

guishes it perfectly from common discourse. And in this, his stile is, I think, preferable to that of Xenophon, which, wanting these figures, is, as I have observed, too like to the Socratic dialogue, that is, to conversation and common discourse. His rhetorical stile, too, is excellent of its kind; for it is evident from his critical writings, that he had studied the rhetorical stile as much as the historical, and knew perfectly the difference betwixt them. And accordingly his speeches are very different from his narrative, being composed in much longer periods, but so well composed, that there is no obscurity in them, tho' some of them run out to a great length, and are much diversified with parentheses and other figures*. He has a great many speeches, more, I think, than any other historian, except Thucydides, and some of them very long. And there is one in particular of extraordinary length;

* There is one in the end of Tullus Hostilius's speech to the army of Romans and Albans, upon the subject of the treachery of Mettus the Alban general, (*Antiquit.* lib. 3. cap. 28.) which is a period of almost half a page, and yet perfectly clear, tho' with more than one parenthesis thrown into it.

but it was upon a subject very important and interesting, namely, the secession of the Plebeians to Mount Aventine *. And what I admire the most in him, is, that, tho' he was by profession a teacher of rhetoric, they are all speeches of business, with nothing of that artificial sophistry, or σοφιστικὴν περίεργον, as the Greek critics call it, or those arguments from general topics so much laboured in the schools of declamation, in which I am persuaded he never practised, but formed his stile of speaking upon the study of Demosthenes and other great authors, who do not draw their arguments from such topics, but from the nature and circumstances of the case; which distinguishes a speech of business from a declamation, or speech of show and ostentation.

From this account I have given of the Halicarnassian's stile, it is evident that my judgment of it is very different from that

* Antiq. lib. 7. cap. 66.

of Photius, who says, that he affects novelty in his words and phrases and does violence to the language, in order to make his style singular and uncommon. This censure of the Halicarnassian, like his praise of Diodorus Siculus, whom he commends for writing a style not too Attic, only shows that the elegance of Attic composition was not in his time relished or well understood.

Upon the whole, therefore, I think, that the Halicarnassian's Roman history is, both for the matter and style, one of the most pleasant, as well as most instructive books in the world. The style is finely tempered betwixt the austere gravity of Thucydides and the sweetness of Herodotus, and, I think, it is more perspicuous than either : For I do not know that there is one obscure or difficult passage in the whole work, except where the text is corrupted ; and, even where that is the case, so clear and perspicuous is his style, that a good Greek scholar can in many places correct the text almost at first sight ; and it is surprising how many corrections Henry Stephen and his scholar Sylburgius have made, that are

now confirmed and ascertained to be the true reading by the Vatican MS. which was collated when the Oxford edition was printed.

To conclude what I have to say of his history;—If any one think, that, in comparing him with Livy, I have done injustice to Livy, let him read what men of a much more learned age than this have said upon the same subject. Their testimonies are prefixed to the Oxford edition. I shall only quote one of them, that of Paulus Benius *de Historia*, whose words are, *Historia Halicarnassei nobilissima, et rerum copia, ordine, perspicuitate, eloquentia, et, quod caput est, veritate, sine ulla dubitatione Livianæ superior*. Now, I have not said, nor indeed could I well say, more than this.

Of the Halicarnassian's critical works I have spoken elsewhere, and given my opinion both of their matter and stile *. I shall only add here, that I beg leave again to recommend, to the studious of Greek

* Book 2. cap. 5. *in fine*, of the preceding vol.

learning and fine writing, a most diligent perusal of them; as it is from the antients that we must learn both to write and judge of writing. Now, this the Halicarnassian teaches us in the best way possible, by precept as well as example, and not only by his own example, but by the example of others, who have written both well and ill, pointing out to us the beauties of the one and the faults of the other. For my own part, I must confess, that, if I had never studied his critical writings, tho,' perhaps, by some natural taste, which I may have, I might have perceived some beauties or faults in prose writing, yet I never should have had any art of criticism, or been able to judge, by any rule or principle, of what was good or bad in that kind of writing. And, as to *poetry*, if I had not studied Aristotle's *poetics*, I should not have so much as known what poetry was, but should have thought as, I believe, many do, that versification and fine diction make poetry, and that an art, taught in verse, with all the ornaments of poetical diction, such as the *Georgics* of Virgil, was a *poem*. I would therefore again recommend it to the scholars of Ox-

ford, as a work that I think would be very useful to the learned world, to publish a portable pocket edition not only of Dionysius's history, but of his critical works, such as the Glasgow editions of some Classics, which might travel or go to the country with one; for his works are of those *Exemplaria Græca*, which a scholar ought to study at home and abroad, day and night *.

* In this edition, if it be revised by a scholar, he will find several faults to correct in Hudson's edition. I will only mention one, which happens at present to be under my view. It is a fault in punctuation, such as I observed in Herodotus (vol. 4. p. 426. of this work); and, as it relates to a very important institution of Romulus, that of *Patrons and Clients*, it deserves to be attended to. As it stands pointed at present it is not sense, neither in the original nor the translation: But, if it be read and pointed thus, it is perfectly clear. After the passage, (lib. 2. cap. 9.) which assigns to the Patricians and Plebeians their several occupations, concluding with these words; γινεσθαι δὲ καὶ κτηνοτροφίαν, καὶ τὰς χρηματοποιίας ἐργάζεσθαι τυχίας, there should be a full stop: Then a new sentence should begin with the addition of the particle δὲ to make a connection; and it should be read thus: Ἰνα δὲ μὴ στασιαζόντι, ὥστερ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαῖς πόλεσιν, ἢ τῶν ἐν τελείῃ προσηλακίζονται τοὺς ταπεινοὺς, ἢ τῶν φερόντων καὶ ἀπορῶν τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερχίαις φθονοῦνται, Here there should

be a comma instead of the full stop in Hudson's edition; then go on, (leaving out the $\delta\iota$ after *παρεκαταθήκας*, which ought to have been inserted in the preceding member of the sentence), and read as follows, *παρεκαταθήκας ἰδὼν τοῖς πατρικίοις τοὺς δημοτικούς, ἐπι-
τρέψας ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πλῆθους ὅτι αὐτοὺς ἐβούλετο τιμῆν
προστάτην*. As thus read, the sense is clear, and a very good reason given for the institution of Patrons and Clients, but which has no connection with what goes before concerning the business of Patricians and Plebeians. One thing every scholar may be assured of, that this author is so perspicuous as well as elegant, that, if there be any where an obscurity as to his meaning, there is some fault either in the MS. or printed copy. There are other passages of the same kind, which may be corrected in a new edition; but, what I chiefly insist on in that edition, is, that the readings of the Vatican MS. or the conjectural emendations of Henry Stephen or Sylburgius, should be taken into the text. This would not only save me the trouble of looking down to the bottom of the page, but also the mortification of being able only to discover that the text is faulty, which is often the case, but not to correct it as Henry Stephen and Sylburgius have done. This, I know, will seldom or never be the case of the great Greek scholars in Oxford, who will enjoy the pleasure of discovering that they are as great Greek scholars, and as acute critics, as the two commentators I have mentioned; but they ought to consult the ease and satisfaction of others as well as of themselves.

C H A P. IV.

The history of Polybius may be considered as a continuation of the Halicarnassian's history.—These two histories the most valuable in the world;—but have come down to us sadly mutilated.—Some excerpts from them preserved.—What Polybius calls his history, comprehends only a period of 53 years, beginning with the second Punic war, and coming down to the conquest of Macedonia.—His two first books are only preparatory and introductory to his history.—His history takes in the most glorious period of Rome.—Description of their glory at that time.—The moderation they showed in the use of their power, and their clemency to those that had offended them.—The grandeur of the Roman senate at that time,—when ambassadors from all parts of the earth, and even Kings in person, attended them.—Their virtue still preserved, and not im-

paired either by power or wealth.—The history of the later and more glorious part of this period, not preserved to us in what we have of Polybius ;—but this supplied by what we have of Livy.—What we have left of Polybius, shows us more of the distresses and calamities of the Romans than of their triumphs.—Their losses both by sea and land in the first Punic war very great ; and their losses in the second Punic war, such as brought them to the brink of ruin.—That war the finest subject of history, on account of the variety of great events in it, and the wisdom and virtue there shown.—The great difficulties that Hannibal had to encounter before he got into Italy, and the prodigious force that was there to oppose him.—The subject therefore of Polybius's history the noblest that can be imagined ;—very proper for enforcing what he recommends so much, viz. submission to the Roman government.—No man fitter to write upon such a subject than Polybius ;—a man of of business, and who had been employed in great affairs, both civil and military.—The difference betwixt him and the

Halicarnassian in this respect, and also in respect of his being much better informed of the facts which he relates.—The subject of Polybius's history more comprehensive than that of the Halicarnassian, in respect it takes in the affairs of other nations, as well as of the Romans.—Of the digressions in Polybius, which, tho' contrary to the laws of history, are very instructive, particularly with respect to the military affairs of the Romans.—His descriptions of battles wonderfully clear and lively.—The value of such a body of history as that of the Halicarnassian and Polybius, if it were all preserved, or if it could be yet recovered;—some chance for that;—a MS. of Livy discovered to be in the Emperor of Morocco's library.—Of the stile of Polybius;—much inferior to that of the Halicarnassian.—Idiotisms of Polybius;—not an obscure writer, but his sense sometimes mistaken both by his translator Casaubon and Livy.—His Greek not elegant, but very intelligible and perspicuous;—very little of the rhetorical stile in his speeches;—no affectation or la-

bour to write ill.—General observations upon the Greek historians compared with the Latin.

THE history of Polybius, tho' written long before the Halicarnassian's, may be considered as the sequel of it ; for the Halicarnassian begins his history with the origin of the Roman people, and the foundation of Rome, and carries it down to the beginning of the first Punic war. There Polybius takes it up, and continues it till the conclusion of the last Macedonian war, when he reckons the Romans attained to the possession of universal monarchy. These two histories, if they had been preserved entire to us, would have made both together the noblest work of history that the world has ever seen ; for they would have been the history of the greatest people, and, during the best ages of their state, before their morals were corrupted by wealth and luxury, and before those factions and seditions, and bloody civil wars, the consequence of that corruption, put an end to their free government, and at last lost them

the empire of the world, and made them a prey to nations more barbarous, as well as less warlike, than those they had overcome. But these two histories have come down to us sadly mutilated; for, of Dionysius's history there remains no more than eleven books out of twenty which he wrote*. These eleven books come no farther down than the 312th year of the city. Of those that are lost, we have nothing but some excerpts preserved to us in the collection of Constantine Porphyrogenet, under the head of *virtues, vices, and embassies* †. Polybius's plan was to be executed, as he tells us, in 40 books; tho' he says it was doubtful, whether he should live to complete them. It appears, however, that he did write at least 37 of them, as Suidas quotes the 37th book of his history. But, of this

* Photius Biblioth. Cod. 74.

† In these excerpts there are some very valuable things, particularly in the beginning of them there is an observation of the author upon the distinction betwixt Greeks and barbarians, which shows a great deal of humanity and good sense.

great and most valuable work, there nothing now remains but the first five books entire, and excerpts from the 12 succeeding, made, we do not know, by whom ; but we are so far obliged to him, that he has not abridged any thing that he has excerpted, as Justin has abridged Trogus Pompeius, but has given us the words of the author entire. We have also excerpts from various books of his history under one of the titles in the great historical pandects above mentioned, of Constantine Porphyrogenet, which Title is inscribed *de Legationibus*, where we have also the text of the author at full length, and not abridged ; so that this collection makes a very considerable part of what is preserved to us of Polybius.

What Polybius calls his *history* begins with the second Punic war, that is, in the second year of the 140th Olympiad, and 535th year of the city ; and it was continued down to the conquest of Macedonia by Paulus Æmilius, a period, as Polybius tells us, of 53 years. But, by way of preparation for this history, and in order to make us understand perfectly the state of

the Roman commonwealth at the time this second Punic war began, he has given us two books, as an introduction to his history ; in the first of which he has given us an account of the first Punic war, which began in the 489th year of the city ; and in the second he relates some dreadful wars which the Romans had with the Cisalpine Gauls, after the conclusion of the first Punic war. In this book he has also described to us very accurately the state of affairs in Greece ; and particularly of the Achean confederacy in Peloponesus, at the time when the second Punic war began. This historical work, therefore, of Polybius, comprehends a most glorious period of the history of the noblest people that ever existed, beginning with the first step they made towards universal monarchy, by going out of Italy into Sicily, which indeed was naturally the first step, as Sicily was the nearest island to them, and undoubtedly at some time or another had been part of Italy, and ending with the conquest of Macedon. Then the Romans were at the greatest height of their glory, though not of dominion

and extent of empire; for they were then not more the conquerors than the saviours of mankind, and the deliverers from tyranny and oppression. The greatest triumph that ever people enjoyed, was what they enjoyed at the Isthmian games of Greece, when, after having driven Philip out of that country, their consul Titus Quinctius Flaminius, by proclamation, declared all the Greek states to be free in Asia as well as in Greece. The thing appeared so extraordinary to the Greeks, that they could hardly believe their own ears; they thought they were in a dream; and, to be assured that they were not so, they desired that the herald should be brought into the middle of the *stadium*, that he might be seen as well as heard. Accordingly the herald placed himself there, and proclaimed the same thing again; upon which there was such a shout and such acclamations from the prodigious concourse of people that was at this *panegyric*, that Polybius tells us it was not possible to be conceived by those who were not

present *. And Plutarch, in his life of this consul, tells us, that the cries rent the air so much, that the birds, flying over their heads, fell down as thro' a *vacuum*; but this is a circumstance not mentioned by Polybius, nor by Livy, who appears to have copied Polybius here as well as in many other places. But in this all the three authors I have mentioned agree, that Quinctius was almost crushed to death by the people crouding to see and thank their benefactor; and he was well nigh smothered by the flowers and crowns they threw upon him. Livy adds, that, if he had not been a strong young man of 33, he could hardly have escaped with his life †. And Plutarch says, that he would not have escaped, strong as he was, if he had not been prudent enough to have retired in time, before the whole croud came upon him. The reflection of Polybius, upon the occasion, is, that however extra-

* Polyb. excerpt. 9. under the title of *Legationes*, p. 798. ed. Casauboni.

† Liv. lib. 33. cap. 33.

vagant the joy of the Greeks may seem to have been, it was not so wonderful as what the Romans had done for them. And indeed there is no example in the history of mankind, of a people leaving their own country, crossing the seas, engaging in a most dangerous and expensive war with the greatest King then upon earth, Philip King of Macedon, and all this for no other purpose than to bestow liberty upon a distant people, with whom they were no ways connected by treaty or alliance, and without retaining any thing out of the conquests they had made, nor exacting from the people they had set free any taxes or contributions, not even the expences of the war. This was a generosity, such as I do not wonder that it appeared, as Livy tells us, romantic to the Greeks themselves *. But their generosity and magnanimity was not confined to Greece. The people of Ilyrium they also declared free, after having conquered them. To

* See a speech made by the Rhodian ambassadors upon this occasion in Livy, lib. 37. cap. 54. of which Livy says, that *'apta magnitudini Romanæ oratio visa est.'*

Antiochus, the great King in Asia, they gave the very same terms of peace, after defeating him in a great and decisive battle, which they had offered to him in the beginning of the war. These were to abstain from Europe, and to relinquish all he possessed in Asia, on this side Mount *Taurus*. But they imposed no tribute upon him, only made him pay a great sum for the expences of the war ; but for which payment they allowed him a certain number of years. And, of all the country they took from him, they kept no part to themselves, but declared all the cities and states in it to be free*.

* Livii lib. 37. cap. 45. where you have a speech of the ambassadors, whom Antiochus sent to Scipio Africanus and his brother Lucius to beg for peace ; in which they say, that the Romans, being now masters of the earth, ought to lay aside all contentions with men, and, like the Gods, only exercise mercy and beneficence to the human race. To which Africanus answered, ‘ That the Romans had every thing from the
 ‘ Gods which they could give them : But their mind
 ‘ was their own, and it had always been the same in all
 ‘ fortunes, neither elevated by prosperity, nor dejected
 ‘ by adversity. Of this,’ says he, ‘ nobody can inform
 ‘ you better than Hannibal who is with you.’ And in-

And their most inveterate enemies the Carthaginians, by whom they had sustained such prodigious losses, as brought them to the very brink of ruin, they did not, after they had subdued them, reduce to a state of slavery or even subjection, but left them their laws and liberties, only stripping them of all their foreign conquests, and taking other means to prevent their again injuring or insulting them; so that it is true what Sallust says of them while they yet preserved their antient manners, *neque victis, praeter injuriae licentiam, quicquam adimebant* *. Nor should it be forgot, that, tho' they had made war against the Lacedemonians, while they were under the dominion of their tyrant Nabis, yet afterwards, when the Achaeans conquered them, and, abolishing the laws and institutions of Lycurgus, under which, says Livy, they had lived 1700 years †,

deed the terms he granted them were a sufficient proof how well they could bear prosperity.

* Catalin. cap. 12.

† Lib. 38. cap. 34.

obliged them to live according to their laws, the Romans again restored them to the use of Lycurgus's laws and discipline *. Their last conquest, with which is concluded the period of the history of Polybius, (and the greatest they ever made, if we consider the glory of the nation, and how many countries they had subdued under Alexander the Great), was the conquest of Macedonia, whose King their Consul Paulus Æmilius led in triumph, when, much about the same time, their Praetor Anicius led in triumph Gentius, King of Illyrium †. The Macedonians, tho' they had conquered them twice, they did not enslave, but declared them a free people, and exacted from them only one half of the tribute which they paid to their Kings. In short, at this time, they had not made one province of any foreign country any more than of Italy ; but had left all the nations, they conquered, in full possession of their laws and liberties, and under the government of their own magistrates. And the transmarine nations, they had subdued, were rather their

* Pausaniae *Arcadica*, cap. 51.

† Livii lib. 45. cap. 40. 43.

friends and allies than their subjects : And I believe they were much of the same disposition with the states of Italy, which Hannibal solicited to revolt from the Romans, and to join him, promising them their liberty if they would do so ; but this offer they refused, tho' he was then laying waste their country with fire and sword, thinking themselves happier under the Roman government than they were under their own ; which, says Livy, is the greatest security for the fidelity of allies *. The Roman senate at this time had ambassadors attending them from almost all the states and nations of the world then known. Even Kings, and the sons and brothers of Kings came to wait upon them, such as Eumenes King of Pergamus, and his brother Attalus, Prusias King of Bythia, and his son Nicomedes ;

* Livy says, that Hannibal could not shake the fidelity of these allies, ‘ quia iusto et moderato regerantur imperio ; nec abnuebant, quod unum’ (I would choose to read *unicum*) ‘ vinculum fidei est, melioribus parere.’ (Lib. 22. cap. 13. in fine). ;—the greatest eulogium he could have pronounced, not only upon the Roman government, but upon the sense of their allies.

and they were addressed like Gods upon earth; some of the ambassadors, such as those from Rhodes and from Ætolia, prostrating themselves before them, and in that way begging to be forgiven for the offences they had committed against the Romans, which accordingly was done.

If Cynias, the ambassador from Pyrrhus to the Roman senate, had seen them in the circumstances I have described, attended by ambassadors from almost every state and country of the world then known, and importuned with prayers and supplications even from Kings, one of whom, namely the above mentioned Prusias King of Bythia, prostrated himself before them, and even kissed the threshold of the senate-house*, he would have said that they were like, not to an assembly of Kings, but of Gods; and indeed at that time they may be said to have been the arbiters of human affairs, and to have governed mankind with goodness and benevolence, and mercy, too, not unworthy of the Divine Nature. And

* Livii lib. 45. cap. ult.

not only did they govern in this manner the states of Europe and Asia, with which they had any connection; but their power extended even to Egypt, not to make conquests there, or acquire any thing for themselves, but to prevent violence and injustice; for they interposed to save from Antiochus that kingdom, which he wanted to wrest from the lawful heirs, the children of Ptolemy the last King, who had shown a friendly disposition to the Romans in the first Macedonian war, tho' he had been of no service to them. To Antiochus the senate sent an ambassador, Popilius by name, who delivered to him letters from the senate, requiring that he should immediately depart out of Egypt, of which he was then in possession. Antiochus answered, that he would advise with his friends what was to be done. Upon which, Popilius, with the rod, that he had in his hand, describing a circle round the King, 'You must,' says he, 'before you go out of this circle, give an answer that I can carry back to the senate.' The King, confounded by so stern a demand, after some hesitation, answered, That he would obey

the senate. And accordingly he gave up Egypt, of which he was master by sea as well as by land, having then beaten the Egyptian fleet *. After this ambassadors came from him to Rome, who informed the senate that he had obeyed their commands, as he would have done those of the Gods. And the ambassadors from the children of Ptolemy, whom the Romans had restored to their kingdom, acknowledged that they owed more to the senate and people of Rome, than to their parents, more than even to the immortal Gods †.

But what is still more wonderful than any thing I have yet related, amidst all this glory and exaltation, though a great deal of the wealth of the east had then come among them, they still retained their virtue and abstinence from money, which in later times drew every thing unto it ; for Paulus Æmilius, who led in triumph the greatest King then in the world, and brought

* Liv. lib. 45. cap. 12.

† Livii lib. 45. cap. 13.

so much wealth into the Roman treasury, died himself so poor that he scarce left enough, after his goods were auctioned, to pay his wife's dowry *. And Lucius Scipio, who first carried the Roman arms into Asia, conquered Antiochus, the greatest King there, and brought from thence to Rome more treasure than, I believe, ever came thither at one time from the east, could not pay the fine most unjustly imposed upon him by the people at the instigation of their tribunes, tho' he sold all his effects for payment of it ; but his friends and clients contributed so much to reimburse him for this loss, that, if he had accepted of it, he would have been richer than ever he was ; but he would take nothing from them. What he wanted for the necessaries of life, his nearest relations supplied †.

It is with this glorious period of the Roman history, when not only her arms were

* *Livii epitome*, lib. 46.

† *Livii lib.* 38. cap. ult.

triumphant every where, and made all the Kings and nations then known bow to her, but her virtue was yet uncorrupted by the greatest temptations to which virtue can be exposed, *power* and *wealth*, that Polybius closed his history, of which by far the greater part is lost, and particularly that part which described the victories and triumphs of the Romans over all their enemies. This loss is in some measure repaired by what is preserved of Livy, and which very probably was taken for the greater part from Polybius. What remains to us of this author chiefly contains the trials and distresses of the Romans, in which they showed themselves greater, if possible, than in their greatest prosperity; for Polybius tells us, that they were never so much to be feared, as after some signal loss *. There is, however, still preserved

* After giving an account of the great preparations they made to repair the loss they had sustained in the second battle with Hannibal, he adds: *Τότε γὰρ εἰσι φοβερωτάτοι Ρωμαῖοι, καὶ κοῖτη καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν, ὅταν αὐτοὺς περιετὴ φόβος ἀληθινός.* Lib. 3. p. 227. edit. Casauboni, lit. B.

to us an account, given by him in his introduction to his history, of one war, in which they were successful; I mean the first Punic war, in which they showed a spirit of resolution and perseverance that are without example in the history of any other nation. In that war they soon discovered, that, unless they could be superior to the Carthaginians by sea, as well as by land, they could not conquer or preserve Sicily, which was the object of the war. But how were they to acquire a superiority by sea over the Carthaginians, the greatest naval power then in the world? they, who had not ships of any kind, not even boats, as Polybius tells us, that could sail in the sea, and who could not even have transported their troops to Sicily thro' the narrow frith which divides that island from the Continent, except by the ships with which their allies upon that coast furnished them. They did not so much as know how to build a ship of war, till by accident they got a Carthaginian galley that had run ashore; upon the model of which they built a fleet; and, having exercised their rowers at land, in the manner Poly-

buis has described, they put to sea with it, and, by the assistance of a grappling machine which they invented, and by which they brought the enemy's ships to close fight, and so supplied their defect in the sailing and managing the ships, they beat the Carthaginians in a great battle. But after this they suffered such losses both from the enemy and by storms, that they fairly gave up the sea : Some time after, however, they took to it again, and fitted out another fleet, which they lost by a great storm and their unskillfulness in navigation. Upon this they gave up the sea a second time, and were for a while altogether without a fleet : But having, by a lucky accident, got hold of a Rhodian galley that was in the service of the Carthaginians, they built a new fleet upon a better model than that of their former ships ; but it was at the expence of the private citizens, the public treasury being quite exhausted. With this fleet, which sailed much better than any they had ever had before, they defeated the Carthaginians in a great decisive battle, which obliged them to sue for peace. In this first Carthaginian

war the Romans not only sustained prodigious losses by sea, but at land too they lost in Africa a whole army, and the Consul Regulus who commanded it.

In the second Carthaginian war they sustained losses, not by sea, but by land and in their own country, such as, I believe, there never was a nation, except themselves, that would not have sunk under them: But, instead of that, they bore up against them, not only with the greatest firmness and resolution, but with a magnanimity which would have done honour to any single man of the most distinguished character; but, in a whole nation, was really wonderful, and could not be believed, if it were not so well attested.

This war was not, for the number of men engaged in it, near so great a war as that of Xerxes with the Greeks; nor would the consequences have been so great, if the Carthaginians had prevailed over the Romans, as if Xerxes had conquered Greece*;

* See what I have said upon this subject, vol. 4. of this work, p. 417.

but it is, I think, a very much better subject of history, as it was of so much longer endurance, and the events in it much more various, and even more virtue and wisdom shown in it, and more of military skill and conduct not only on the side of the Romans, but also of the Carthaginians: For there never was an enterprise so boldly undertaken, and carried on for no less than seventeen years with such success, as Hannibal's invasion of Italy, whether we consider the difficulties he had to encounter before he could enter the country, not from enemies only, but from nature, which appears to have fortified the entrance to Italy on the side of Gaul, from whence Hannibal entered it, by a ridge of mountains hardly passable by a single man, much less by an army; and, after he had got into the country, with the loss of more than half of the army, he brought with him from Spain, he had to encounter a force of the Romans and their allies, which consisted, as Polybius has reckoned it up, of above 700,000 foot, and 70,000 horse *, to which he had nothing

* Lib. 2. p. 113. *Edit. Casauboni.*

to oppose, but a weather-beaten army worn out with fatigue, of no more than 20,000 foot, and 6000 horse *. With this handful of men he beat the Romans in four great battles, the last of them one of the most decisive victories that ever was gained, maintained himself, as I have said, 17 years in the country, and at last brought his army out of it unconquered.

And here it may not be improper to observe how soon the Romans, after the period when Polybius closes his history, fell from that height of glory which they had then attained, and that reputation for justice and humanity, which made them so much loved, as well as feared by all the nations of the world then known. Very soon after Perseus was defeated and taken prisoner, they pillaged and destroyed in one day no less than 70 cities in Epirus that had revolted from the Romans and joined Perseus, and made slaves of 150,000 people ;—the greatest calamity, perhaps, that ever befel the human race in so short a

* Polyb. lib. 3. p. 209.

space of time. This was done in order to give the plunder to the soldiers, who had got a taste of the wealth and luxury of the east, and could not bear to see all the wealth of Macedon carried to the public treasury at Rome. It was done, too, in a manner unworthy of the Roman greatness and magnanimity ; for ten of the principal men out of each city were sent for, and desired to collect all the gold and silver from each of the cities, which was understood to be given as the price of the liberty they were to enjoy, as well as the Macedonians. After this was done, upon a signal given, the soldiers took possession of the cities, plundered them, and demolished the walls, making slaves, as I have said, of the inhabitants *. Another thing they did soon after this, was not so cruel, but more unjust : They insisted that the Achaean confederacy should send no less than 1000 of their principal men, of whom Polybius was one, to Rome, where they were detained as prisoners for no less than 17 years, when they were dismissed ; but, by that time, no more than 300 of them

* Livii lib. 45. cap. 34.

were alive, such of them, as had attempted to make their escape and were caught, having been put to death. The pretence for doing this, was, that they were suspected of favouring Perseus, and endeavouring to persuade their countrymen to join him in the war against the Romans: But this charge they denied, and desired to have a fair trial, which, however, they could not obtain *.

Not long after this followed the destruction of three remarkable cities by the Romans, Corinth, Numantia, and Carthage. Corinth was a Greek city, situated betwixt two seas in the isthmus which joins Peloponesus to the rest of Greece, and famous for the works of art that adorned it. This city Mummius the Roman General sacked, plundered, burnt, put to the sword all the men, and sold the women and children for slaves †, because, as Livy tells us ‡,

* Pausaniae lib. 7. cap. 10.

† Ibid. cap. 16.

‡ *Epitome* lib. 52.

some insult had been offered there to the Roman ambassadors, probably by the populace. Polybius was himself present at the sack of this town, and saw some fine pictures, two particularly which he mentions, thrown upon the ground, and the soldiers playing at dice upon them*.

The destruction of Numantia, as described by Appian, is one of the most dismal tragedies that we read of in history. The inhabitants of this city appear to have been as valiant a race of men as ever existed. They were no more than 8000 fighting men, horse and foot; and with so small a force they not only maintained their liberty and independence against the Romans for several years, but defeated them in sundry battles, in one of which, with no more than 4000 men, they defeated 30,000 Romans†, and compelled one of their generals to make a peace with them. This peace the Romans

* Of this fact we are informed by Strabo, lib. 8. The passage is quoted by Casaubon in his Collection of the Fragments of Polybius, p. 996.

† Livii Epitome lib. 55.

would not ratify, thinking themselves justified for not doing so, by giving up the general who made it; but him the Numantines would not accept, tho' they could not have been blamed if they had taken him, and put him to the most cruel death. Not moved by this generosity of so gallant a people, the Romans sent against them the best general they then had, Scipio, the second Africanus, who came against their city with an army of above 60,000 men. The Numantines, not discouraged by such a prodigious superiority of force, offered him battle in the open field. But this Scipio declined, and did what, Appian says, and, I believe, truly, no general ever did before, besieged and inclosed in a city men that were willing to fight him in a fair field. The works he made about this city were such, that it was impossible to get either into it or out of it: The consequence of which was, that, tho' the Romans did not so much as attempt to take the city by storm, the Numantines were at last reduced to the greatest extremity by famine; insomuch that they began to eat their sick and useles people. At last they offered to surrender: But Scipio would give them no other terms, ex-

cept that of giving up their arms and their city at discretion. Such terms a great part of them refused to accept, and rather chose to put themselves to death. Of the surviving Scipio made slaves, all except 50, whom he reserved for his triumph; and razed the city to the very foundations*.

The third town I mentioned destroyed by the Romans was Carthage, which contended so long with them for empire. The tragedy of this city is still more lamentable than that of Numantia, and was of much longer endurance; for the siege lasted three years, and was concluded with a sack and a massacre of the inhabitants, which lasted seven days. And the Romans were guilty of a still greater breach of faith to the Carthaginians than to the Nu-

* Appian *De Bellis Hispanicis*, p. 310.—See his whole account of this war, which is very well worth reading. According to Livy, if I understand him right, they all killed themselves. (Epitome lib. 59.) The words are: * Numantini, fame coacti, ipsi se, per vicem tradentes, trucidaverunt.' What the meaning of the words *per vicem tradentes*, is, I do not well know; but, I think, it is pretty plain he meant that they all killed themselves.

mantines, and acted in a more indirect manner, and which may truly be called knavish, altogether unworthy of Roman generosity and magnanimity. In the first place, their pretence for beginning the third Punic war was the most slender that can be imagined. It was because they had entered into a war, in self-defence, with Masinissa, the ally of the Romans; in which war they were worsted, and lost a great number of men. In satisfaction of this offence given to the Romans, or rather taken by them, as a pretence for destroying their city, they first sent, at the desire of the Roman senate, 300 of the children of their noble families to Rome. Upon this, the senate promised that they should have their liberty; but they sent, however, both an army and a fleet against them; and the consul, who commanded the army, insisted, that, in order to have the liberty promised them, they must give up their arms, and all their machinery for the defence of the town. Even this they complied with: But, not satisfied with this, the consul, in name of the senate, insisted that they should leave

Ch. IV. PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE. 181

the town, which they and their forefathers had dwelt in for 700 years, and remove to any other place they chose, at the distance of 80 *stadia* from the sea ;—a demand most unexpected to the Carthaginians, and which, if it was ever to be made upon a people, with whom they had concluded a treaty of peace and amity upon their own terms, which the Carthaginians had most religiously observed, having given up their ships and their elephants, and paid up punctually the tribute imposed upon them, and, over and above that, had voluntarily assisted them in their three wars with Philip, Antiochus, and Perseus, ought certainly to have been made before they received the hostages, or at least before they took their arms and their warlike stores from them ; but *delenda est Carthago*, was the word among them, upon any pretence, for security of their wealth and power. When this so unjust and unexpected demand was made, the Carthaginians, as may well be imagined, were quite frantic, and tore in pieces the senators who advised them to send hostages, and give up their arms. But after their fury had subsided, they pre-

pared for their defence ; and, tho' in the most destitute condition, without arms, ships, or engines of war of any kind, having contrived, with incredible invention and industry, to make new arms to themselves, new engines, even ships of war, and a new port, when the old one was blocked up by the Romans, they made a resistance, such as we do not read of the like in history, for no less than three years, against the force of Rome, then mistress of almost the whole known world, worsted their enemies in several encounters, till at last the Romans having sent against them their best general, the second Scipio Africanus, who blocked up the city both by sea and land, and thereby cut off from them all supplies of provisions, so that many of them died of famine, he at last took the city by storm ; and continued, as I have said, the sack and devastation of it for seven days ; all the circumstances of which Appian has described so pathetically *, (for he excels in such descriptions), that one cannot read the passage without

* *De Bellis Hispanicis*, p. 302.

horror. One remarkable particular he has mentioned, that Scipio himself was so much moved with the sight, that he shed tears; and, reflecting upon the fate of this and other great cities which had been destroyed in like manner, he repeated the lines of Homer, where he makes Hector prophecy the destruction of Troy *; and, when he was asked by Polybius, who then happened to be beside him, what he meant by repeating these verses? he plainly applied them to his own city, presaging that some time or other Rome might have the fate of Carthage and other great cities. This, says Appian, Polybius has related in his history of this third Carthaginian war.

This manner of treating conquered cities was very different from what they practiced in the better times of the commonwealth. Then they conquered, in the manner Sallust has described in the passage above quoted, and deserved that fine eul-

* Εστίται ημας, 'εγ' ουκ ετι' ελθωη Ιλιος 'ιρη.

Και Πριαμος, και λαος εϋμελιω Πριαμοιο.

Iliad 2. v. 448.

logium, which Virgil has bestowed on them in the following beautiful lines :

Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento,
(Hæc tibi erunt artes) pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.

Æneid. lib. 6. v. 852.

Besides the destruction of these three cities, I cannot help regretting, that they did not spare, for some time longer, the last remains of liberty in Greece ;—I mean the Cities of the Achæan league, but made a province of the whole country of Greece, to be governed by Roman laws and Roman magistrates. This, I think, was not necessary for their safety at that time, after they had conquered Macedonia, and had driven the great King of Asia, Antiochus, beyond Taurus.

The prediction of Scipio above mentioned was so far accomplished in later times, that Rome was thrice sacked by the Goths : And one of their Kings, Totila, had once resolved to destroy it as totally as Scipio had destroyed Carthage ; for he was to have made a sheep-park of it, and

had actually demolished a part of the walls.

These events happened at a very distant period ; but the decline of the Roman manners, which ended in the ruin of their state, began after the conquest of Macedon, when Polybius concluded his history. And first, with respect to foreign states, they did not, as I have said, show that benevolence, goodness, and compassion, which before distinguished them, as the most humane and generous conquerors that ever existed, and made them the admiration of mankind ; on the contrary, in some of the instances I have given, they were not only not generous, but unjust and fraudulent, and mean in their dealings. But, after the destruction of Carthage, they became very much worse ; and those vices, which wealth and power had produced in them, having no longer any objects to operate upon abroad, turned against themselves, and made them prey upon one another. And accordingly, after they had accomplished the long wished for destruc-

tion of Carthage, we have in Rome almost one continued scene of disorder and confusion, faction and sedition, murders, massacres, proscriptions, and bloody civil wars, till there was an end of their liberty and the republic under Augustus Caesar, who was succeeded by some of the most cruel tyrants that we read of in history. And so things went on from bad to worse, with some variety of good Emperors, but no change of the people for the better, not even under the reign of the philosopher, Marcus Aurelius, till at last the events I have mentioned happened; and Rome, once the mistress of the world, and the most magnificent city that ever existed in respect of its buildings, and the works of art that were there, collected from every part of the world where art was to be found, has undergone more desolation and misery than any city ever did that was not totally destroyed.

If it be asked, from what cause this wonderful change of fortune proceeded? the answer is simple, and, I think, obvious;—From *money*. It was this that ruined Spar-

ta, as the oracle had foretold, tho' there was very little of it there ; and it was this that ruined all the antient heroic kingdoms in Greece, tho' there was still less of it in them. But, little of it as there was, it made tyrants of those heroic Kings *, who continued till the several states, with the assistance of the Lacedemonians, got free of them, and, in their place, established aristocracies or democracies †.

* Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 13.

† Ibid. cap. 17. And here it may be observed, that to the wisdom of Lycurgus, more than human, as the oracle thought, who recovered Sparta from a state of the greatest disorder and misrule, as Thucydides, in the passage here quoted, informs us, and established in it a government which lasted so long, we owe the arts of Greece ; for, if the states there had continued under their tyrants, the spirits of the people would have been debased, and they never would have excelled neither in arts nor arms. To the Lacedemonians therefore in the first place, and in the second place to the Lacedemonians and Athenians joined together, who drove Xerxes out of Greece, we owe the preservation of arts and sciences.—See what I have said in p. 417. of the preceding volume, of the consequences which would have followed, with respect to arts, if the Persians had succeeded in that enterprise.

However paradoxical it may seem, it is certainly true, that in every country where there is much wealth there is more poverty : For wealth necessarily makes the rich luxurious ; and, as the lower sort of people always imitate the manners of the great and rich, luxury must descend from them to the lowest of the people ; the consequence of which is, that by far the greater part of the people become very poor, and little better than absolute beggars ; and, as there can be no bounds set to luxury, even the rich become indigent. Besides, money begets money ; and, therefore, wealth of necessity runs into few hands : And, as land is the most certain fund of wealth, the rich become great monopolizers of land. Accordingly, the land of Italy, instead of being possessed in small farms by free citizens, as it was of old, became the property of the great and rich, and was cultivated, as Livy tells us, by slaves *. In this way the people of Rome were driven from the Country into the Town ; where they lived, as Sallust tells us, in the great-

* P. 25. of this vol.

est indigence, having no possessions, nor any thing but their daily bread *, and this was furnished them, for the greater part, by public distributions of corn. When Julius Caesar was Dictator, there were no less than 320,000 citizens maintained in that way, which number Julius reduced to 150,000 †. This number of poor must appear very extraordinary, when we consider, that, in the last *census* mentioned by Livy, which was made by the same Julius, there were no more censed than 150,000 ‡, that is, so many males above the age of puberty. The effect, therefore, of wealth in a country is not only to corrupt the manners of the rich, but very much to increase the number of the poor, and at last to depopulate the country; as we may see from the example of antient Italy.

But, besides the influence of wealth upon the Roman state, of wealth infinitely

* Sallust. *Catalin.* cap. 48.

† Suetonius in *Caesaris vita*, cap. 41.

‡ Livii *Epitome* lib. 115.

greater than that which destroyed Sparta and the other antient kingdoms of Greece, and which truly might be said to have been the whole wealth of the world at that time, there was an imperfection in the Roman government in later times, so great even in that golden age of the Roman state, which is the subject of Polybius's history, that it would have fallen to pieces, and destroyed itself, as it did in after times, if it had not been for the extraordinary virtue of the people during that period. The Roman government, in its original institution, and as it continued under the Kings, was an heroic government, such as we find obtained in the several states of Greece at the time of the Trojan war ; for, as the Hali-carnassian has observed, there was a great resemblance betwixt the institutions and manners of the antient Romans, and those of the heroic ages. Now Homer has described to us very exactly this heroic government, at the head of which was a Chief, or King, a man of high birth, and distinguished from the rest of the people by superior abilities both of mind and body. This King was assisted in his government

by the men of distinguished rank among the people, who composed the *βουλή γεραιών*, or the *Senatus*, as the Romans called it. The King with this council first deliberated what was proper to be done upon any extraordinary occasion; and, when they had come to a resolution, they assembled the people, and desired their concurrence with what the Senate had resolved: For the people were not treated like slaves, who are only to obey the commands of a master; but, like rational creatures, they were to be convinced before they acted. And, therefore, it was necessary, that those heroic Kings should excel not only in council and fight, but in eloquence also, so as to be able to persuade the people to agree to the resolutions of the senate. And accordingly we find from Homer, that the Greek heroes valued themselves upon their eloquence, as well as upon their valour.

The first King among the Romans was undoubtedly, by his mother at least, whoever might be his father, of heroic race; and I have no doubt but that his 100 Senators, and the whole order of Patricians,

out of which both Senators and Knights were chosen, were, probably for the greater part, of Trojan families that came with Romulus from Alba to the new city, 50 of which the Halicarnassian tells us, were existing even in his time *. The whole administration of government was in the hands of those Patricians, and the people only consulted upon extraordinary occasions, such as the election of a King.

And here it may be observed, that this heroic form of government seems to have been of very antient use, not only among civilized nations, but among the nations we call barbarous. The government of the Hurons, the most antient nation in North America, was, about the middle of last century (for, I believe, they are now almost quite exterminated), as it is described by Gabriel Sagard †, who was a missionary for several years among them, exactly

* Lib. 1. *Antiquitatum* cap. 85.

† See an account of this author in p. 471. of the second edit. of vol. 1. of this work.

of the same kind with the heroic governments in Greece ; and, as I am very well informed by people that have been in the country, the more southern tribes of Indians in that part of the Continent are governed in the same way. And every body, who has been among the Indians, knows, that a Chief among them is not valued, if he does not excel, like the Greek heroes, in eloquence as well as in fight.

The kingdom of Rome having ended in the same way as the antient kingdoms of Greece above mentioned, by the avarice and cruelty of the last of the Kings, Tarquinius Superbus, the government that was established after his expulsion was likewise a mixed government ; but it had, I think, too much of democracy in its composition ; for, in the first place, the people had the election of the magistrates that were to govern them, particularly of the two chief magistrates who came in place of the King, and were elected annually, which put a great deal more power into the hands of the people, than if they had been for life,

as the Kings were. 2do, No law could be enacted but in the assemblies of the people. 3tio, They deliberated, and determined also, as to peace and war. 4to, They were judges of capital crimes in the last resort *. And, lastly, under the republic there was an alteration of the constitution, which gave much more power to the people than they had under the Kings; for then nothing that the people determined or enacted was valid, unless ratified by the senate, and that form was kept up in later times, but then, as Livy tells us, it was no more than a form; for, says he, before the people gave their suffrages, the senate ratified what they should do. His words are: *Priusquam populus suffragium ineat, in incertum comitiorum eventum patres auctores sunt* †. And I should have thought the government little better than an absolute democracy, if it had not been for two things, first, the *Comitia Centuriata*, a most political device, as I have already observed ‡, to moderate the power of the

* See Polybius, lib. 6. where a most accurate account is given of the different powers belonging to the Senate, the People, and the Consuls.

† Lib. 1. cap. 17.

‡ P. 124. of this vol.

people, which, at the same time that it laid the burden of the taxes upon the rich, threw into their hands a great part of the power of the state ; and, *secondly*, the magistrates and governours, tho' elected by the people, must be all of the Patrician order, that is, of the best race of men among them, and who, therefore, were the most proper to govern them. And in the hands of these men was the religion and the wealth of the country, and also the laws, by which every man's private property was secured to him. And yet, with all these restraints upon the people, I still think, that the government was too democratical. And I am persuaded, that, if the government of Sparta had been as democratical, it never could have lasted 700 years, nor half that time. There was, to be sure, a mixture of popular government in the Spartan constitution ; for, upon extraordinary occasions, we find the people were assembled and consulted ; as when they deliberated whether they should break the 30 years truce with the Athenians, and begin the famous Peloponnesian war *. But there

* Thucyd. lib. i. cap. 87.

was a very small mixture of it, of which we need no other proof than this, that we read in their history of no divisions or disorders in their state by disputes betwixt their Patricians, or Spartiates, as they called them, and the rest of the Lacedemonians, such as we find among the Romans, almost every year, betwixt their Patricians and Plebeians.

But in progress of time the Roman government, under the republic, became more and more democratical, till at last it was little better than a pure democracy, or rather *Ochlocracy*. The first step towards this total change of the government was the creation of the Tribunes of the people, by which, as was foreseen at the time*, of one state there were made two, in opposition to one another. This event, as I have said, was produced by *money*, the root of all evil, as it is most properly called in our Sacred Books, and what is the necessary consequence of money, the wealth of a few, and the poverty of many. If the Tribunes

* P. 136. of this vol.

had been elected in the *Comitia Centuriata*, instituted by Servius Tullius, the mischief would not have been so great; for the Patricians, by the means of their Clients and Dependents, might in those *Comitia* have got Tribunes elected that were in their interest. But, by the violence of the Tribunes, which had almost brought things to the extremity of bloodshed, a law was made enacting, that the Tribunes should be elected in the *Tributa Comitia*, in which every man, whatever his rank or fortune was, had an equal vote*.

But the demands of the people still rose higher; and at last they got a law enacted, by which every law that passed in the *Comitia Tributa* was binding upon the whole citizens †, by which the legislative power was put wholly into the hands of the people.

* See the account of this law given by Livy, lib. 2. cap. 56. 57. & 58.—See also what I have said in p. 139. of this vol. of the difference betwixt the three kinds of *Comitia*, viz. *Centuriata*, *Curiata*, and *Tributa*.

† Dionys. lib. 11. cap. 45.

The Patricians, however, still continued a distinct order of men from the Plebeians; nor was their race contaminated by any mixture with them. But this, too, the Tribunes got altered; and a law was made permitting what the Decemvirs had prohibited, and which was part of the common law, and the constitution of the country;—the marriage of Patricians and Plebeians. By this law the race of governing men was confounded with the people who were to be governed, and that distinction destroyed, which I hold to be established by nature among all herding animals, betwixt those who are fit to lead, and those who by nature are destined only to follow. Such a mixture of races must produce the same effect among men, as we know the mixture of horses of blood with common horses produces in the horse kind; for I hold that Horace argues well, when he says:

Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis;

Est in juvencis, est in equis patrum

Virtus.———*Carminum* lib. 4. ode 4.

And he might have said the same of all animals; for I hold, that the excellency of every species of animals is confined to a few races, or families, in that species.

As yet, however, the Patricians retained the right of being Consuls only ; so that they still had in their hands the executive power of government, tho' elected by the people, and under the controul of the popular assembly of the *Comitia Tributa* ; but this last of their privileges was also taken from them, and the Tribunes carried through a law, by which Consuls might be chosen out of the Plebeians. From that time, I hold that the Roman government ceased to be a mixed government, and may be said to be altogether popular.

The consequences of so great a change, and so much for the worse, soon appeared. The first Plebeian Consul that commanded an army fell into an ambush, was killed, and his army totally routed ; upon which, tho' it was a great public calamity, the Patricians exulted, as it may be believed, very much, saying, that the people by a law might so far offer violence to the religion of the country, as to take from them the right of auspices, of which they had been in possession since the foundation of Rome, but they could not persuade the immortal

Gods to give success to enterprises undertaken under such unhallowed auspices * : For, till this law was made, the *auspicia*, by which the Romans were directed in all their enterprises, were intirely in the hands of the Patricians, as indeed was the whole religion of the country. A much greater calamity than this did afterwards befall them under a Plebeian Consul, the greatest that ever they suffered from a foreign enemy. This was the battle of *Cannae*, where Terentius Varro, the son of a butcher, commanded as Consul. He was chosen by the people, as a *vere plebeius* or *novus homo*, and preferred to two Patricians who stood against him † ; for the Tribunes told them, that the Plebeians, who had been promoted to Curule offices, and in that way had become noble, adopted the sentiments of the Patricians and the antient nobility, and no longer minded the interests of the people ‡.

* Livii lib. 7. cap. 6.

† Ibid. lib. 22. cap. 35.

‡ Ibid. cap. 34.

These, and many other mischiefs which might be mentioned, were all owing to the prevalence of the popular government among them. It was by their driving into exile the greatest general they then had, Camillus, that their city was taken and destroyed by the Gauls, and all that was left of their power and glory was nothing but the Tarpeian rock, which was also very near taken, and only saved by the valour and strength of one of their citizens. It was the popular faction, too, that reduced to a state of beggary, as I have observed *, Lucius Scipio, who first carried their arms into Asia, defeated the greatest King of the East, Antiochus, and brought into the public treasury prodigious wealth. His brother the first Africanus, to whom they owed the preservation of their state, and who, perhaps, was the greatest man they ever had, they drove out of their city, to some obscure place upon the coast of Baiae, where he died, and was, by his own order, buried, being resolved not to leave even his bones in his ungrateful country.

* P. 168. of this volume.

The reader may perhaps think it strange, that, in a work which professes to treat only of stile, I should have said so much of the subject of Polybius's history; but it is by the choice of the subject, a material thing in every work, that the history of Polybius, is distinguished above all the histories that ever were written; for it is the history of the most glorious period of the noblest people, and the greatest in arms and government that ever existed. The choice of the subject is one reason, and, I think, a good one, why the Halicarnassian has preferred the history of Herodotus to that of Thucydides*; and for the same reason, I think, the history of Polybius preferable to any other history, at least of Roman affairs. I thought it also not improper to give some account of the fall of the Romans from a state of such high exaltation; for Polybius has told us in more than one place, that, unless we can discover the reasons and causes of events, we do not profit by the reading of history.

* See vol. 4. p. 419. of this work.

I will say no more of the subject of Polybius's history, except to add, that it was most proper for recommending what may be called the moral of the history both of the Halicarnassian and of Polybius, namely, a submission, by all other nations, to the government of the Romans, as a people destined by God and Nature, and fitted by their laws and institutions, to be the rulers of mankind, degenerate as men then were; and that therefore the nations could do nothing better, or more for their own interest, than to submit to their government, it being for the interest of every individual, as well as of every nation, to be governed by better men than themselves.

Of this so noble a subject Polybius has made the most instructive history that ever was written, and the best school in which a man can be formed, either for civil or military business. And there was no man more fit to write a history of that kind, as he was both a statesman and a soldier, and had been employed in great affairs of both kinds. He was a man of birth and rank, being the son of Lycortas, the praetor of the

Achaean league, and was employed by his country in public business of the greatest consequence. And, when by the misfortunes of his country he was brought to Rome, there his merit, for it could be nothing else, released him from captivity, and made him be taken notice of by the greatest men of those times, particularly the first Scipio, and his friend Laelius, with whom he lived in the greatest intimacy. And he was the educator and instructor of the second Scipio Africanus *, by whom he was employed in military affairs when Scipio took Carthage and put an end to the third Carthaginian war. And, as to his reputation in his own country of Arcadia, the many statues erected to him there bear witness ; one particularly in the town of Acacesus, with this most honourable inscription : ‘ That, if the Greeks had followed his advice, they would not at first

* This is a circumstance of his life very probable indeed in itself, but recorded by no author so far as I know, except by Appian *De Bellis Punicis*, in a passage quoted above, p. 183. where Appian relates what Polybius heard Scipio say, when he saw the desolation of Carthage.

‘ have erred ; but, having erred, he alone
 ‘ saved them from destruction *.’ The
 meaning of which is, that he was at great
 pains to dissuade the Achaeans from break-
 ing with the Romans ; but, having failed
 in that, he had interest enough with the
 great men of Rome to procure them the
 best terms after their defeat. And the same
 author tells us, that he was employed by
 the Romans to settle the government of
 the several cities belonging to the Achaean
 league, and to give them laws. Consider-
 ed, therefore, as a man of business and ac-
 tion, I know only two other historians of
 antiquity that can be compared with him,
 Julius Caesar and Xenophon.

In this respect he was far superior not
 only to Livy, but to Dionysius, who was
 nothing but a man of letters, a rhetorician,
 and an excellent writer. Polybius, there-
 fore, by his experience of business and ob-
 servations, must have been able to relate ci-
 vil transactions, and the intercourse betwixt
 different nations, and particularly military

* Pausanias in *Arcadicis*.

operations, (of which it was impossible the Halicarnassian could have any knowledge, except by reading books), much better than the Halicarnassian : And we are further to observe, that he had a much better opportunity of being informed of what he relates of the second Punic war, and downwards to the extinction of the Macedonian empire, which is what he calls his History, (the two books before it being no more than an introduction), and which may be considered as the history of his own times ; for he relates nothing during that period but what he might have been informed of by persons then living. And that he was at the utmost pains to get such information, his history itself bears witness, tho' he had not told us so. But, besides he has told us, that, with respect to the actions of Scipio in the second Punic war, he had his information from Laelius, his friend and assistant in all his exploits. And, with respect to Hannibal, it appears that he had seen a record made out by him, relating to the state in which he left affairs when he marched to invade Italy : And he has given us an accurate account, taken from a monument which

was to be seen in Italy in his time, namely a column in the town of Lacinium, of the army with which Hannibal entered Italy, viz. 20,000 foot, and 6000 horse; and this pillar, with these numbers engraved upon it, he says, was erected by Hannibal himself *. Whereas Livy has given us no more than reports upon this subject, exceedingly different from one another †. And, that he might be the better able to describe the military actions he mentions, he took the trouble of going to the places where they happened, and particularly, he says, he went to the place where Hannibal passed the Rhone and the Alps, and informed himself by people then li-

* Lib. 3. p. 209. lit. B.

† Livii lib. 21. cap. 38. I observe that Polybius was very curious about antient monuments when he could find them; and he has given us a copy of one very antient, and in a language so different from the Latin that was spoken in his time, that it was hardly understood by the most learned among the Romans. This was the first treaty that was made betwixt the Romans and Carthaginians under the first Consuls, Brutus and Marcus Horatius, and which was still preserved in Rome, when Polybius wrote his history. (Polybius, lib. 3. p. 177.)

ving, who had been eye-witnesses of what had happened, of an event, which, by many historians that had written before him, had been represented as altogether supernatural, and not to have been effectuated but by the immediate assistance of the Gods. He was also in Spain, which was the scene of the great actions performed by the first Scipio ; and indeed he appears to have been in almost every part of the world then known. And his travels were not confined to the land ; for he was entrusted with the command of a fleet, which was sent by the Romans to make discoveries in the Atlantic ocean on the coast of Africa *.

For these reasons, it is evident, that the facts related by Polybius must be much better authenticated than those collected by the Halicarnassian from antient authors, none of whom wrote the history of their own times, (for writing history, as he tells us, began very late among the Romans), but related what they wrote from tradition

* Polybii lib. 3. p. 211. lit. D.—Plinii Nat. Hist. lib. 5. cap. 1.

or common report. At the same time, I am persuaded, that Polybius was not learned enough to have written such a book of Archeology as the first book of Dionysius, or to have collected from so many authors, Greek and Latin, the history of the first ages of Rome.

As to the *matter*, therefore, I think the history of Polybius more valuable than that of the Halicarnassian, not only because, as I have observed, he writes the history of the noblest period of the Roman state, when they excelled all other nations not only in arms, but in virtue and goodness; but because he was a man of business, and much better informed of the facts he relates than the Halicarnassian possibly could be, of those which are the subject of his history. And he appears to me to have been also better informed, than Livy, of some facts particularly of one very important fact, namely, the taking of Rome by the Gauls. That Rome was so taken, both Polybius and Livy agree: But Livy says, that the Gauls were defeated by Camillus, the Ro-

man General, in two battles; in the last of which they were totally destroyed, *et ne nunci-
us quidem cladis relictus* *. Whereas Polybius says, that they made peace with the Romans upon their own terms, and went off quietly in order to defend their country against a neighbouring nation, whom he calls *Veneti*, who had invaded them †. I do not believe that Livy has willingly falsified this fact; but has copied it from some Roman historian before his time, who thought it was not for the honour of the country that the Gauls, after taking the city, should go off with impunity, and therefore invented the story of Camillus defeating and destroying the whole army of Gauls; but Polybius, I think, could hardly be mistaken as to a fact, which happened not 200 years before his time, and could not then have been forgotten, neither by the Romans themselves nor by the neighbouring nations. And he certainly had no prejudice against

* Livii lib. 5. cap. 49.

† Polybii lib. 1. p. 5. lit. E.; et lib. 2. p. 126. lit. C.

Ch. IV. PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE. 211

the Romans or favour for the Gauls, that could have made him misrepresent the fact so much.

The subject, too, of Polybius's history is more comprehensive than the Halicarnassian's* subject, not indeed in point of time; (for it does not take in near so many years), but in this respect, that he does not confine his history to the Romans, but mixes it with the history of other nations, with whom the Romans had intercourse after they had carried their arms first to Sicily, then to Spain, Greece, Macedonia, and Asia; and indeed from that time the history of Rome became the history of the world, as far as it was then known; so that, as he observes, the history of Rome could not have been understood without relating many particulars concerning those other nations.

And not only has he given us much information, and information that, I think, was necessary, concerning the affairs of other nations; but also, where he treats only of Roman affairs, he has many digressions

sions upon the subject of their government, and particularly their military discipline. Upon this last mentioned subject I do not remember that the Halicarnassian has said any thing; and indeed I believe he was as incapable to give the reader any information concerning it as Livy was: Whereas Polybius appears to have understood military affairs perfectly well; and his descriptions of battles are so accurate and lively, that they may be called pictures, which we not only understand but see, and imagine ourselves present in them: And he never fails to let us know by what councils and conduct the several battles were won or lost. His battles, therefore, I perfectly understand, as I do those of Julius Caesar; whereas there are few battles described by Livy that I can make sense of.

Before I have done with the *matter* of Polybius, I cannot help observing, that, if we had the whole history of the Halicarnassian and of Polybius preserved to us, it would be the finest body of history in the world, containing the rise and progress of the greatest people that ever existed, from

their first origin down to the zenith of their power and glory. If it could be yet recovered, it would be the greatest discovery that has been made since the restoration of letters; And I have some hopes that it may be discovered; for I have certain information, that there is a MS. of Livy in the Emperor of Morocco's library at *Fez*. If it should be a complete copy, containing the 105 books of Livy that are lost, even that would be a great acquisition. But I should think it a much greater, if the histories of the Halicarnassian and Polybius could be found complete; and, I think, it not impossible that they will be so found: And indeed it appears to me more extraordinary that Livy should be there found, than that any Greek author should not be found, as it is well known that the Arabians were much more curious about the Greek than the Roman learning. One thing I know, that Mr Mattra, our Consul at Morocco, who is authorised by our government to search for MSS. in the Emperor's library, will not be wanting in diligence to procure them; for I know the man, and correspond with him.

But, as much as the Halicarnassian is inferior to Polybius in the *matter*, so much and more he surpasses him in the *style* of his history; for the style of Polybius appears to me to be not Attic Greek, but the common Greek of the times, as it was spoken in Peloponesus, with a mixture of some idioms peculiar to his country; for that there are such Megalopolitan idioms, as I call them, in Polybius, is not only my opinion, but appears to have been the opinion of a very learned man of the last age, namely, Burman; for there is a copy of Polybius in the Advocates library in Edinburgh, which once belonged to Burman; and there is a note of his hand writing upon the margin of a passage in the beginning of the first book, where Polybius speaks of the utility of history, a topic, says he, which not one or two have enlarged upon, ἀλλ' ἅπαντες, ὡς ἐπος εἶπεν, ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος κεχρηνται τούτῳ. *Hoc Graeci dicunt*, says Burman, θρυλλεῖν ἀνω κατω. From these words, one should believe, that Burman did not think he wrote Greek. But I am of a different opinion, and think it is Greek and very intelligible, and his style

would be full as clear and perspicuous as that of Herodotus, if his idioms were as carefully collected and explained, as those of Herodotus are by Henry Steven *.

But, clear and perspicuous as it is, the sense of it is mistaken in some places by Livy, and in some very important passages; one I have already mentioned, where he makes nonsense of a great battle which the Consul Flaminius had with Philip King of Macedon, when the Romans first encountered that phalanx, which had conquered so great a part of the world. I will here give another example of a like mistake of his. It is where he describes the passage of Hannibal over the Alps, which he has copied from Polybius; and indeed he could not follow a better author than one who,

* I had begun a collection of these idioms; but I found them so numerous, that I grew weary of the task, and was satisfied to understand them by Casaubon's translation, tho', I think, some of them he has not translated well; as for example, ἐξ ὁμοιογεν, he has translated *ex compactu*, (p. 261. of his edition). Now, I think, it is clear that it signifies nothing more than *confessedly and without dispute*.

as he has told us, had been upon the spot, and, by the information he had got from people who were still living, and had been eye-witnesses of what they told him, could trace the passage of Hannibal over the Alps, a journey which he himself made *. He says, that, in going down the Alps, the Carthaginians came to a great slough, or gulf, of extent a *stadium* and a half, that is, above 750 feet. The difficulty of passing here Polybius has most accurately described. It was caused by the new snow which had fallen above the old of last year. This new snow being soft and not very deep, they easily got through it, and came to the old snow, upon which, being hard and firm, they slid as upon ice; and, when they fell, and endeavoured to rise again, struggling with their feet and hands, this only served to carry them the faster down the hill. The horses that carried their luggage, when they fell and endeavoured to get up again, piercing thro' the under snow, stuck in it, and remained fixed as if they had been frozen in it. For these reasons, finding

* Lib. 3. p. 302. lit. C.

that the snow was impassable, unless a way was made through it, he fell to work, and in one day's time filled up the slough, so that his cavalry and baggage horses could pass over it; and in two days more he made it passable for his elephants*. Now, in this way, it is not at all incredible, that the passage should have been made; but, in the way that Livy has told the story, it is absolutely incredible; for, instead of a slough or gulph, he has made a precipice of no less than a thousand feet. And it was a rock, he says, which hardly a single man unarmed could go down, hanging by shrubs and roots. The rock, he says, was dissolved by vinegar poured upon it when it was hot; a fable which Juvenal has very justly ridiculed. And in this way, having consumed a thousand feet of rock, he, in the space of four days, made a way over it for his elephants†. When the reader compares these two narratives, he must su-

* Lib. 3. p. 207. lit. E.; et p. 208. lit. A.

† Livii lib. 21. cap. 36. et 37.

spect, not that Polybius, who was so well informed, has told so incredible a story, but that Livy has mistaken his meaning *.

Casaubon, the translator of Livy, was a very learned man; and his translation, upon the whole, is, I believe, the best translation that we have of any Greek author. But

* Polybius's words are, (lib. 3. p. 207.) That they came to a place in descending the Alps *οὐ οὐτε τοῖς θηρίοις οὐτε τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις δυνατόν ἢ παρελθεῖν διὰ τῆς στενότητος, σκῆδον ἐπὶ τρεῖς ἡμιστάδια τῆς γῆς ἀπορρογῆς καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν εὐσεῖς, τότε δὲ καὶ μάλλον ἐστὶ πρὸς φάτος ἀπὲρρογῆς.* Now, the three half stadia, which Livy understood to be the depth of the gulph, is only its extent in length; for this the Greek words clearly denote. And it is evident, from the account which Polybius gives of the difficulty of passing it, that it was not a precipice, as Livy has described it, but a very slippery path, down which men might have slid, but horses, especially if they were loaded, could not pass, much less elephants. The difficulties of the passage, which Polybius, as I have observed, has described most accurately, but Livy in such a manner, that I should not have understood him, if I had not before read Polybius, Livy applies to the hills at some distance from this passage, and not to the passage itself. And these difficulties he represents as unsurmountable; and therefore, says he, Hannibal was obliged to dissolve the rock, 1000 feet high, with vinegar.

I have observed some places in which, I think, he has mistaken the sense. In the very passage just now quoted concerning the gulph or slough, which Hannibal met with in descending the Alps, he seems to have understood the description of it as Livy has done; for he describes it thus: *Locus, jam ante praeceps in pedes fere centum nonaginta, recenti insuper lapsu terrae magis erat abruptus.* And, in his translation of the account of the battle of Cannae, he has fallen into a very material error*.

* It is where Polybius relates the way in which Terentius Varro ranked his foot in that battle. After having told us, that he drew up his horse upon the right wing by the river, he adds: *Τους δι' αὐτοὺς ἐν-
ιχνης τοῦτοις ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς εὐθείας ἐξέταξε πυκνότερας ἢ πρὸ-
θεν, τὰς σημαίας καθίσταται, καὶ ποιεῖ πολλοπλασίον το βῆ-
θος ἐν ταῖς σκιρμαῖς τοῦ μεταποῦ.* The meaning of which words, I think, plainly is, That he placed his manipuli thicker and closer upon one another than was formerly used, making his files, that is, the depth of the men, double or more than double the number of those in front, which he might very well do, as he was so much superior in number to the enemy. Now, Casaubon has translated this in a way, which, I confess, does not to me make sense of the passage. He says, ‘*Signa ma-
gis conferta in extrema acie quam in prima statuit, nu-
mero cohortium quae in fronte consistebant in postremis*

There is one praise which the stile of Polybius certainly deserves, that, though he has nothing like the Attic elegance of

'*ordinibus multiplicato.*' (Lib. 3. p. 263. lit. A.) And, what has led him into this erroneous translation is, that he has understood *πρῶτον*, of place, and not of time, and made it to be the same with *μετὰ*, which just follows; so that Polybius, according to him, has said the same thing twice in the same sentence.

There is also a passage in the description of the battle of Zama, (p. 791. lit. A.) which Casaubon has not properly translated, tho' the error be only in a single expression. It is where Polybius says, *Πάντες οὐτως ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ κατ' ἀνδρᾶ τῆς μάχης*, which Casaubon has translated *Quum in dextra omne certamen esset*, which will apply to any way of fighting, either close fight, or at a distance. Whereas Polybius means to describe the closest fight that can be imagined, where the men fought not with spears or swords, as he tells us in the same sentence; consequently it must have been with their daggers.

In some passages of Polybius I have observed the text, as it stands in Casaubon's edition, not correct, particularly in a passage where he gives an account of the loss of the Romans in the battle of Cannæ (p. 267. A.) The passage is thus read in Casaubon's edition :
Ἐκ δὲ τῶν πιζῶν μαχομένοι μετ' ἑαλῶνται εἰς μυρίους. Ὅτι δ' ἐκτὸς οὕτως τῆς μάχης ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ κινδύου τρεῖς χίλιοι μισοὶ ἴσως εἰς τὰς παρακείμενὰς πόλεις διαφύγον. Ὅτι δὲ λοιποὶ

Dionysius, there is no affectation in his style; nor does he labour to write ill, which, as I have observed elsewhere, is the greatest fault that a style can have; nor is it cut

παντες οτις εις εστα μυριαδας, απιθανον ευγενης. Here there should be no full stop at the word *μυριους*; and the paricle *δι*, which follows, should be left out; and also the word *μαχομενοι*, which is also superfluous, and tends to confound the sense; for these 10,000 were not taken fighting in the battle, but in the camp, as Polybius tells us in the same page. The text therefore should be read thus: *Εκ δε των πεζων μετ' εαλωσαν εις μυριους οι εκτος οτις της μαχης εξ αυτου δι του κινδυνου τρισχιλιοι μονον ισαν εις τας παρακειμενας πελις διαφυγον.* But Casaubon has both pointed and translated the passage wrong. The singularity of this battle, and which makes it in every respect the most memorable battle, perhaps, that ever was fought, was, that not one Roman was taken prisoner in the field of battle. Of the foot 70,000 were killed upon the spot, and only 3000 escaped; and, of their 6000 horse, only 70 made their escape. And, of those that thus escaped, and had fled to the neighbouring towns and fortifications, the greater part were made prisoners. A few days after this so great calamity, the Romans got the news of a Praetor of theirs in Cisalpine Gaul having fallen into an ambush, and he and his army totally destroyed. Under such accumulated disasters there is no nation that ever existed, which would not have sunk except the Romans.

down or minced into short sentences like a great deal of the Roman writing, but there is composition in it, without which it is impossible that the meaning can be properly conveyed either in narrative or argument; and, therefore, I hold, that an author who affects to write in that way has not so much as the idea of what good writing is. The composition indeed of Polybius is, I believe, as the Halicarnassian says, defective in the rhythm and melody, which in general, he says, was very much neglected by all the later writers*. But this is a defect which cannot offend our ears, as they are not formed to judge of the numbers or the melody of the Greek language; all I can perceive is, that there is not that variety of arrangement in the style of Polybius, nor, consequently, that beauty of composition which I find in the style of the Halicarnassian and other Attic writers.

I will conclude this long chapter with observing, that from what I have said of

* Dionys. *De Compositione*.—See the passage quoted by Casaubon, p. 997.

the Latin writers of history compared with the Greek, it must be evident to every reader of taste and discernment, that Virgil, among other arts that he mentions*, in which the Greeks excelled his countrymen, should have mentioned the art of writing history; for it appears, that, though the Romans learned that art of writing as well as every other from the Greeks, yet they were very unsuccessful in imitating, and even translating the Greek authors. It may appear very wonderful to one who has not studied the history and philosophy of man, and does not know how different the genius and talents, not only of individuals, but of nations, are, that a people should have been able to perform such wonderful actions, and yet not to relate them properly; but, though the Romans excelled mankind in arms and government, they were not favoured by the Muses and Graces as the Greeks were; and therefore, compared with them, they have not excelled in any art. A Roman statuary or painter of any eminence never was heard of; and to these

* *Æneid.* lib. 6. v. 847.

arts, in which Virgil confesses the Greeks excelled, he might, I think, have added poetry; for, without excepting even Virgil himself, I do not think that any Roman has excelled in poetry, except Horace, who having been educated in the seat of learning and good taste, I mean Athens, and having first introduced into the Roman language the Greek Lyric poetry, and given them a variety of versification which they had not before, may be truly said to be a great poet, though, I am persuaded, he himself did not think that he was to be compared with Pindar, Alcaeus, Stesichorus, or even Sappho.

Of their historians Livy is undoubtedly the best, for Julius Caesar I reckon only a memoir writer, and accordingly he has entitled his work *Memoirs*. But, though his history be no doubt very instructive, containing a great deal of most important facts, and, though his orations be full of very good argument, his style is such, that, I must confess, I cannot lay down Herodotus or the Halicarnassian, to take up Livy and read him with any pleasure.

In oratory, as well as in other arts, Virgil acknowledges the superiority of the Greeks over his countrymen. But, in latter times, Cicero, and not Demosthenes, became the standard of that art among the Romans; ‘*Ille se profecisse sciat,*’ says Quintilian, ‘*cui Cicero valde placebit* *.’ And, from what he says in that chapter, and in other places, it is evident that he preferred Cicero to Demosthenes; and, in general, I observe, that, after the days of Augustus Caesar, the Romans, forsaking the study and imitation of the Greek authors, set up, for models in every kind of writing, authors of their own nation. Thus Virgil became the standard for epic poetry in place of Homer; and, accordingly, it is evident, that Lucan, Statius, and Silius Italicus, imitated his diction and versification. And, as to history, it is evident, that Tacitus imitated Sallust, and made a bad model much worse; but the imitation of Tacitus was reserved only for the ignorance and ill taste of modern times.

* Lib. 10. cap. 1. sect. 3.

C H A P. V.

Of modern historians, particularly Buchanan.—His history of Scotland written in very good Latin.—In his learned age the Latin was a living language among the learned.—In the next age Milton wrote Latin perfectly well.—Buchanan's style of narrative better composed than that of Livy, and not so obscure.—His speeches also good, but few of them.—Most of them indirect ;—one direct and of considerable length, against female government ;—an heroic speech he puts into the mouth of a woman.—The speech of David I. King of Scotland on the death of his son, containing a topic of consolation not common.—Of Milton's English history.—It is an abridgement of history ;—therefore the composition of it not so fine as might otherwise be expected.—Of Lord Little-

ton's history of Henry II. :--Not an abridgement like Milton's history ;—therefore still more copious ;—the best stile of History that has been written in this age.—His account of the Norman invasion fuller and better than that of Milton.—Of the Histories of modern times :—The actions of barbarous nations, such as those who made themselves masters of the provinces of the Roman Empire in the middle ages, not a fit subject for history.—The subject of History concluded with an advice to authors to form their stile upon the antient models ;—to imitate these and to translate from them ;—but from the Greek rather than from the Latin ;—to translate as Queen Elizabeth did.—The advantages of this practice.—The uniform sameness of arrangement in the modern languages ought to be avoided as much as may be.—Examples of the common order of words being changed with elegance and without obscurity.—The connection betwixt the relative and its antecedent ought to be well marked, sometimes by the repetition of the word.—There may be a classical repetition of a word, as well as

an ellipsis.—Where there are cases in our language formed by a change of the word, advantage should be taken of that to alter the common arrangement:—Example of this.—By such transpositions the stile of Thucydides may be imitated.—Of variety in the composition of periods, and their several members:—In this the Halicarnassian excels wonderfully.—Milton the best composer in English, both in verse and prose.—Of his verse both blank and rhymed:—Style of his polemical writings more composed in periods than that of his history.—Examples of some periods from these writings:—Wonderful variety of matter in them.—Dr Johnson's censure of Milton's style.—The Doctor, not being a Greek scholar, no judge of it.—His preference of the Paradise Lost to the Iliad absurd and ridiculous.—Dr Johnson's attack upon Milton's Latin, as ill founded as upon his English.—Apology for what the author has said of Dr Johnson.—Recommendation to historiographers and all authors to form a good taste of writing before they begin.—If their taste be bad, the more they labour their composition, the worse it

will be.—Example of that.—But the moderns very deficient in it.—Of the necessity of forming a good taste before one begins to write.—If not, the style, the more it is laboured, the worse it will be.

TO what I have said of antient historians I will add something concerning modern ; and I will begin with my countryman Buchanan, who has written the history of his own country in Latin, and in such Latin, that I am not afraid to compare his stile with that of any Roman historian. He lived in an age when the Latin language was very much cultivated ; and among the learned it was not only the only language in which they wrote, but a living language ; for they spoke no other when they conversed together, at least upon learned subjects. Even in the next age, I mean the 17th century, it was written with the greatest purity and elegance ; nor do I know any writer of the Augustine age that shows a more perfect knowledge or greater command of the Latin

language than Milton does. In such an age, and with all the advantages of a learned education, did George Buchanan write the History of Scotland from the earliest times down to his own time ; And I hesitate not to pronounce that the stile of his narrative is better than that of Livy ; for it is as pure and elegant, is better composed in periods not intricate and involved like those of Livy, and without that affected brevity which makes Livy's stile so obscure. Even in speeches, in which Livy is supposed to excel so much, I think his composition is better ; and he has none of those short pointed sentences, the *vibrantes sententiolae*, which Livy learned in the school of declamation. At the same time I must acknowledge, that there is not so much variety of facts and arguments in Buchanan's speeches as in Livy's : They are but few in number compared with those of Livy, and very much shorter ; the greater part of them being indirect, that is, in the way of narrative, and very few of them formal orations. Of this kind there is one almost as long as any in Livy, being upon a subject that the author was

very fond of, and that was the inconvenience of female government. He puts it into the mouth of James Kennedy, Archbishop of St Andrews, upon occasion of a debate in parliament, whether the widow of James II. should be regent during the minority of her son, or whether the parliament should choose one or more of their number for that office *. The matter in this speech is most fully and accurately argued; and as the bishop had on his side the authority of so many precedents, and indeed the invariable custom of the kingdom, it is no wonder that his opinion prevailed. The stile too of the speech is, I think, excellent; for it is composed in very good periods and perfectly clear and perspicuous.

The next speech I shall mention is that of an heroic lady to her husband upon a very singular occasion. The King of England, after the death of the great King Robert Bruce, was besieging Berwick, of which the then governour was one of the noble family of Seton, who, being hard

* Lib. 12. cap. 10.

pressed by the enemy, agreed, that, if he was not relieved against a certain day, he would give up the town ; and in security of his fulfilling this agreement, he gave for hostage one of his own sons, and another of them was taken prisoner during the siege. A Scotch army being in march to relieve the town before the day of surrender, the English King being desirous to have the town without the hazard of a battle, produced before the town these two sons of the governor, in a place where they could be seen from the walls, and erected a gallows, on which they were to be immediately hanged, if the town was not given up. Such a sight, as may be believed, moved the father exceedingly : But his wife, in a short speech, which Buchanan puts in her mouth, exorts him to prefer his duty to his King and country, and the honour of his family, to any private considerations ; and accordingly she prevailed, and the two sons were hanged *. Here was a subject very like those that

* Lib. 9. cap. 13.

were handled in the schools of declamation among the Romans. But we see here nothing at all of *Portius Latro**, but plain good arguments, such as were very proper to prevail with a man of a noble and generous disposition.

I will only mention one other short speech of his, which he puts into the mouth of the *First* David, King of Scotland, addressed to his nobles, who had come to comfort him upon occasion of the death of his only son, a youth of great hopes. It is a speech of great magnanimity, showing that he bore his misfortune as a man and a Christian ought to do. It contains many excellent topics of consolation; but I will only mention one of them, which I think will apply to every man who has lost a relation or a friend that he was very fond of, as I think it is one of the best and most natural that can be suggested, to make us bear patiently such a loss. I will give it in the words of the author. ‘Quod si

* See concerning this author and the schools of declamation, vol. 3. of this work, p. 250. &c.

‘ mali tantum morerentur, jure quidem in
‘ propinquorum obitu dolendum esse. Ve-
‘ rum cum bonos etiam decedere videamus,
‘ et homini Christiano esse debeat tam per-
‘ suasum, quam quod est certissimum, bo-
‘ nis (neque vivis neque mortuis) quicquam
‘ mali evenire posse; quid est cur hanc
‘ disjunctionem a propinquis, praesertim
‘ tam brevem, adeo moleste feramus? cum
‘ non tam nos reliquerint quam ad com-
‘ munem patriam praecefferint, quo nos
‘ eos, etiamsi longissimum vitae spatium
‘ transigamus, tamen brevi sequemur. Fi-
‘ lius autem meus, si hanc peregrinationem
‘ prius suscepit, ut parentes et fratres meos,
‘ homines sanctissimos prior videret, eorum-
‘ que consuetudine prior frueretur; id si
‘ moleste feremus, providendum erit ne
‘ potius illius invidere felicitati, quam mala
‘ nostra lugere, videamur. Vobis autem,
‘ viri optimi, cum ob alia plurima officia,
‘ tum ob hanc erga me caritatem, et illius
‘ piam et jucundam memoriam, uterque
‘ (ut pro filio etiam spondeam) plurimum
‘ debere profitemur*.’ Here is a thought

* Lib. 7. cap. 35.

uncommon, yet natural enough, and which has nothing of the quaint turn of the schools of declamation: ‘When a friend,’ says he, ‘has gone before us to enjoy a ‘better world, if we mourn for him, we ‘ought to consider, whether it has not ‘more the appearance of envying his felicity, than lamenting our own loss.’

As I have mentioned modern historians, it would be improper to omit the greatest writer in English, both in verse and prose, and who has also merit as an historian; I mean Milton, who has given us a history of England from the earliest times down to the conquest. As to the matter of this history, it appears that he has collected it from a great many authors, very faithfully, I am persuaded, but not fully; for his history is to be considered as an abridgement, and therefore we have no speeches in it; so that if he had not written anything more, we should have known nothing of his rhetorical talents, which in my opinion were very great. The style of this history is altogether classical, such as might be expected from so great a scholar

as Milton. But it is not so much composed in periods, as I am persuaded it would have been, if it been a formal history at full length; and I am persuaded that, if the abridgement, which the Hali-carnassian made, of his history, had come down to us, it would have been found to have been composed in the same manner. There is nothing however in Milton like what I call the short cut of stile; and he has distinguished his language from common speech by all the variety of arrangement, and all the abbreviations, which the language could admit of: And, upon the whole, though I do not think it one of the best of Milton's writings, it is a work that does him no dishonour, and is such that the writers of history at present may profit by it.

The next English writer of history I shall mention, is an author whom I had the honour of knowing and corresponding with, and whom I admired very much both as a scholar and a man of taste. The author I mean is George Lord Littleton,

who has chosen for the subject of his history, not the whole English History, but a period of it, namely, the reign of Henry II. with the history of the Conquest, and of the Norman Kings preceeding Henry II. by way of introduction : And to this period of history, I think he has done more justice than he could possibly have done, if he had undertaken, like some other authors, to write the whole history of the country from the earliest times down to the present. The *matter* of his history he has been at very great pains to collect, with the greatest diligence and accuracy, from many authors whom he has done the reader the justice to quote on the margin ; and his collection appears to me to have been much fuller than that of Milton, as I think is evident from the only part of the history in which their narratives coincide, I mean the history of William the Conqueror's expedition into England, and the battle of Hastings, with which Milton concludes his history. For Lord Littleton's account of that expedition and battle is very much fuller, and in every respect more instructive and more entertaining

than that of Milton. And though his *stile* be more in the present taste, and therefore not so classical as that of Milton, yet it is a more copious *stile*, as being not an abridgement, but a full and compleat history of that event; and upon the whole I think it is the best *stile* of history that has been written in later times, either in English or in any other language that I know.

To a man that dwells as much as I do in the antient world, there is no subject of history that gives any pleasure except that which shows

——quid virtus et quid sapientia possit,

like the *Odyssey* of Homer, Herodotus's account of the invasion of Antient Greece by Xerxes, or 'like that period of fifty-three years of the Roman history, which Polybius has chosen for the subject of his history. If I am to read of vice and folly, it must be the vices and follies of heroes, such as make the subject of the *Iliad*; not the vices, follies, and weaknesses of men such as we, which may make a very good

subject for a comedy or a mock heroic poem, such as the *Batrachomyomachia* of Homer ; but I think are not a proper subject for so grave and noble a composition as history. It is sufficient, I think, that they are recorded in Newspapers and Annual Registers.

That Milton did not think the actions of the barbarous nations, who possessed themselves of the provinces of the Roman Empire in the middle ages, were a fit subject for history, appears from a passage in his history of England, which I have quoted * ; yet, barbarous as those nations were, they were men much superior to us in strength both of mind and body, and accordingly their exploits were very great. The Crusades, by which they carried on a war betwixt Europe and Asia for more than two centuries, are not to be paralleled in antient history, except by Xerxes's invasion of Greece. The migration too of the Goths from Crim Tartary, where both the name and the Language of the people are yet pre-

* Page 10. of this vol.

served, to Scandinavia and the northern parts of Europe, under their leader *Odin*, of whom they made a god that we may call the Jupiter of modern times, is a great event in the history of mankind. The conquests of their descendants the Danes and Norwegians, and the discoveries they made of countries quite unknown before, such as Iceland, and Greenland, and even the new world of America, which they certainly discovered before the Spaniards, are wonderful events; yet the actions even of such men, very fierce and brave indeed, but without council or conduct, I hold not to be a fit subject of a work such as history ought to be, and it is sufficient that they are recorded in the barbarous chronicles of that age.

The only proper subject therefore of so dignified a work as history, I hold to be the actions of nations as far advanced in the arts of life as the Greeks and Romans were; men who excelled not only in fight, but in council and eloquence, and who therefore may be supposed to make speeches, which we could not without absurdity

put into the mouths of barbarians ; for I hold that speeches give not only a beautiful variety to historical composition, but that they are a very material part of it, as they best explain the reasons and motives of action, and state every thing that can be said for or against any measure. They give likewise to history what, I have observed elsewhere *, is one of the greatest beauties of composition ; for they make it *ethical*, that is, imitative of characters and manners, which are better expressed by making the persons speak themselves than by any thing the author could say upon the subject. Besides that the descriptions of characters of men, as well as reasonings of the author upon the justice or injustice, the utility or inutility of actions, stick out of the work, and destroy that unity and integrity which is essential to every good composition. If therefore our modern historiographers, not content with the history of antient times, which the antients

* See on the subject of the *ethical* stile, vol. 3. lib. 4. cap. 8. ; and p. 390. of volume 4th.

themselves have left us, will undertake to write it anew, they ought certainly to give us the speeches by which we know certainly that their councils were directed, and which therefore are matters of fact that ought to make part of the narrative : And accordingly Thucydides informs us *, that the many speeches in his history were all actually made, he having either heard them himself, or having learned the substance of them from others that had heard them. Or if our historiographers will descend from those antient times to write the history of our age, there ought also to be speeches in it, especially if it be the history of Britain that they write, where we know that public measures are debated in both houses of parliament.

Of some late writers of history in Britain, I will say nothing ; I read not to find fault, but to admire and to be pleased. And when I cannot be entertained in that way, I chuse not to read at all. Now to criticise such works, it is necessary to read

* Lib. 1. cap. 22

them ; and that is a task I cannot submit to. Leaving therefore such authors to be praised or dispraised by the reviewers, as they are paid or not paid, I will conclude this subject of history by giving to our modern historiographers and writers of every kind an advice, by which, if they do not profit, those that come after them may. It is acknowledged by all connoisseurs that no man can form a taste, much less learn to be a performer in statuary or sculpture, without studying the antient monuments of that kind which have come down to us ; and not only studying them, but copying them again and again with the greatest care and diligence. Now, I say it is the same in the writing art, and that no man can write well, unless he not only reads and studies the best antient models of the writing art, but copies them both by translation and imitation. And when I know that an author is not a scholar, and has not formed his taste in that way, I am sure that he cannot write well, any more than a man can excel in painting or sculpture, that has not studied the antient monuments of art. Cicero was not ashamed to

form his stile by translating from the Greek both of Plato and Demosthenes : And if he had not done so, I am persuaded he would not have been so good a writer. And I would recommend to the young student of the writing art to follow Cicero's example, and to translate from the Greek rather than the Latin, not only as the most perfect language of the two, but also because its idiom agrees better with the English than with the Latin in sundry respects, but chiefly because we have an article and an active participle past which the Latins have not. And I would also advise him, if he desire to be thoroughly acquainted with the geniusses of the two languages, to practise, as Queen Elizabeth did, double translation, that is from English to Greek, and back again from Greek to English *. By this means he will know perfectly the difference betwixt the two

* See what I have said of this practice of Queen Elizabeth, in Vol III. of this work chap. 20. p. 389. where I mention also Lady Jane Grey, who not only wrote but spoke Greek, and carried her studies beyond classical learning, even to philosophy, and read Plato as well as the Greek historians and orators.

languages, and will observe how near we can bring our language to the standard of the most perfect language; for he ought to know that the nearer he can bring his English stile to the Greek, the more perfect it will be. It was in this way that Milton, both in his prose and verse, has formed a stile, which I call the *English Attick*, but which is now reckoned uncouth and pedantic, particularly in his prose, as the Attick Greek was in later times*.

By practising in this way the young student will learn to avoid as much as possible that uniform arrangement of the words in the modern languages, which is so tiresome and offensive to an ear accustomed to the variety of antient composition, and will throw them out of that order, which the unclassical reader would call the natural order, as much as the stinted genius of the language will admit. Thus, for example, such a reader will tell us that according to the natural order of the words,

* See vol. 3. of Ant. Metaph. in the Preface, p. 63. and 64.

the *antecedent* ought to go before the *relative*; and that no doubt is the order in which a school-boy construing them will put them. But the elegant writer will very often (not always, for there must be variety in writing as well as in other arts) invert that order, and put the relative first, saying, for example; as the translators of our Bible say, *Give me also this power, that, on whomsoever I lay my hands, he may receive the Holy Ghost* *; besides many other instances that might be given of the same kind. Here what is called the natural order would be, 'that he

* Acts of the Apostles, chap. viii. ver. 19. The verse in Greek is *Δετι καμει της εξουσιας ταυτης, ινα ο αν επιθη της χειρας, λαμβανη πνευμα αγιον*. Here our translators have followed the Greek idiom in transposing the Relative and giving it the place of the Antecedent, but they have not carried their imitation of the Greek so far as to omit the Antecedent; and I think they have done well, for that omission would have made the expression obscure in English. But Milton has in some passages left out the Antecedent with great elegance I think, and without any obscurity, as in *Paradise Lost*, Book vii. ver. 38. where addressing himself to his muse, he says,

—So fail not thou, who thee implores.

may receive the Holy Ghost, on whom-
 'soever I lay my hands.' With respect
 to the *relative*, it may be observed, that
 the perspicuity of the stile depends very
 much upon our perceiving readily the
 connection betwixt it and the *antecedent*.
 For this purpose the Greeks very often
 make the *relative* agree with the *antece-*
dent in case, though the verb which go-
 verns it require another case. This we
 cannot do in our language, having no cases

which is much more beautiful, and no less clear to
 the scholar, than if he had added the pronoun *him*,
 and had said,

—So fail not thou *him*, who thee implores,

And in that most beautiful passage where he describes
 Eve going out of the bower, and leaving the Angel
 and Adam in it, and which I think should be studied
 by every lady who would desire to go out of a room
 gracefully, he uses the same ellipsis, and says that Eve,

' With lowliness majestic from her seat,
 ' And grace that won who saw to wish her stay,
 ' Arose ;' ————— Book. viii. Ver. 42.

—where the reader may supply the ellipsis by under-
 standing one or other of the pronouns *him*, *her*, or *them*.

such as the Greeks ; but we can do as Julius Caesar does often, we can repeat the *antecedent* with the *relative*, which not only adds to the perspicuity, but gives a certain classical colour to the style ; and the repeating of a word is sometimes elegant as well as the suppressing one, or what is called *ellipsis* *. We should take advantage also of the few words we have with cases, such as our pronouns, which enable us to vary the natural order so much as to put *the case governed* before the *verb governing*, and sometimes at a considerable

* I observe that for want of this repetition of the antecedent, there is sometimes an obscurity in the language of the New Testament, which must be the case when there are other words and sometimes members of sentences betwixt the relative and its antecedent. Of this I have observed several examples, particularly in St Paul's writings : I will mention only two ; Rom. chap. iii. ver. 8., and the Address of that Epistle to the Romans, contained in the first six verses of the first chapter, which is so composed as to be hardly intelligible. It is probably such obscure passages as these, that have made one of the fathers, St Jerome, if I am not mistaken, pass so severe a censure upon St Paul's writings, as to say that he did not understand language.

distance from it. Of this I have elsewhere † given a notable example from that fine period of Milton in the *Paradise Lost*,

Me, tho' just right and the fix'd laws of Heaven
Did first create your leader, next free choice,
(With what besides in council or in fight
Hath been atchiev'd of merit,) yet this loss,
(Thus far at least recover'd,) hath much more
Establish'd in a safe unenvied throne,
Yielded with full consent *.——

where betwixt *me* the case governed, and the governing verb *established*, there are interjected four lines, with two parentheses, and yet the sense is perfectly clear, and more forcibly conveyed than it could have been without the transposition of the pronoun. Now I say such composition used now and then (for it ought not to be too

† Vol. 2. of this work, p. 355. and following ;— where it is shown that not only the sense is more forcibly conveyed, but the period is more compact and better rounded than it could have been in any other way.

* Book II. ver. 18.

frequent) is as beautiful in prose as in verse *.

By such transpositions as these a stile may be made not unlike the stile of Thucydides, which is a kind of stile that the Halicarnassian praises very much when moderately used. It is a composition, which by the phraseology, but chiefly by the arrangement of the words, makes the stile quite different from common speech. In this way some of the examples the Halicarnassian gives of this kind of stile, which he calls a *made stile*, compared with common speech, may be literally translated into English †.

* I observe that the English translators of the New Testament have availed themselves of the change of the word in the oblique cases of our pronouns, as in the pronoun *he*; for in ver. 23. of the 2d chap. of the Acts of the Apostles, they have imitated the Greek arrangement of the words, and have said, ‘*Him*, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain.’

† I will give an example from an oration of Demosthenes, in which he has imitated the stile of Thucydides. It is quoted by the Halicarnassian in his

But besides the uniform arrangement of the words, there is a sameness in the structure of periods and sentences, and of their several members, in modern writing, which I think is more offensive and, at the same time, less excusable, because the blame cannot be laid upon the language. As we write at present, if there be a period at all, it consists commonly only of two members, and these tacked together by the conjunction *and*, and the words of both of the same form and structure: And in some fashionable writings of late, the conclusion is commonly tagged with a *noun*, and very often two *nouns* and their attendant *epithets*, which such writers imagine give an agreeable cadence and something like numbers to their composition *. And as they think

treatise, *Περὶ τῆς δυνατοῦτος τοῦ Δημοσθένους* cap. 9. The word *are*, *Εἰτ' οἰσθε* 'οἱ μιν (οὐδὲν) αὖ κατὰ δύναμιν ποιῆσαι κακοί, αὐτοὶ δὲ μὴ παθεῖν ἐφυλάξατ' αὖ ἰσως, τούτοις μιν ἐκπατῆν ἐκτρέφειν μάλλον, ἢ περιλιγόντα βιάζεσθαι?' which may be thus rendered: 'Do you think, that who 'could do him no harm, tho' they might be upon their 'guard lest they should receive harm from him, these he 'would rather chuse to deceive, than to use open violence 'against them.'

* See also p. 133. and 134. of volume 4th.

the parenthesis is a disjointed composition which obscures the sense and offends their ears, they do not use it at all; and I have heard it observed, of a late complement of antient history which is in high vogue, that there is not a parenthesis in it all. On the other hand, the classical writer will study variety very much in the composition of his periods, making them sometimes of more and sometimes of fewer members, connecting those members in different ways, by adversative as well as conjunctive particles, and by relatives and participles, varying also the structure of the words and the phraseology in the several members, and likewise the matter, and throwing in now and then a *parenthesis*, which, by being disjointed from the rest of the composition, will excite the attention the reader or hearer the more, and, if well composed, and well pronounced, will give occasion to an agreeable stop and variation of the voice, one of the greatest beauties of speaking, and also of writing *, as speaking or reading is the best test of wri-

* See vol. 3. p. 76.

ting. In this elegant variety of composition, I think there is no author, not even Demosthenes himself, that exceeds the Halicarnassian; for you hardly ever see in him two periods together of like phraseology, or arranged and figured in the same way, unless where the sense or sentiment makes such similarity of composition a beauty: For in good writing, as I have elsewhere observed *, every thing must not be altogether different, any more than perfectly alike.

The stile in English likest to the Halicarnassian's, and liker still I think to that of Thucydides, is the stile of Milton, who in my opinion is the greatest writer both in verse and prose that we have in our language. As a poet his merit is generally acknowledged. His blank verse is so written as to be the finest composition that our language or, I believe, any modern language, is capable of; and his rhyming verse I think is also excellent. In his *Comus*, the best poem in my opinion he ever wrote, he has made a very agreeable variety, by

* Pag. 45. and 77: of vol. 3.

mixing together the blank verse and the rhyme, after the manner of the Italian opera, which he has imitated throughout in that piece, and accordingly has, intermixed with the rest of the poetry, songs in it the finest in English. As to his prose, if it be true that the antient authors ought to be our standards for that composition, and that the nearer we can bring our language to the idiom of Greek and Latin, the more perfect our style is, it must be confessed, that Milton's prose, as well as his verse, is the best we have in English; for it certainly comes as near to the Greek and Latin composition as the imperfect grammar of our language will admit, so near that I know it is by many thought to be harsh, obscure, and perplexed; and so I know it must appear to those who are not learned. But Milton wrote for a learned age; and I am persuaded his stile was not then obscure, otherwise he would not have been employed so much by the parliament and Oliver Cromwell to write on public business. At the same time, considering it as a classical stile, it must be allowed to be an artificial one, of the kind which the Halicarnassian

calls περιττη και εξηλαγμενη, or what may be called in English a *made stile*, that is, a stile very different from common speech. His history being, as I have observed, an abridgement, the stile of it is, as it ought to be, much simpler and plainer, and such as any man, who has learned the English grammar, may easily enough understand. But his controversial writings are in a stile very different; and they ought to be so, for they are of the rhetorical kind, and the stile of rhetoric should be very different from that of narrative; and it is a difference which Milton appears to me to have perfectly known, as well as the difference betwixt either of these stiles and the epistolary, of which we have evidence from the letters he wrote in name of the commonwealth and Oliver Cromwell to sundry kings and states, which we have both in Latin and English, and they are as good letters of business as ever were written.

That he excelled in this rhetorical stile is evident from the speeches of the Paradise Lost, which are out of all degree of comparison the best orations we have in

English. And it appears to me to be a stile which he had practised more than any other, having been engaged in controversies civil or religious from his youth upwards down to the restoration. The variety of matter in these controversies is wonderful: They abound more with learning of all kinds, divine and human, and there is in them a greater copiousness of arguments, of facts from antient and modern, civil and ecclesiastical history, of authorities from scripture, from Fathers of the Church and modern divines, and lastly from heathen poets, philosophers, and historians, than is to be found in any one book I know; with all this, there is a keenness of satire, of wit too and ridicule, which is hardly to be paralleled. And he concludes his discourse upon the Reformation in England with an invective upon the Prelatical party, much more violent than any thing that Demosthenes has said against Philip.

The stile of these Philippics, as they may be called, has all that variety of composition, which I have praised in the Hali-

carnassian, and is brought as near to the Greek and Latin idiom, and as much figured as the poverty of our language will admit. In these works there is much more of composition in periods, as there ought to be, than there is in his history. I have given elsewhere an example of what I think a very fine period in the beginning of his *Eiconoclastes*, and I will here give an example of two in the beginning of another polemical work of his, entitled *The Reason of Church Government urged against Prelaty*. He begins his preface thus: ‘ In
 ‘ the publishing of human laws, which for
 ‘ the most part aim not beyond the good
 ‘ of civil society, to set them barely forth
 ‘ to the people without reason or preface,
 ‘ like a physical prescript, or only with
 ‘ threatnings, as it were a lordly command,
 ‘ in the judgment of Plato, was thought
 ‘ to be done neither generously nor wisely.
 ‘ His advice was, seeing that persuasion
 ‘ certainly is a more winning and manlike
 ‘ way to keep men in obedience than fear,
 ‘ that to such laws as were of principal
 ‘ moment, there should be used, as an in-

VOL. V. K k

‘duction, some well tempered discourse,
‘showing how good, how gainful, how
‘happy it must needs be to live according
‘to honesty and justice ; which being ut-
‘tered with these natural colours and
‘graces of speech, as true eloquence the
‘daughter of virtue can best bestow upon
‘her mother’s praises, would so incite and
‘in a manner charm the multitude into the
‘love of that which is really good, as to
‘embrace it ever after, not of custom and
‘awe, which most men do, but of choice
‘and purpose, with true and constant de-
‘light.’ Here it may be observed the
first period consists only of two members,
the one much longer than the other, end-
ing with the word *command* ; the other
short, and concluding the period with a
very natural cadence. The second period
I would divide into four members ; the
first a short member ending with the word
fear ; the other longer, concluding with
the word *justice* ; the other of much the
same length ending with the word *praises* ;
and the fourth, longer than any of the

former, concludes the period, and in the way in which Aristotle says it should be concluded, by the natural cadence of the words, and not by the sense only. And the reader will observe that the two periods are wholly different from one another, and the several members also different, both in the structure and composition of the words, and in their way of being joined together ; so that we have here that variety without which there can be no beauty, as I have had frequently occasion to observe in the course of this work, in any of the works of art.

Besides this classical composition in those controversial works, there is a richness of words that I do not find in other English authors ; and, though many of these words are now obsolete, they are such as, in my opinion, ought to be revived and brought again into fashion.

Such a style therefore must have, as was said before, a great deal of the colour of Thucydides, whose style was varied and distinguished from common speech by all

the variety of figures, which even the Greek language will admit. And as Thucydides's style is not to be understood except by a very good Greek scholar, so neither is Milton's (though not near so obscure in English as Thucydides is in Greek) to be perfectly understood, except by a scholar who has formed his taste of good writing upon the antient masters of the art *. It was no wonder, therefore, that such a critic as Dr Johnson, who, in my opinion, was neither a scholar nor a man of taste, should pronounce, among the o-

* The edition of Milton's prose works, I use, is in 3 volumes in folio, printed in Amsterdam in 1698. And, as it is printed in a foreign country, by a printer, who, it is likely, understood little or no English, and under the inspection of a corrector of the press, who, we may suppose, did not perfectly understand Milton's Attic English, it is not to be wondered that there are sundry errors of the press in it, (and indeed I wonder there are not more), which really make it obscure. There is no other edition that I have heard of; and the book is so rare, that I could not find it, when I wanted it, (such is the taste of the age), in the shop of any bookseller in London. In this manner, so great a treasure of learning, arguments, and words, may be said to be lost to the public.

ther oracles which he has uttered from his tripod, that Milton does not write English, (and I have heard some of the Doctor's admirers say the same), but a Babylonish dialect. And indeed an unlearned critic, who judges of the English language, by what is now written in it, will be disposed to censure those classical idioms of Milton above mentioned as harsh and uncouth; though, if he be more candid and good natured than the Doctor, he may not give so hard an epithet to Milton's stile, and which indeed is the worst thing that could be said of any stile, as to call it Babylonish. But the Doctor, who was not a Greek scholar, and could not read the Halicarnassian's critical works in the original, which cannot be understood in the translation, where the several ways of distinguishing stile from common speech by the grammatical figures of construction, are better explained than by any other author, knew of no other way of adorning his stile, and making what he thought fine writing, except by epithets, antitheses, and coining new words. Now, if he had been scholar enough to have read Thucydides, the great standard for what I

call the *made* stile, he would have seen that it could be made without either epithet or antithesis : And as to new coined words, if Thucydides had attempted that, the people of Athens had such regard for the purity and chastity of their language, that they would not have born it, any more than I think the people of England should have born the words that Dr Johnson has made, and the reflections that he has thrown out upon an author, who does so much honour to modern times and to the English nation in particular. The commendation of the *Paradise Lost*, with which he concludes his life of Milton, is I think more absurd than his censures of him, and so ridiculous that, if I had had a better opinion of the Doctor's critical talents, I should have imagined that he said it by way of irony and ridicule of Milton. He says that ' the *Paradise Lost* is not the greatest of heroic poems, only because it is not the first.' Now, as the chief merit of a poem, a picture, or indeed of every work of art, is the choice of the subject, if Dr Johnson had been but the twentieth part the tythe of a critic, (to use an expression of Shake-

spear), he would have known that, by the nature of things, it was impossible, of such a subject as that of the *Paradise Lost*, to make so fine a poem as the *Iliad* of Homer. For an epic poem as well as a tragedy is, as Aristotle tells us, the imitation of a human action. Now the subject of the *Paradise Lost*, as I have observed elsewhere,* is divine and supernatural ; and there is hardly any thing human in it, except the speeches in the council of the Devils, which are the best of the rhetorical kind to be found in English, the seduction of Eve by the flattery of the Devil, and the quarrel betwixt the Man and Wife after the Fall : For, as to his battles of Angels fighting in *Cubic Phalanx*, they are altogether out of nature, at least human nature. The characters likewise are either too good or too bad, not mixed, as characters in poetry ought to be. The subject therefore of the *Paradise Lost* is much too high for poetical imitation ; whereas the story of Homer's *Iliad* is the best subject for an epic poem that ever was invented, or to speak more properly, that ever was chosen ; for though the genius

* Preface to vol. 3. of *Ant. Metaph.* p. XLIII

of the poet might adorn and embellish such a subject, by adding or taking away circumstances, I hold it to be beyond the power of man to have invented altogether such a story. All therefore he could say, with any show of reason, in praise of Milton above Homer, is, that, if Homer had had the same subject, he could not have made so much of it as Milton has done.

The Doctor has been pleased not only to censure the English of Milton, in the strong terms above mentioned, but to attack his Latin in that noble work which gained him so much reputation all over Europe, I mean his *Defensio pro Populo Anglicano*, in which he encountered a man who was reputed the greatest scholar of the age, and with such success, that it is said to have proved the cause of his death. In this work Milton has shown that Salmasius did not write good Latin; and, in return, the Doctor has endeavoured to show that Milton's Latin is as bad; but in this he has not succeeded*.

* The Latin which the Doctor finds fault with, is in the beginning of his Preface to his *Defence*;

Before I read this criticism, though I knew the Doctor was no Greek scholar,

where, after exposing a French Idiom which Salmasius has used, where he speaks of the *Persona Regis*, he adds, *Cæterum ob hujusmodi noxas Gallico-Latinas, quibus passim scates, non tam mihi, neque enim est otium, quam ipsis tuis Grammatistis pœnas dabis; quibus ego te deridendum et vapulandum propino.* Upon which the Doctor's Remark is, That 'Milton has enforced the charge of 'a Solecism against Salmasius, by an expression in itself grossly solecistical, when, for one of these supposed 'blunders, he says, as Ker, and, I think, some one before him, has remarked, *propino te tuis Grammatistis Vapulandum.* From *Vapulo*, which has a passive sense, *Vapulandus* can never be derived. No man 'forgets his original trade: the rights of nations and of 'Kings sink into questions of Grammar, if Grammarians discuss them.' Here the Doctor has used a liberty, not uncommon with him, to coin a new word viz. *Solecistical*, to express this gross blunder of Milton; but a word, formed not according to the analogy of the Language, and, what is worse, confounding a distinction which the Grammatical Art makes betwixt a Barbarism and a Solecism; the first relating to single words, the other to the composition and construction of them. This distinction is laid down in the Philosophical Greek Grammar of the learned Greek of modern times, Theodorus Gaza, but which I would have excused the Doctor for not knowing, as that Grammar is not translated. But the same de-

I believed that he had understood Latin as much at least as any man can understand a

distinction is laid down in the common Grammars and Dictionaries. Now Milton's error, if it be one, is a Barbarism and not a Solecism ; and one should have thought that the real name for the thing would have pleased the Doctor more than the wrong name he has given it : so that here it appears that the Doctor has forgotten his original trade as, he says, Milton has done. The expression is such, that, as it stands in Milton, it is impossible to mistake the meaning of it ; and it is only the *obscure diligence* (to use an expression of Terence) of a Pedantic Schoolmaster that would have observed it, tho' the Doctor has not even the glory of having first discovered it. This Blunder, so gross, that it could not be expressed in the common words of the Language, comes only to this, that Milton has used a Participle of the word *Vapulo*, derived from the passive voice of the Verb, which, the Doctor says, it has not : And he may be in the right, at least I do not remember to have read any Tense or Participle of the Verb derived from *Vapulo*. But so far Milton is in the right, that he uses the Verb only in a passive sense ; for if he had given it an active signification in any of its Voices or Tenses, I should have thought it an error. But all he has done is to borrow from the passive voice a future Participle, and which I think was of necessity, if he was to use the word at all ; for if he had used the future active Participle, I should not, for my part, have understood him ; nor do I believe there

learned language, who understood not the science of language nor any other sci-

is an example of *Vapulaturus* being used in that sense. Now he could have used no word so proper as *Vapulandus*; for *Verberandus* would not have been so proper, because Milton certainly did not mean that he was to be *whipt* by his Scholars, but only *derided* and *railed at*, as pretending to understand what he did not understand. Now in this sense of *being railed at*, the word is used by Cicero; for he says *sermone vapulo*, that is *I am abused and railed at*. Another thing to be observed is that the gerund *vapulandum* of this verb is in common use. Now the Gerund is nothing else but the neuter of the passive participle future. All therefore that Milton has done is to use the passive participle *Vapulandus*, not in the neuter Gender only and as a substantive, but as an adjective. But farther, if the transferring a Participle from one voice to another, was without example in the Latin Language, there might be some truth in the Doctor's Criticism: But there is a well known Example in the word *sequor* which is a verb in the passive voice with an active signification; and yet it has the present participle of the active voice *viz. sequens*, as well as the future passive participle *sequendus*; and it likewise borrows from the active voice a future participle *secuturus*; and the same is the case of *loquor*, and several other *deponent verbs*. Now, if a verb of a passive form with an active signification can borrow two participles from the active form of the same verb, why may not a verb of an active form with a passive signi-

ence *. But I am now in doubt, whether he was even a complete Latin scholar in the

fication, such as *vapulo*, borrow one participle from the passive form of the same verb? I therefore say that the use of the passive participle *vapulandus* by Milton is according to the analogy of the Language. But further still I say that if the expression could not be justified by the common analogy of the Language, there are other Expressions in the best authors more contrary to that analogy; for in Virgil we read *Ventosa per aquora velis*, where the defect of the Latin Language, in not having a present participle passive, is supplied by the use of the past participle passive: And by Cicero it is supplied in a more extraordinary manner by using the present participle active; for he has said *Marinis invectens belluis*. (See what further I have said upon this subject p. 85. of vol. 4th. of this work.) Now I think Milton in this instance has done no more than supply a defect in the Latin Language; for certainly the Language was defective, if it afforded no word to express the futurity of *Vapulo* in a passive sense.

* My reason for saying that the Doctor understood no science, is that he was ignorant of what I call the ABC of science, I mean the principles of Geometry: for in his Dictionary he has defined a Theorem to be *a Position laid down as an acknowledged truth*, plainly confounding it with an Axiom or self-evident Proposition. (See what I have further said of *Geometry* in vol. 4. Book 2. p 194.) And

common sense of the word, though he had not only learned it as other men do, but taught it.

What I have said here of Dr Johnson will, I know, be very unpopular, as the Doctor was very much admired during his life, and has been wonderfully celebrated since his death. But I write neither for profit nor fame; or, if I were desirous of fame, I think, I could say with Milton ‘that I am not so destitute of other hopes,

here I cannot help observing, that it were to be wished, that the English Scholars in their long Course of Education at School and College, of no less than twelve years, applied themselves more to science, and did not employ their time wholly upon Greek and Latin. I have been told that the first Lord Lyttleton, whom I had the honour to know, and who was a man of a great deal of genius and an excellent scholar, had not the use of the *Rule of three* when he was Chancellor of Exchequer; and in Letters published under the name of his son, it is said that he could not sum up an account of pounds, shillings and pence. Now, tho’ Arithmetic, as a science, is for the greater part lost in modern times, we certainly ought to learn the practice of it, as an Art not only useful but necessary in human life.

‘and means more certain to attain it,’* as to become the panegyrist of Dr Johnson; or, if I had desired that reputation, I could not have exceeded, nor even have come up to what Dr Beattie has said in his praise; for in two words he has celebrated him more than all his other encomiasts put together, who in my opinion would have praised him much better if they had not used so many words, and had related fewer particulars concerning him; for Dr Beattie has called him *the great and the good Dr Johnson*. Now some men have been *great* that were not *good*, and others have been *good* that were not *great*; but to be both *good* and *great* makes a character absolutely compleat,

But though I were able to praise Dr Johnson as ably as Dr Beattie has done, I am not at all disposed to display my panegyrical talents in that way: So far from that, I hold that the praise and admiration, which so many of the English nation (not the whole, nor the men of learning and taste among them), have be-

* Introduction to the *Iconoclastes*.

flowed upon Dr Johnson, both alive and dead, is one of the greatest disgraces that ever befel them, considered as a nation of learning and taste, and the most adverse to their national character: for Dr Johnson was the most invidious and malignant man I have ever known, who praised no author or book that other people praised, and in private conversation was ready to cavil at and contradict every thing that was said, and could not with any patience hear any other person draw the attention of the company for ever so short a time. Now the character of the English nation is to praise and admire whatever they think worthy of admiration; and which is so well known abroad, that every man, who thinks he has any thing curious to show or to publish, comes to England. Of this so amiable disposition of the English nation, I myself have had experience. When I published the first volume of this work, the Scotch reviewers, who were not then my friends, any more than the English reviewers now are, and for the same reason, did all they could to cry down the work, and which no doubt in Scotland had some

effect : But in England the work was most favourably received, though the author at that time had no particular connections in England, being hardly known there ; and the first edition was immediately sold off, and a new edition published. This provoked the Scotch reviewers so much, that when the second and third volumes were published, they became quite scurrilous, not only abusing the work but the author, which raised the indignation of the people of Scotland so much against them, that there was no more sale for their review ; and we have had no reviewers here in Scotland since the review of my third volume. Although therefore I never sought any patronage for my works, nor indeed very much desired it, (for I am so selfish, as I have acknowledged elsewhere, that I write more for myself than for the public), yet I think that I am much obliged to the English nation, for the protection they have given me, against the abuses both of the Scotch reviewers and their own ; and if I could repay that obligation by putting an end at last to the panegyrics upon Dr. Johnson, which do so

little credit to the nation, and of which the public appears now to be quite sick, I should be very much pleased.

I should be thought to do injustice to Dr Johnson, if, before I took leave of him, I did not bestow some commendation upon his English Dictionary. It is certainly a most laborious, and, I think, an useful work. But there are many works useful, and even necessary, which require no genius at all; and dictionary-making is one of these. Julius Caesar Scaliger called the labourers of this kind, *les portefaix de la republique de lettres*, the porters of the republic of letters; and yet these in his time were composers of Greek and Latin dictionaries. Such dictionary-makers I reckon among the restorers of antient learning, by whose industry we are enabled to live in the antient world, one of the greatest blessings, in my opinion, which we enjoy in this. Of these, Henry Stephen is the most eminent, who has, with infinite labour, compiled a Greek dictionary, which he very properly entitles *Thesaurus Lingue*

Grece ; out of which have been made all the Greek dictionaries of any value since his time. He was not only a man of the greatest learning of his time, but a man of genius, even a genius for philosophy, as he has shown by his edition of Plato : And therefore, I think, the learned world has infinite obligations to him, for stooping to the labour of compiling a dictionary even of so noble a language as the Greek. But to compile a dictionary of a barbarous language, such as all the modern are, compared with the learned, is a work which requires neither genius nor learning, and which, a man of real genius, rather than undertake, would choose to die of hunger, the most cruel, it is said, of all deaths.

I should, however, have praised this labour of the Doctor's more, though of the meanest kind, if, in the account he has given us of words, he had distinguished between the proper and original signification of the words, and the figurative and metaphorical ; as it is impossible that we can use any word fitly in its metaphorical sense, without knowing its proper meaning. Now

the Doctor, though he gives us many different meanings of the same word, distinguishes them no other way than by the numbers, *one, two, three, &c.* To be convinced how defective his dictionary is in this respect as well as in some others, we need only compare it with the dictionary of the French language compiled by the French Academy, where we have the proper signification of every word carefully distinguished from the figurative; and, when any word is of low or vulgar use, and therefore unfit for grave and serious composition, we are likewise informed of that.—In short, it is the best dictionary I have ever seen, except the Greek dictionary of Henry Stephen above mentioned.

I will conclude this book with some observations upon style in general; and I will begin with an observation which I have elsewhere made, but which, I think, it is not improper to repeat here, That there is nothing offends a judicious reader so much as when he perceives that an author labours to write ill. Now, this must be the case, if a writer has formed a bad taste of

stile. It is the same as in dress, in behaviour, or in any thing else of ornament; for, if your taste of dress is bad, the more you labour to adorn your person, the worse you will be dressed; and nothing offends men of good taste more than studied and affected graces of behaviour; and it is the same with respect to the *arts*, which have been all at different times spoiled more or less by a bad taste of ornament, and no art more than the writing art. The stile overlaboured, and in bad taste, is what is called by the antients the sophistical stile, upon which I have bestowed a whole chapter, viz. the 23. chapter of lib. 4. of vol. 3. of this work. The writer of history, therefore, or of any thing else, ought to be sure before he begin, that he has formed a good taste of writing; for, if his taste be bad, he may be assured, that the more he labours his composition, the worse it will be, and the more disgusting to men of good taste.

The most laboured stile of history that we have seen in our time, is the fashionable history above mentioned, I mean Mr

Gibbon's Roman History, in which the author appears to have studied to give us all kinds of stiles, the historical, the poetical, the rhetorical, and the didactic. This makes such a jumble and heterogeneous mixture, that I do not know what name to give to his stile, unless it be the name which Mr Gay gives to a Farce of his writing, viz. the *What d' ye call it*. You have epithets, periphrases, and minute descriptions tending to please the fancy or move the passions. By epithets, I mean not every adjective which is joined to a noun, but such as tend to excite surprise, admiration, abhorrence, or any other passion, not such adjectives as are necessary either for narrative or argument. Now, as to epithets, in the sense I use the word, there is nothing that distinguishes poetry more from prose than the frequent use of them. Take from Homer his epithets, and his language, setting aside his versification, is, I am persuaded, nothing but the common language of the times in which he wrote. Now, Mr Gibbon abounds so much in epithets, that, to quote examples from him, would be to quote almost every page of his history. As

to periphrases, I shall only mention two, one of them for a very common thing, namely, *fishing in the sea*, which he calls, ‘*casting nets in the waves of the ocean**.’ The other is a thing also very well known, *excommunication*, which he describes to be, ‘*devoting a man to the abhorrence of Earth and Heaven*†.’ As to minute and circumstantial descriptions, which are so proper in poetry, but for the greater part exceedingly improper in history, there is one remarkable example in his description of the mad pranks of Commodus the Emperor, particularly his ridiculous imitation of Hercules, upon which Mr Gibbon has thought proper to bestow all the flowers of his wit and eloquence‡; but which a grave and sober historian would hardly have deigned to relate circumstantially, even in the plainest manner. And not only in this poetical way has he described extraordinary things, such as the follies of Commodus,

* Vol. 2. p. 527.

† Ibid. p. 225.

‡ Vol. 1. p. 96.

but even the most ordinary things, such as the situation of Constantinople, which he has described in this manner: ‘*The figure of the city,*’ (upon which, according to his usual custom, he bestows the epithet of *imperial*), ‘*may be represented under that of an unequal triangle. The obtuse point, which advances towards the east and the shores of Asia, meets and repels the waves of the Thracian Bosphorus**.’ Here he has enriched the language of geometry by applying the word *unequal* to a single triangle; and he may be said to have made a great discovery in philosophy, by finding out that a single thing might be *equal* or *unequal*, without comparison to any thing else. But, passing over this, and supposing that he meant to say, that the angles of the triangle were unequal to one another, what shall we say of his describing ‘the obtuse point of this triangle as meeting and repelling the waves of the Bosphorus?’ Was it not sufficient to have told us, that ‘*this point run into the Bosphorus*?’ or, if he had a mind to

* Vol. 2. p. 3.

make his stile somewhat poetical, he might have said, that '*the Bosphorus washed this point.*' But to tell us, that '*it met and repelled the waves of the Bosphorus,*' is a high poetical figure, giving life and animation to this blunt angle, such as Homer gives to his darts, but, when strip'd of its poetical dress, and reduced to plain English, is telling us no more than what every body knows, *that the city was not overflowed by the Bosphorus.* So common a thought, so dressed and adorned, makes what Mr Bayes calls *a stile that elevates and surprises.*

As to the ornaments of rhetoric in Mr Gibbon's stile, I think there should be more of them than there is; because I hold, that, in every history well composed, there ought to be *speeches* *, without which, I think, a history hardly deserves that name, but should be called a *chronicle*, or *annals*: Or, if we are to give it the name of history, it should be called an *abridgement* of history, such as Milton's history of England. But, in

* See p. 241. of this volume.

the narrative of history, whether it have speeches or not, rhetoric is very improper. And, though it were to be adorned in that way, epithets, in which Mr Gibbon abounds so much, do not belong to the rhetorical stile, unless the subject of the oration be either invective or panegyric; and I can produce whole orations of Demosthenes in which there is not a single epithet. *Antithesis* is one of the principal figures of rhetoric. Now of this figure there is a great deal more in Mr Gibbon than in the best orations of antiquity, such as those of Demosthenes, though it certainly belongs more to reasoning and argument than to narrative. But what chiefly distinguishes the stile of rhetoric from any other stile, is composition in periods, whereby is made what is called by the antients the *numerus oratorius*, and of which we cannot perceive the beauty, not having our ears formed to their rhythms of long and short syllables; yet it must be acknowledged, that a well composed period in Greek or Latin, or even in English, though pronounced, as we pronounce, by accent, and not by quantity,

both fills and pleases our ears *. Mr Gibbon has attempted this beauty of the rhetorical stile, but, I think, not fortunately ; for I hardly observe in him any thing like a period, except a sentence, which is frequently to be found in him, terminated with two nouns, and each its attendant epithet. The rest of his composition is either in short sentences, or, if longer, of two members only, connected together inartificially by the conjunctive particle, and of the same form and structure of the words. How different this is from Milton's periods, is evident from the examples I have given both in this volume, and in other volumes of this work. Even in his historical composition, such as his history of England before the Conquest, Milton has periods, but not so many of them, and very different, as they ought to be, from his rhetorical periods.

A stile, so over laboured as Mr Gibbon's, and in such a manner, offends me much more

* See what I have said of composition in periods, vol. 3. lib. 4. cap. 5.; also vol. 2. p. 355. and following. But, besides rhythms, the Greeks had melody in their language, which made a material part in their composition.—See vol. 2. lib. 3. cap. 7.

than the most negligent and artless composition. His preface to his first volume, which, I am persuaded, cost him very little trouble, pleases me much more than the stile of the history itself; and it was the reading of it, which encouraged me to dip into the body of the work. But with it I became very soon disgusted; for I am like a painter or sculptor, who has formed his taste upon the antient monuments of art to be seen at Rome and Florence, and who, therefore, can hardly bear to look at sign-post painting, or any thing of the kind, that is not formed upon the antient model; so I, having formed my taste of writing upon such authors as Herodotus, Xenophon, Demosthenes, and Dionysius the Halicarnassian, or Julius Caesar in Latin, not only by reading them very diligently, but by translating and imitating them, cannot read with any pleasure what is composed in a stile so different as that of Mr Gibbon; but rather choose to go to the original authors, if I desire to be informed of the crimes and vices, the follies and extravagances of those degenerate days, of which Mr Gibbon writes. And the reader would

not have been troubled with these animadversions upon his stile, if, in looking through that great collection of papers, which I have lying by me, and which I value as much as any miser does his hoards of money, I had not found a letter from a friend of mine, who is no more, Mr Chamberlayne, an excellent scholar, and a man who had as good a taste in stile as any man I ever knew. In this letter he gives me the greatest part of those observations which I have here published.

After all the faults I have found with Mr Gibbon's stile, it may be true, that he has a genius, taste, and learning superior to the age in which he lives. But, though he knew what was most perfect in stile and composition, he may have thought it proper to write, *accommodate ad sensus hominum*, as Cicero says an orator should speak: And accordingly he himself suited his oratory altogether to the taste of his audience; but which, I am persuaded, would have been so disagreeable to the people of Athens, that he would not have been heard there with any patience. Fol-

lowing so great an example, Mr Gibbon perhaps has chosen to write in a stile very well suited to the taste of his age, and which has therefore given him much greater reputation, as well as profit, than if he had imitated those authors I have mentioned. For example, if he had taken Julius Caesar's Commentaries for his model, the most of his readers, I believe, would have formed the same judgment of his stile, which the Frenchman I have mentioned formed of the stile of Caesar *.

A book has lately fallen into my hands, in which, I think, the author has outdone even Mr Gibbon in the florid, poetical, and epithetical stile ; and indeed has exceeded every thing of the kind that I have seen, except the advertisements of Dr Graham, which I hold to be the perfection

* P. 82. of this vol.—See what I have said of the stile of Caesar's Commentaries, p. 83 ; where, I think, I have bestowed upon them the greatest praise which can be bestowed upon any stile, that of drawing your attention to the matter more than to the words. The very reverse of this is a distinguishing mark of the stile of Tacitus.—See vol. 3. lib. 4. cap. 12. p. 213.

of this fashionable stile. It is a book of *Travels of Eyles Irvine through the Red Sea and the Coast of Arabia and Egypt*; a book in which one should expect nothing but a plain narrative of facts. But to show how much he has raised his stile above that, I will only quote one passage, page 52. where he gives us a comparison betwixt two things that one should think exceedingly different, a camel and a ship; but betwixt which he has found a wonderful likeness, expressed in the following words: 'While the wooden bark,' says he, 'ploughs the deep, and wafts from shore to shore the produce of each climate, this living vessel traverses the pathless waste, fraught with the precious treasures of the East.' So he goes on for several lines, and then concludes: 'His mighty strength, his dauntless heart, sink beneath the whirlwind's rage; and, like the towering ship, which winds and waves assail with ceaseless fury, he yields at length to inevitable fate.' In this way he goes on in a stile neither verse nor prose; or, if you will call it prose, it is what Mr Pope calls *prose run mad*, till at last, in the

end, he gives us pure poetry, in two odes, one on the *Desart*, and another on the *Nile*; both which I think very much better than his prose; for the author does not appear to me to want a lively imagination, and he has a sufficient command of words; but he is entirely defective in that, without which no work of art can be perfect, I mean a sense of what is decent, proper, becoming, and suitable to the subject, which I have used many words to express, but which by the Greek critics is expressed in one, viz. the *το πρεπον*; a thing so various, and so different in different subjects, that it never has been defined, nor, I believe, ever can be defined: But we are sure that it depends upon a natural sense of what is beautiful, graceful, and becoming; which, if it be wanting, cannot be given by any art or teaching, but may be greatly improved by the study of the best models*.

I will make one observation more upon this fashionable stile of Mr Gibbon and Mr Irvine; and it is this:

* See what I have said upon this subject, vol. 4. p. 290. and following.

An historian, or narrator of any kind ought to make his narrative such, that the reader may believe it to be true. Even if he writes a romance, like the travels of Gulliver, it is one of the greatest praises of such a work, that it has at least the appearance of truth and probability, which the Dean, by imitating the simplicity of stile of the antient historians, has given to his most extravagant fictions more than is to be found in many of our modern histories*. Now, in this most important point, the history of Mr Gibbon, and the travels of Eyles Irvine, are remarkably deficient: For whoever reads them will be disposed to believe, that they are written to show the wit of the authors, and to amuse and please the fancy of the reader, not to instruct him, or inform him of facts. To be convinced of this, I desire any man to read Mr Gibbon's description above mentioned of the ridiculous exhibitions of Commodus in the amphitheatre at Rome. There he tells us, ' That the dens of the
' amphitheatre disgorged at once 100 lions;

* Vol. 3. lib. 4. cap. 10. *in fine*.

‘ 100 darts from the unerring hand of
 ‘ Commodus’ (whom he dignifies with the
 name of *imperial performer*) ‘ laid them
 ‘ dead, as they ran raging round the are-
 ‘ na.’ And again: ‘ A panther was let
 ‘ loose; and the archer waited till he had
 ‘ leaped on a trembling malefactor: In
 ‘ the same instant the shaft flew, the beast
 ‘ dropt dead, and the man remained un-
 ‘ hurt,’ &c. Now, let this be compared
 with the account given by Herodian of
 this matter *, and he will clearly per-
 ceive the difference betwixt the plain hi-
 storical stile, and the stile of wit and fan-
 cy. For my part, if I had not read the
 narrative of Herodian, I should have belie-
 ved Mr Gibbon’s narrative to have been,
 for the greater part, mere fiction. But,
 besides the air of romance that Mr Gib-
 bon has given to this part of his history,
 he has omitted one circumstance in the
 narrative of Herodian, which shows more
 than any other how unlike the Emperor
 was to the character he assumed. Herodian

* Herodian. lib. 1. cap. 47.

tells us, that there was made for Commodus a gallery round the amphitheatre, for the purpose that he might not come to close engagement with the wild beasts, but might shoot them from above with perfect safety. But he adds, that, as to deers and hinds, and other horned beasts, except bulls, he ran along with them in the arena, and shot them as they ran; whereas lions and panthers, and other fierce animals, he killed with his darts from above. This circumstance, which I think the most important of all, as it best characterises the Emperor, Mr Gibbon has omitted, and has only told us in general, 'That the securest precautions were used to protect the person of the Roman Hercules from the desperate spring of any *savage*,' (an unknown use of the word to denote a wild beast) 'who might possibly disregard the dignity of the Emperor and the sanctity of the God *.' Here is a little stroke of the ridiculous, which, though the lowest character of style, he has thought proper, in this and many other passages, to mix with his historical style.

* Gibbon, vol. i. p. 96.

By what I have said of the taste for such writings as those I have mentioned being fashionable, I would not be understood to mean, that it is the taste of the whole English nation, any more than other tastes that are fashionable. There are men at this day of as good a taste in writing as Mr Chamberlayne; and some of them men of great eminence and distinction, whom I have the honour to know, by whose example and authority, a sober sensible stile of prose writing, may, it is hoped, be introduced.

If any of my readers desire further information about the historical stile, they may read what I have written, vol. 3. lib. 3. cap. 19. towards the end, where they will find the general rules for that stile laid down, which I have here explained at more length, and illustrated by examples.



B O O K II.

Of the Didactic Stile.

C H A P. I.

The Didactic Stile plain and simple,—the most necessary of all stiles, being that by which all arts and sciences are taught. —It is of two kinds:—That by which a man is taught to know that he does not know; and that by which he is made to know, or is instructed.—The first method extremely offensive.—Socrates put to death, and Epictetus beaten, for practising it.—The Socratic dialogue a good way

of instructing ;—practised both by Xenophon and Plato.—An account of Xenophon's dialogues in the Memorabilia.—In that work we have the genuine philosophy of Socrates pure and unmixed.—Socrates a most extraordinary man.—In the Memorabilia both methods of instruction practised.—Difference in that respect betwixt Xenophon and Plato.—One remarkable conversation of Socrates with Euthydemus, recorded by Xenophon, which ended in Euthydemus being instructed, and becoming a follower of Socrates.—Socrates in Xenophon not only asks, but answers questions.—A conversation of that kind with Hippias.—Though the philosophy of the Memorabilia be not perfect, it is a most useful work.—Of the Œconomics of Xenophon.—The difference betwixt it and the Memorabilia ;—more a piece than the Memorabilia.—Socrates, instead of instructing, as in other conversations, is himself instructed.—Oeconomy of two kinds, within doors and without.—Of each in its order.—The first depends most upon the wife ;—the instructions proper to be given to a wife.—Of the oeco-

nomy without doors,—which in this case was the management of a farm.—This depends upon the right choice of an overseer.—Of the operations of farming.—An eulogium upon that art.—The lessons which Socrates receives in this art, the best example of the Socratic method of teaching by asking questions.—An account given of that method of teaching in this dialogue ;—the conclusion of it very fine.—It is a piece invented by the author, not a real conversation like those in the Memorabilia.—Of the third and last dialogue of Xenophon, the Hieron,—more poetical than any of them, having a kind of peripeteia in it.—The conclusion of this piece translated from the Greek.—Observations upon the stile of Xenophon's dialogue-writing.—A perfect model of the stile of Attick conversation.—When he departs from that stile in one instance, the writing not good.

THE *didactic stile*, as it is the most necessary of all stiles, being that by which all arts and sciences are learned, so it is the plainest and easiest, requiring no

ornament, nor any thing but propriety of words, and a perfect knowledge of the subject. This is the case, when the person to be taught does not think that he knows the thing already ; for, if he think so, he must be first taught that he does not know, because we learn nothing that we think we know already. It is recorded as a modest saying of Socrates, *that the only thing he professed to know, was that he knew nothing.* But, whatever may have been the case among the Greeks at the time when he lived, it is, according to my observation, a kind of knowledge so rare among us, that a man who possesses it may very justly boast of it. It is the want of this knowledge, that makes it so difficult to teach some men any thing ; for, if a man is only ignorant, it will not be a difficult matter to instruct him. But, if he has formed an opinion, and at the same time thinks well of his own judgment, which is a very common case, it will be difficult to convince him of his error, especially if he is to be convinced by any man whom he knows, and to whom he may think himself equal, if not superior, in genius and

learning, or perhaps in rank and fortune. And this is the reason why so few people profit by conversation (the best way of learning every thing); which proceeds not so much from their incapacity to learn, as from vanity, which makes them disdain to be taught by any man living, or, if their vanity be very great, by any dead author; for there are people, who think it a poor mean spirited confession of Cicero, *That, distrustful his own genius, he had sought the assistance of learning* *.

With people of such a character there must be a method of teaching practised very different from the plain and simple method above mentioned; for, before they can learn in that way, they must be convinced that they are both ignorant and vain: A man being only ignorant, when he does not know a thing; but, if he imagine he knows it, he is vain, as well as ignorant. Here, therefore, is a very difficult and very unpleasant lesson, and, with

* Pro Lucio Muraena, cap. 30.

some people, not practicable; and, therefore, a man who knows the world, will not undertake it, if he have not a particular regard for the person, and think himself bound in duty to instruct him.

But, if this method is to be practised, the question is, In what way is it best practised? And I say, it is in the way of Socratic dialogue, such as we have in Plato and Xenophon, where a man, by proper interrogatories, is made to convict himself of ignorance and vanity. But, though it be the most effectual of all methods of conviction when it is at all practicable, it is the most unpleasant; and the very attempting it, if we should not succeed, gives the greatest offence. Nor do I wonder, that Socrates, by practising it, drew such an odium upon himself from the Athenians, as, I am persuaded, was the cause of his death, not the accusation of impiety, and corrupting the youth*; for neither of

* These were the two charges against him, upon which he was tried and condemned.—See Xenophon in the beginning of the *Απομνημονεύματα*, and Plato in the *Απολογία*.

which, it does not appear, that there was the least ground. And accordingly Plato, in his *Apology* for Socrates, tells us, that this charge against him by Melitus was nothing but a mere form of words; and that the real charge against him, upon which he was condemned, was, that he went about convicting every body, who entered into conversation with him, out of their own mouths, that they knew nothing; which, he said, he did, in order to justify what the oracle had said, that he was wiser than other men. For, says he, I discovered that they thought they knew when they did not know; whereas I knew that I did not know. How much offence he must have given by this method of instruction, however necessary, is evident: And, I think, the wonder is not, that they put him to death at last, but that, in a state where the people were the governours, they let him live so long. Epictetus, who attempted this method among the Romans, was not put to death, as the Roman government was not then democratical; but he was beaten by those with whom he conversed.

That Dialogue is an excellent method of instruction, in either of the ways above mentioned, is evident; for what a man learns in that way, he thinks he has discovered himself, and therefore remembers it better than if it had been simply told him. The most famous dialogists of antiquity are the two I have mentioned, Plato and Xenophon, very different in their manner. Of these I propose to give some account beginning with Xenophon. He has written three pieces in dialogue, his *Memorabilia* in four books, his *Oeconomics*, and his *Hieron*, or *Tyrannus*, each in one book; for, as to his *Symposium*, it is not so much a dialogue as an account of the conversation and of other things that passed at a table where Socrates was. Besides these dialogues, he was a great writer of history, and, I think, I may say of romance; for his *Education of Cyrus* I consider as no better than a romance, but the finest of the kind that ever was written.

His greatest work of dialogue-writing, is the one I first mentioned, namely, the *Memorabilia*, which I hold to be one of

the most valuable works that has come down to us from antiquity ; for we have there the genuine philosophy of Socrates, without any mixture of that philosophy which came from Egypt and the school of Pythagoras, whereof we have so much in Plato. His philosophy was entirely of the moral and practical kind : Nor does he appear to have ascended to that first philosophy, which teaches us the principles of all arts and sciences. It was this philosophy, which Pythagoras and Plato learned in Egypt ; and it was the *wisdom*, or *philosophy* (as the word ought to be translated) of the Egyptians in which Moses was learned *. But even of the only philosophy he taught, namely, moral philosophy, it appears, that he did not know the principles †. But, when we consider, that his philoso-

* Acts of the Apostles, chap. 7. v. 22. Where the word *wisdom*, in our translation, is in the original *σοφία*, which in the Greek language denotes *philosophy*, and *philosophy of the highest kind* ; but is quite different from what is denoted by the Greek word *φρονεσις*, which in English is *wisdom*, or *prudence*.

† See what I have said upon this subject in the preface to vol. 3. of *Metaph.* p. 27. and following.

phy, defective as it was, was the discovery of a single man, it must appear a most extraordinary discovery, and he himself one of the most extraordinary men that ever lived.

In the *Memorabilia* Socrates is the only teacher. And he teaches in both the ways above mentioned, that is, both by refutation, and convincing men that they did not know what they thought they knew, and by instructing them when they did not profess to know and were only ignorant. Besides the dialogue we have in this work, Xenophon has given us a great deal of the doctrine of Socrates upon different subjects, without any dialogue, or mention of any particular person whom he meant to instruct. Of this kind there is a great deal in the third book about the middle of it, and in the fourth towards the end of it.

There is one difference, among many others, which I observe betwixt the dialogues of Plato and of Xenophon, that, in many of Plato's dialogues, there is nothing else but refutation; and a man is only convinced that he does not know, but is not instructed: Whereas, in Xenophon, the two al-

ways go together ; and a man, after being convinced that he is ignorant, is taught what he did not know before. A remarkable example of this we have in his conversation with one Euthydemus, in the beginning of the fourth book. This Euthydemus had collected a great many books, and thought himself very learned, so learned, that he could not be instructed by the conversation of Socrates, which, therefore, he shunned, avoiding even the appearances of admiring Socrates, or receiving instruction from him or any body else ;—a character, which, I have observed, is not uncommon in this age ; and indeed it is a natural consequence of a high conceit of one's self, and the affectation of superior wisdom. Socrates, however, contrived to draw the attention of this young man, by going to a bridle-maker's shop, which he frequented very much, and there holding conversation with his own followers, in which he contrived to make mention of Euthydemus in his hearing, as a man who intended to be a great speaker and a leading man in the state, but who disdained to be instructed by any body. Having thus excited the attention of Euthydemus, and

being desirous to do all the good he could to the young man, he took an occasion to converse with him alone in the same place ; and, having praised him for his love of learning, which had made him collect so many books, and having by that compliment pleased him and engaged his attention, he went on in a series of interrogatories, by which he made Euthydemus contradict himself so often, that, at last, he was convinced that he knew nothing of what a wise and good man ought to know ; upon which, says Xenophon, he went away much mortified, and despising himself. But the consequence was, that he became an assiduous follower of Socrates, listening attentively to whatever he said ; which when Socrates observed, he was at pains to instruct him in the plainest and simplest manner, without embarrassing and confounding him as he had done at first. And accordingly, immediately subjoined to this first conversation with Euthydemus, there is another with him upon the subject of piety, in which Socrates sets before him, at great length, and in the plainest manner, all the obligations that men owe to

the Gods. And here our author observes, that many who had been made by Socrates to convict themselves of ignorance and vanity, like Euthydemus, never came back again to Socrates; and he might have added, that they hated him mortally. And I have no doubt, as I have said, but that the hatred of such men was the chief, I may say the only, cause of his condemnation.

And not only did Socrates, in this manner, instruct his followers by asking questions, but he could also answer questions; when they were asked at him. Of this kind, a conversation is reported by Xenophon, in the middle of the same fourth book, betwixt him and Hippias the Elean, who appears to have been a kind of travelling sophist. This Hippias, after observing that Socrates was in use to laugh at, and make fools of people by asking them questions, and then laying hold of their answers to confute and perplex them, while he himself answered no question, nor declared his own opinion upon any subject, told Socrates, that he would ask one que-

tion at him, which was, *What justice was?* To this Socrates made an answer. To which answer Hippias made fundry objections; and so they went on debating, till, at last, Hippias is convinced that Socrates had answered him right, and defined *justice* well.

To conclude what I have to observe upon this part of Xenophon's work;—I think he has shown very clearly in these four books, that Socrates was as learned in the philosophy of morals as it was possible that any man could be, of the best understanding, the most accurate observation, and, at the same time, the most virtuous disposition, but who was not taught by any body, nor instructed in the *wisdom* of the Egyptians, which his followers, Plato and Aristotle, were, who, in that school, learned to know the first principles of all philosophy, and of all arts and sciences: Whereas, from what I have observed elsewhere, it appears, that Socrates did not know the principles even of morals, when he maintained that *virtue* was *science*; and I doubt whether, if there had been an Hippias to

interrogate him What science was, he could have given a satisfactory answer. At least, I am sure, that nobody in this age can answer that question properly, without having studied the logical works of Aristotle. But, though the theory of morals is certainly not perfect in this work of Xenophon, it is the best practical piece of morality, and the most useful in the conduct of life that ever was written ; and therefore every man who has a mind to apply to antient philosophy, or to be a wise and good man, should begin with the diligent study of this work.—And so much for the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon,

The next work of his I mentiond is his *Oeconomics*, which is much more a piece, or a whole, than his *Memorabilia*, and a very artificial piece ; for it is a dialogue within a dialogue, after the manner of several of Plato's dialogues, and yet the integrity of the piece is perfectly preserved ; whereas the *Memorabilia* is a collection of scattered and detached conversations, and sometimes not conversations, but observations upon different subjects. And there is

another singularity in this work, that here Socrates, instead of instructing others, is himself instructed, and in the most simple way, not needing to be first convinced that he did not know, but, on the contrary, professing his ignorance, and not asking questions, as he commonly did, for the instruction of others, but in the natural way, for his own instruction.

The subject of this work is Oeconomy, which is of two kinds, either within doors, that is, in the house, or without doors. The dialogue begins with a conversation betwixt Socrates and Critobulus, in which, Socrates, by questioning Critobulus in his ordinary way, proves to him, that oeconomy was a science, and a science which Critobulus had need to practise, though a rich man. For it appears, that he was like many rich men of this age, whose expences exceed their income. Critobulus being convinced of this, and being afraid of becoming poor, desires that Socrates would teach him oeconomy. Socrates excuses himself, by telling him, that it was impossible he could understand oeconomy, never ha-

ving had any thing of his own to manage. But, upon Critobulus still urging him, he said he would relate to him a conversation he had upon the subject with one Ischomachus, a man who had universally the character of a *Καλοσκαγας*, a word which we cannot express but by several words in English ; for it denotes a man of worth and goodness and beauty of character. And here comes in the dialogue, which, as I said, was inserted into the dialogue with which the piece begins, and made the principal part of it. And here it is that Socrates learns, and is himself instructed, instead of instructing others ; and indeed this was necessary, as he had professed that he was entirely ignorant of oeconomy, having had no practice or experience of it. This conversation with Ischomachus is divided into two parts : The first concerning oeconomy within doors, or the management of a family ; the second concerning the management of a farm ; for that was the occupation of Ischomachus. The first part is almost a continued discourse of Ischomachus, with very little interruption by questions from Socrates. In this discourse he

relates how he instructed his young wife when he first married her; how she was to put every thing in order in the house, so that she could readily lay her hand to whatever was wanted; and how she was to treat the servants, and behave in every respect like the mistress of a family. To say of this part of the work, that it is the best thing that has been written upon the subject, would be but a poor eulogium, as I do not know of any thing antient or modern relating to oeconomy worth mentioning. But, I think, it is the best thing that can be written upon the subject. Ischomachus here relates certain curious facts concerning the Queen of the Bees, whom he proposes as a pattern to his wife for the government of her family, which I should be glad to know, whether they were verified by modern observations. He relates also several particular facts concerning his wife, shewing how much she had improved by his lessons. These Socrates was delighted to hear; and, I think, every reader of any taste must be very much pleased with them.

In the beginning of the second part of this conversation, Ischomachus goes on as he did in the first, in a continued discourse relating to Socrates by what exercise and manner of living he preserved his health and strength, and made himself fit for the discharge of all the duties of a citizen, both in peace and war. For this, both he and Socrates agreed, belonged to the oeconomy without doors, and was so essential a part of it, that, without it, no man could deserve the fine epithet with which Ischomachus was dignified. Then he proceeds to give an account of his farming, which was properly what we would call his occupation, beginning, as was natural, with the choice of an overseer ; for a man who is not successful in that choice, cannot succeed in farming, if his farm is of any considerable extent, and if he has other business besides, which was the case of Ischomachus. Here we have all the qualities of a good overseer carefully enumerated, and the method by which such an overseer was to be educated and formed ; and here there is more of dialogue, than in the preceding conversation with Ischoma-

thus, Socrates asking a great many questions concerning a thing of such importance as the education of a governing man, which the overseer of a farm must be.

Socrates being thus instructed concerning the qualities of a good overseer, proceeds very naturally to inquire about the operations which this overseer is to direct. And here Socrates is taught the art of farming by Ischomachus, who very properly introduces his lessons by an eulogium upon farming, which, I think, is as just as it is well expressed. He says, it is the most useful of all arts, the most pleasant in the practice, the most liberal too; for it has no secrets or mysteries, such as some other arts have; but the farmer most readily communicates, and with the greatest pleasure, what he knows, to any body who desires it; and, last of all, it is most easily learned; for you learn it only by seeing and hearing what farmers do: Whereas other arts are not to be learned without much time, study, and practice; and indeed what follows shows it to be so; for Ischomachus does no more than ask questions at

Socrates ; but these so proper, that Socrates not only answers them right, but gives reasons why the thing is so and not otherwise ; which makes Ischomachus say, that Socrates desired to be instructed by him in an art which he knew as well as he. Nor do I know any so fine an example of the Socratic method of teaching, by asking questions at the person taught, unless, perhaps, it be the making a slave demonstrate in that way a proposition of geometry in the *Meno* of Plato, which Socrates makes use of as an example to prove his doctrine, that all our knowledge in this life is reminiscence ; and, I think, the lessons which Ischomachus gives to Socrates in agriculture prove the same doctrine.

Socrates having here discovered, by the questions which Ischomachus put to him, that he knew what he believed himself to be quite ignorant of, gives this account how *questioning* should be *teaching*. ‘ You lead me,’ says he to Ischomachus, ‘ through things that I understand, to things that I thought I had not understood ; but, dis-

‘ covering that they have a resemblance to
‘ what I formerly understood, I think that
‘ I formerly understood them also.’ Here
you have the whole secret of the Socratic
reasoning discovered, and the greatest beauty
of the Dialogue explained.

The Dialogue concludes with an admirable observation of Ilichomachus, That what is most excellent in agriculture and war and all the great arts of life, and ensures more than any thing else the success of these arts, is a genius fit to govern, and to which those who are commanded willingly submitting, obey with chearfulness and emulation who shall best do his duty. This genius, says he, may be improved by teaching and study; but it must be given originally by the Gods. As a proof of the truth of this observation, and that this distinction of men is truly from God and Nature, and not the effect of teaching and institution only, I will add, that there is no designation of character more visibly marked in the human countenance, the voice, the air, the manner, the look, and the action both of the features of the face in speaking, and

of the body in moving, than that of a man destined by Providence to govern his fellow creatures *.

I have only further to observe upon this dialogue, that, as it is more a *piece* than any thing of the kind that Xenophon has written, so I am persuaded it is for the greater part, if not altogether, an invention of the author, and in that respect resembling the dialogues of Plato more than any thing he has written; for, as to the conversations in the *Memorabilia*, I believe them all to have been real conversations, with little or no addition from the author.

To conclude my observations upon this dialogue, I think it the best thing of the kind that Xenophon has written, and a most perfect model of the Socratic method of teaching. It has not the defect which I have observed in the *Memorabilia*, I mean the want of philosophy; for there is e-

* There is just in the end of this dialogue a most admirable correction of the text by Henry Stephen, which is as ingenious as it is necessary, the passage being absolutely unintelligible without it.

nough of philosophy in it, and more would have been superfluous and even ridiculous.

I come now to speak of the last work of Xenophon I mentioned, the *Hieron*, or *Tyrannus*. It is undoubtedly a work of invention, as I believe the *Oeconomics* to be, but of more simple composition than the *Oeconomics*; for there is in it no dialogue within a dialogue: Yet it is a most poetical piece; for it has a *Peripeteia*, a change from one *contrary* to another, which both surprises and pleases. The subject of it is the comparison of the life of a private man, and of a tyrant; by which name the Greeks designed any man, who governed a free people without their consent, whether he governed well or ill. The interlocutors are Hieron the tyrant of Syracuse, and Simonides the poet, who asks at Hieron, what the difference was betwixt the private and tyrannical life, in point of happiness or misery? Which difference, says he, nobody should know better than you, who have had the experience of both. In answer to this question, Hieron desires Simonides to enumerate to him all the different plea-

fures ranged under their feveral heads, which a man in private life enjoys. This divifion of pleasures was what Simonides was, no doubt, more capable of making accurately than Hieron, being a greater philofopher than he. Upon this Simonides enumerates all the pleasures both of body and of mind : And Hieron fhow's, that in every one of thefe the tyrant was inferior to the private man. This he does in almoft a continued difcourfe, with but few interruptions by queftions from Simonides, putting him in mind of the particular pleasures he had enumerated. Then he proceeds to fhow what a miferable life of fear, fufpicion, and diftruft of every body a tyrant led ; and how much that band of foreign mercenaries, which he was obliged to maintain at the expence of the people for the defence of his perfon and government, muft make him hated by the people. Then he goes on to fhow how much happier he was as a private man : But, fays he, what is worft of all, I cannot now make the exchange, and return to my former life ; for then I muft fuffer all the punifhment which the hatred of the people

makes them think I deserve. He concludes, therefore, that the best thing he can do, is to hang himself.

Here then we have the Fable, as it may be called, wrought up to a crisis, and the knot fairly tied, which Simonides unties in the discourse that follows ; wherein he proves, that, if a tyrant be a good man, and govern as he ought to do, he will enjoy every pleasure, whether of mind or body, in much greater perfection than a private man can do, and particularly the pleasure of being loved, admired, and praised : And even his body-guard of foreigners, Simonides proves, that, if he employed them properly, he might make them the instruments of procuring still more the love of his people. ‘ Governing in this way,’ says he, ‘ you shall not only be loved, admired, and praised by your subjects, but by all those who hear of you. All your people shall rejoice in the good things you enjoy, and shall defend you and fight for you, as they would do for themselves ; and the wealth of your friends shall be as much yours as theirs. Take courage,

' therefore, Hiero; enrich your friends;
 ' for, in doing so, you will enrich your-
 ' self. Add to the wealth and power of
 ' the state, which will be adding to your
 ' own. Procure allies to it. Think that
 ' your country is your house, your citi-
 ' zens your companions, your friends your
 ' children, your children your very life
 ' and soul. All these endeavour to over-
 ' come in good offices; and, if in that
 ' way you overcome your friends, your e-
 ' nemies never can stand before you. All
 ' this if you do, be assured, that you shall
 ' attain to the noblest and happiest state
 ' among men. You shall be happy, and
 ' not be envied.' With this fine epilogue
 the piece concludes.

These are my observations upon the di-
 dactic works of Xenophon, which, I think,
 ought to be most carefully studied, both
 for their matter and their stile. As to the
 matter, besides the excellent practical phi-
 losophy that is contained in it, we have
 more of the manners and private life of the
 Athenians, than is any where else to be
 found. And the stile is exactly the stile

of Attic conversation, which I hold to be as perfect of the kind as their historical, oratorical, or poetical stile: And I would desire those, who choose to be critics, and to be able to distinguish accurately different stiles from one another, to compare the stile of those conversations, which Xenophon has given us, with the historical stile of Thucydides, and the oratorical stile of Demosthenes, not to mention the stile of their tragic poets, which is so different from that of Xenophon, that no man can be so unlearned in criticism, or so void of natural taste, as not to perceive the difference in the diction, as well as in the numbers. I will only add upon this subject, that, when Xenophon departs from the stile of conversation, which he does in the story from Prodicus, *of the Judgment of Hercules*, and affects a higher stile, he does not at all please me. For the speech of Virtue there is too full of *antitheses*, and of *παρσι-σώσεις*, and *παρομοιώσεις*, that is, sentences of the same length, and the same construction and arrangement of the words, and has not that variety in the composition, which I hold to be essential to all fine writing,

C H A P. II.

Plato the greatest dialogist of antient or modern times.—His dialogues reckoned by Aristotle Pieces of poetry.—He has imitated Homer in two things, of never appearing himself in his works, and in mixing the narrative with the dramatic.—His dialogues therefore very properly divided into dramatic, narrative, and mixed.—Great variety in his narrative dialogues.—Some of his dialogues have only the form of dialogues, but not the nature; such as the ten books de Republica, and the twelve de Legibus.—The Protagoras, the finest of all Plato's dialogues, considered as a poetical composition.—A particular account of it.—The scenery in it, and the various turns and incidents in it, particularly fine.—It concludes with a change of the opinions maintained by the two disputants, which

may be called the catastrophe of the piece.—The next most beautiful dialogue in Plato, is the *Gorgias*.—Not necessary to give so particular an account of it.—Of the manner of teaching of Plato in his dialogues.—It is for the greatest part only refutation.—This more agreeable to the character of Socrates than plain teaching.—Of the matter of the dialogues of Plato.—It is chiefly moral and political, but with a great mixture of the doctrines of the Eleatic and Pythagorean philosophy, and of the philosophy of ideas, which he brought from Egypt, as well as the doctrine of the Trinity.—The two last mentioned, the most valuable part of the philosophy of Plato.—His philosophy of morals defective, in not knowing that the principle of morals was the *το καλον*, and in not defining what the *το καλον* is, though he has mentioned it so often.—His logic and dialectic, too imperfect, compared with those of Aristotle.—His philosophy of Nature likewise not so good as the Pythagorean work from which he has copied it.—His system of government not so good neither as that which the Je-

suits actually put in practice in Paraguay.—The Theology therefore of Plato, the best part of his philosophy.—This exalts the mind above human affairs and all things on earth.—This philosophy should be most cultivated in a degenerate state of a nation :—This practised by the the Alexandrine school.—Of the stile of Plato.—This immoderately praised by Cicero, but with a proper distinction by the Halicarnassian.—His chief beauty of stile is in the numbers of his composition, of which we have no perception.—His works upon the whole are very valuable and ought to be carefully studied.—They are the best preparation for the philosophy of Aristotle, and particularly for his logic.

I COME now to speak of Plato's manner of teaching. He is the greatest of all dialogists that have come down to us from antient times, or, I believe, that ever was; for he has written a very great number of dialogues, and nothing but in dialogue, except some epistles. His dialogues, as I have

observed, are very different in every respect from those of Xenophon, whose dialogues are real conversations, at least, in the *Memorabilia*, of which, I am persuaded, Xenophon took notes or memorandums, and from thence the name in Greek by which they are called ἀπομνημονεύματα: Whereas the dialogues of Plato are pieces of poetry, where you have fables, manners, characters, and incidents, and sometimes changes which surprise us, and therefore may be called περιπέτειαί. It is for this reason that Aristotle very properly, I think, reckons the Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι, by which he certainly means the Socratic philosophy in Plato's dialogues, as a species of poetry*. We are informed by Diogenes Laertius, that Plato in his early youth showed an inclination towards poetry, and actually wrote some poetical pieces: And, I think, it is evident, both from the form he has given to these dialogues and their stile, that he had a genius for poetry; and if so, it was very natural that he should give a poetical form to his philosophy.

* Aristotle in the beginning of his *Poetics*.

And here I cannot help observing, that it is a most absurd charge which a French author, the Marquis De L'Argent, makes against Plato; of pretending to impose upon the public fictitious conversations for real. A man must indeed be a wretched critic, who cannot discover that Plato's dialogues are poetical pieces, not intended to pass for historical facts.

There is one thing in which Plato has imitated Homer, the great master of all poetry, dramatic as well as epic, and that is, he never appears himself, neither as an interlocutor, nor as a narrator: And in another thing he has also imitated him, that he has mixed together narrative and dialogue in many of his pieces, in which he has introduced some person narrating the conversation. Of this kind are the *Alcibiades first and second*, the *Sophista*, the *Politicus*, the whole twelve *Books of Laws*, and indeed the greater part of his dialogues. But he has varied a good deal the form in these narrative dialogues: For sometimes Socrates himself, and who is commonly the principal figure in every piece, is made

the narrator, as in the *Protagoras*, the books *de Republica*, and many others. At other times the conversation is narrated by one who was not present, but had it from Socrates, as in the *Theaetetes*, where the time of the action is after the death of Socrates. Sometimes the conversation is repeated only from memory: At other times it is read from notes, which the narrator took of it, as in the last mentioned dialogue of the *Theaetetes*. Sometimes the person, to whom the narrative is addressed, is not mentioned; so that the narration is to nobody, so far as appears, as in the *Ἐρμια*, the books *de Republica*, and many others. At other times, a person is mentioned, to whom the narration is made, but without any character or name other than that of *ἑταῖρος*, or *companion*, as in the case of the *Protagoras*; but at other times he has a name and character, as in *Theaetetes*. Some of the dialogues are altogether dramatical, without any narrative either in the introduction or intermixed with the conversation. Such is the *Eutyphron*, the first dialogue in the way they are commonly arranged, and many others. These perfect-

ly resemble the scenes of a comedy, where you get no information from any narrative, but only from what the persons of the drama say to one another. That division, therefore, of the dialogues of Plato, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in his life, I think a very proper division of them, as far as relates to their form and composition, into dramatical, narrative, and mixed.

All this variety in the form of the composition, together with the variety of subject and stile, of characters and manners, makes these dialogues of Plato the most agreeable of all writing to a man who has a taste both for poetry and philosophy. And, supposing that the reader had no taste for the admirable philosophy contained in them, but only for the poetry, I think, as a critic and a man of taste, he ought to be much entertained : For there is in some of them a fable and story, which is sometimes highly wrought up, and finely diversified by incidents, particularly in such of them as are narrated ; for in some of these there are scenes admirably painted, and a variety of action introduced, as well

as of conversation. This is particularly the case of the *Protagoras*, where the scene is so well described, that we could not have a more lively idea of it, if we were to see it represented on the stage.

At the same time it is proper to observe, that his two greatest works, though they be called dialogues, have nothing more but the form; for they are truly systems of science, in which questions are asked by the person who delivers the system, but to which the interlocutors answer only *Yes* or *No*. The two works I mean, are his ten books *de Republica*, and his twelve *de Legibus*. Both of these have a *place*, which is indeed essential to a drama; but *time* is as necessary. Now, neither of these is circumscribed by *time*: And, as I have observed elsewhere *, the dialogues are so long, that it is impossible they could have been finished in any *time* that we can suppose men to be kept together, without interruption of one kind or another. In the beginning of the books *de Republica*, there is

* Vol. 4. p. 345. of this work.

what may be properly called a dialogue, which continues till about the middle of the second book; and we are informed upon what occasion the company met, and how Socrates was led on to give a system of what he understood to be a perfect government. In the books *de Legibus*, though there be more dialogue, there is no introduction at all to it; for it begins directly with one of four travellers upon the road in Crete, asking a question at the others, Whether it was a God or a Man who first gave laws to men? To this one of them, who was a Cretan, answers. And so the conversation goes on for four books; after which, the Athenian stranger gives them a system of laws in the other eight books, with little interruption of questions.

The *Protagoras*, which I mentioned above, is the finest of all the dialogues of Plato, considered as a poetical composition; for there is more scenery and action in it, a greater variety of turns and incidents, and more imitation of characters and manners, than are to be found in any other of

his dialogues. I think it, therefore, not improper to give a more particular account of it than of any other.

In this dialogue Socrates relates to a companion of his, who is not named, that one Hippocrates, an acquaintance of Socrates, a young man of a keen violent spirit, came to him very early in the morning before it was day, to let him know that the great sophist Protagoras was come to town, and lodged in the house of one Callias;—informing Socrates at the same time of his most earnest desire to be the scholar of Protagoras, and, as he took money for teaching, to give him all that he had of his own, and all that he could procure from his friends. This naturally led Socrates to inquire what he was to learn of Protagoras, for which he was to pay so high a price. Hippocrates was much puzzled to answer this question, and plainly showed he did not well know what he would be at. In this conversation they passed the time till the day broke; and it ended in their resolving to go to Protagoras, and ask him, what he pretended to teach, and then to advise with his friends

whether he should go to school to him. After this follows a scene with the porter of Callias's house, who having been much troubled with the great resort to the house, of sophists, and others, who wanted to see Protagoras, refused at first to give them admittance. After they got in, they found there not only Protagoras, but two other famous sophists, Hippias and Prodicus, each of them in different attitudes and situations, which are all very finely painted. Protagoras, the chief figure in the piece, was walking in the portico;—he in the middle, and so many, whom Socrates names, on each side of him. Behind them was a train of followers, whom Protagoras had collected from the different cities of Greece where he had been. This chorus, as Socrates calls them, followed most obsequiously, listening to what Protagoras said, and carefully turning when he turned, so that they might never be before him, or interfere with him, nor any ways disturb the order of the procession. Socrates, after having spent some time in seeing all this, addressed himself to Protagoras, and told him upon what business they were come, desiring to know, whether he chose to converse with them in

private or before all the company. Protagoras chose the last, being desirous to show himself as much as possible. He then gave an account of himself and his art, which ended by answering to Socrates's question, 'What he professed to teach?' That he professed to teach Virtue, and to make men good citizens and good masters of families. Upon this Socrates started a doubt, whether Virtue was a thing that could be taught. In answer to which, Protagoras first told a story, or fable, concerning the origin of the human race and of the political life; and then he answered more particularly Socrates's arguments. When he had done, Socrates was so charmed with what he had heard, that he stood for some time like one enchanted, still in the posture of listening. This description our Milton has almost translated, at least more closely copied than he is in use to do. The passage I allude to, is in the beginning of Book Eighth of *Paradise Lost*, where Milton describes the effect of the Angel's voice upon Adam, in these words:

- ' The Angel ended, and in Adam's ear
- ' So charming left his voice, that he a while
- ' Thought him still speaking, still stood fixt to hear.'

After this Socrates began to question Protagoras about what he had said, of the Virtues being different from one another. This led to a close dispute in the dialectic manner of question and answer, in which Protagoras being puzzled and confounded, betook himself to the haranguing method, and, instead of making a short and direct answer to Socrates's questions, ran out into a long dissertation. This Socrates complained of, and said, that, having a short memory, he could not dispute in that way; and therefore, if Protagoras would not go on with him as he had begun, there must be an end of the conversation. Upon which he rose to go away; but all the company interposed, earnestly desiring that the conversation might be continued. Upon this occasion, Hippias and Prodicus, each of them, made a speech, in which Plato has imitated the manner of those two sophists. Hippias's stile is pompous, panegyrical, and full of metaphors and figures, such as he was accustomed to use in the great assemblies at the games. But Prodicus's stile was accurate and critical, affecting to use words in their most proper signification, and di-

stinguishing nicely betwixt words seemingly of the same signification. One of the company proposed that Protagoras should be allowed to answer in what manner he pleased, and that Socrates should have the same liberty. But here Alcibiades, who by this time was come in, interposed, and said, it was not fair, that, as Socrates had said he could only dispute in the one way, while Protagoras professed to dispute both ways, Socrates should not have his choice of the only way in which he could keep up the argument. At last it ended in this, that Protagoras might have his choice, whether he would ask or answer, or, as it is expressed in Greek, *give or receive a reason*, but that the argument must go on in the way of question and answer. Protagoras chose the part of questioning, and began with a passage of Simonides, concerning the meaning of which he interrogated Socrates, who at first was a good deal puzzled; but at last having given an answer, which seemed satisfactory to the company, and Protagoras having no more to ask, Socrates began again where he had left off, concerning the difference of the

Virtues, and asked Protagoras, whether he still maintained that the Virtues were all different from one another. To which Protagoras answered, that at least Fortitude was different from the rest. The argument being thus confined, the debate went on, Socrates maintaining that Fortitude, as well as the other virtues, was nothing but Knowledge or Science. And so far we are sure, that Plato has not misrepresented the philosophy of Socrates; for we are told by Xenophon, that it was one of the peculiar tenets of Socrates, *that all virtue was science*. The debate ended in Protagoras being at last silenced; and, when pressed by Socrates to bring the argument to a conclusion, answered only by a nod. But through the whole argument Socrates behaves with the greatest politeness, abstaining from every thing that looked like insult, or even raillery, upon the advantages he had obtained, and at last concludes with putting them both upon the same footing, by showing, that they had both lost sight of the argument with which they set out, and had fairly changed sides in the dispute. ‘For I,’ says Socrates, ‘began with main-

‘ taining that Virtue could not be taught ;
‘ whereas you, Protagoras, maintained that
‘ it could: But, as the dispute went on, I
‘ maintained that all Virtue was Science, in
‘ which case it certainly might be taught ;
‘ whereas you maintained that it was not
‘ Science, the consequence of which was,
‘ that it could not be taught.’ This dialogue, therefore, may be said, without exaggeration, to be the most elegant and polite philosophical comedy that ever was written.

The most beautiful dialogue in Plato, considered as a poetical piece, next to the *Protagoras*, is the *Gorgias*. But, after having given so full an analysis of the *Protagoras*, I will say no more of the *Gorgias*, except that there are in it various turns and incidents, and changes of person as well as of subject; which make it a very beautiful composition.

Of the two manners of teaching I have mentioned, refutation is that which Plato uses ; by which Socrates convinces those with whom he converses, that they did not know what they thought they knew, and

consequently were both ignorant and vain; and there is very little plain teaching in Plato, except in the books of Polity and of Laws. And indeed, as Socrates professed to know nothing, and was directed by the oracle, as Plato has informed us in the *Apology*, and likewise by Dreams, and in every other way by which the Gods signified their will to men, to go about and convince his citizens that they were as ignorant as he, and so far more ignorant, that they did not know they were ignorant *, whatever is delivered by Socrates in the way of system or science may be considered as out of character.

And thus much for the *manner* of Plato in his dialogues. As to the *matter*, the subject of by far the greater part of them is Morals and Government. It was only upon these subjects that Socrates philosophised. Whatever, therefore, we have in Plato upon other subjects, is taken from other schools. Thus, what we have on the

* See more upon this subject, p. 299.

subject of dialectic in the *Sophista* and *Politicus*, is from the Eleatic school : What is in the *Timæus*, upon the subject of natural philosophy, is from the Italic school ; and his Doctrine of Ideas, which was thought to be peculiar to him, I am persuaded, he brought with him from Egypt, as well as the Doctrine of the Trinity, which he has not published in his Dialogues, but kept as a secret to be communicated only to the few initiated in the mysteries of his philosophy * ; or, perhaps, he

* This appears from a letter of his to Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily, the second epistle in the order in which they are printed. He mentions the mystery of the Trinity very shortly and enigmatically ; that, as he tells him, if the letter met with any accident, and fell into other hands, it might not be understood. He mentions also in the same letter another mystery of philosophy, viz. the Origin of Evil. This he speaks of as a very great mystery, which very few of his followers had been able to learn. He says that he never had written upon the subject, and never would ; because such things were not fit to be communicated to the vulgar. He therefore desires Dionysius, if he wishes to be informed about them, to correspond with him by the means of one Archidemus, who was to go betwixt them ; and he advises Dionysius to write nothing upon the subject himself, and to burn this letter after reading it over and over again. His doctrine of the

found this mystical philosophy in the books of the Pythagoreans of Italy, some of which Laertius tells us he purchased at a great

Trinity, however, came to be pretty well known among his followers of later times, -one of whom, by name *Amelius*, wonders how so sublime a Theology should be found in the works of a barbarian; (so he calls St John the Evangelist *). But I thought it had been known only to the Platonic philosophers and those of the Alexandrine school, till a learned and worthy gentleman of my acquaintance in London, Dr Heberden, showed me a passage in Seneca's *Consolatio ad Helviam*, from which it appears, that it was known to the Stoics. His words are, speaking of the misfortune that had befallen this woman: 'Id actum est, mihi crede, ab illo, quifquis formator universi fuit, five ille Deus est potens omnium, five incorporalis ratio, ingentium operum artifex, five divinus spiritus, per omnia maxima ac minima, aequali intentione diffusus, five fatum et immutabilis causarum inter se cohaerentium series.' Senecae *Consol. ad Helviam*, cap. 8. edit. Lipsii, p. 77. This Theology with other sciences came from Egypt to India, where at this day the doctrine of the three persons of the Deity in one Substance, is an essential part of the Creed of the Bramins; and they call those persons by the same names that we do, *the Father, the*

* See *Eusebii Praepar. Evangel.* lib. 2. cap. 14. & 20. See also what I have said upon this subject, vol. 1. of this work, p. 8. of second edition.

price. But the Pythagorean philosophy, as is well known, came likewise from that country.

This philosophy is what Xenophon, in his letter to Eschines, calls the *τερατωνος σοφια*, or *monstrous philosophy*, (as, I think, it may be translated), of Egypt and of Pythagoras. These two, he very fitly joins together; as, I think, there is no doubt, that Pythagoras learned that philosophy in Egypt. But, for my part, I hold, that this same philosophy is the best that is to be found in the writings of Plato; for, though Morals, as I have observed, are the chief subject of his dialogues, yet his philosophy in them is so defective, that he has not told us that the true princi-

Son, and *the Holy Ghost*. The first in their language is *Rama*, the second *Vishnu*, and the third *Crisna*. This fact is told in a French book written by one LA CROZE, entitled *Histoire du Christianisme des Indes*, vol 2. book 4. p. 48. And he relates it upon the credit of one Manuel Godinho, a Portuguese, who was in India in the year 1663. And I have heard the fact attested by an acquaintance of mine who had been many years in India.

ple of every virtuous action is the *το καλον*, or *beautiful*; which is the more surprising, that, in almost every page of his writings upon the subject of morals, he speaks of the *το καλον*. That this was well known in the Pythagorean school, I have shown elsewhere *: And Aristotle, who appears to have got more of the Pythagorean books than Plato, or to have perused them more diligently, has laid it down expressly, that there can be no virtue without a sense of the *το καλον*, or the *pulchrum* and *honestum*; and that for the sake of it, virtue is practised †. Instead of this, Plato has been at great pains to prove in the *Protagoras*, that Virtue is no more than a science, like geometry or arithmetic; and that, therefore, he, who understands what

* Preface to Antient Metaphysics, p. 33.

† Besides the passages I have quoted from Aristotle in the preface above mentioned, there is one in his *Magna Moralia*, (Lib. 2. cap. 7. *v. finem*,) where he says, that the *ερμηνεια προς το καλον* is more the principle of virtue than *λογος*, or *reason*: For, says he, in the practice of virtue, the *ερμηνεια* must begin and carry on the practice, while reason only directs and approves. The *ερμηνεια* therefore is the leading principle.

virtue is, is virtuous, as a man, who is learned in geometry or arithmetic, is a geometer or arithmetician. And another fault I find with Plato's philosophy, that, though he speaks so much of the *το καλον*, he has never so much as attempted to define it; whereas Aristotle has given us two popular definitions of it, and, if his treatise upon the subject had been preserved, we should no doubt have had a precise philosophical definition of it *.

As to his books *de Republica*, the system of government there contained is altogether romantic, and such as was never so much as attempted to be executed; and in theory I think, it is not so good a system, as that which was actually put in practice by the Jesuits in Paraguay. This was a government by religion and philosophy, which made the people happier than, I believe, any people ever were; and it is, perhaps, the most extraordinary fact in the history of mankind, that such a govern-

* See what I have said upon this subject, *Metaphys.* vol. 2. p. 105. where I have endeavoured to supply the defect of Plato's philosophy, and the loss of Aristotle's work.

ment should have been established among savages, and in the middle of savage nations inhabiting a great Continent, by men come from such a distance, and who were born and bred in what may be called another world. It is a fact not much known, but of which I have had an opportunity of being pretty well informed both by books and conversation *.

This is Plato's philosophy of morals and government. What he has given us by way of *logic* or *dialectic*, as he calls it, is certainly not comparable to what Aristotle has left us in his books of Analytics and Topics, in which he has properly distinguished betwixt Logic and Dialectic. And, as to his Philosophy of Nature, if there be any merit in it, it certainly does not belong to him, but to Timæus the Pythagorean : And, as his original work is preserved to us, I must own, that I prefer it to the diffuse commentary, which Plato has given us in his dialogue inscribed *Timæus*.

* There is a book upon the subject in Italian by one MURATORI, and translated into English, entitled, *A Relation of the Missions of Paraguay*. I would recommend it to the reader, if he desire to be informed of so extraordinary an event.

The Theology, therefore, of Plato, and which was afterwards cultivated in the Alexandrine school, is undoubtedly a more sublime philosophy than that of Socrates in Xenophon, allowing the Socratic philosophy to be a perfect system of morals: For it is the wisdom of the Egyptians, into which Moses was initiated *, and it is the knowledge of divine things which are so connected with human, that, without the knowledge of the one, we cannot perfectly understand the other; for which reason the ancients very properly defined philosophy to be the *knowledge of things divine and human*. It therefore elevates the mind more than any other philosophy known in Greece, raising it much above human affairs and all things of this earth, and thereby preparing it for that higher state to which we are to be exalted, if we live here as we ought to do.

It was this sublime Theology of Plato which made the Fathers of the Christian Church study and admire his philosophy

* See p. 301.

so much. St Augustine says, that there is no great difference betwixt his Theology and the Christian *. And in another passage he says, that those, who have studied Plato's philosophy, are so disposed, *ut, paucis verbis et sententiis mutatis, Christiani fierent, sicut plerique recentiorum nostrorumque temporum Platonici fecerunt* †. And Origen, in his work against Celsus, tells us, that Celsus thought the conformity was so great, that he believed Jesus Christ had studied the works of Plato: And, with respect to its conformity with the Old Testament, there is one Eumelius, a Pythagorean philosopher, who calls Plato the Attic Moses.

So sublime a philosophy, as that of Plato, ought certainly to be the study of every man who applies to philosophy, if it be his misfortune to live in an age and nation of which the morals are so corrupted, that no man of sense and pru-

* *Sti. August. opera*, tom. 1. p. 748.; tom. 2. p. 337. of the Benedictine edition.

† *Ibid.* tom. 1. p. 750.

dence (not to speak of a philosopher) will choose to take any concern in their public affairs. The greatest admirers of modern times will not, I hope, be affronted, if I suppose it possible, that, even in the happy age in which we live, there may be a nation such as the Athenians were in the days of Socrates. Now at that time Socrates, in the Apology that Plato has made for him, says, that he was forbid, by the genius which attended him, to meddle with public affairs; and he adds, that, if he had not taken the warning, he could not then have been alive, persevering, as he was always resolved to do, in what was just and right; and of this he gives a very strong proof from fact and experience. Now, if it was so in Athens, I think, we may suppose, that there are nations in Europe in which a man of sense, experience, and observation, though no philosopher, would, without any warning from heaven, be extremely averse to engage in public affairs, from a conviction that he could be of no real service to his country: And, if he were a philosopher, he would know that it was impossible he could do any good, for which

it would be worth his while to sacrifice his time and philosophic ease. And, I am afraid, his opinion of the rising generation would be such, that, if the desperate remedy were to be used, proposed by Heraclitus, the philosopher, to his countrymen the Ephesians for the reformation of their manners, of hanging all those above the age of *ten*, it would be fruitless, as there would not be in their children neither minds nor bodies, of which by any education good men could be made. Nothing, therefore, will be left for such a man, if he had a mind to be of any use to the public, except to go about, as Socrates did in Athens, convincing every man with whom he conversed, that he had neither virtue nor wisdom, though he believed he had both; and that therefore he ought to bestow his whole time and attention to acquire them. The consequence of this might not be, that he should be put to death as Socrates was, but he would certainly make almost every body his enemy, and would, I am persuaded, have many fewer followers and admirers than Socrates, if he had any at all; so that in reality he would do

no good, at the same time that he made his own life very troublesome and disagreeable.

What then is a man of a philosophical turn to do in such a nation as I have described? And I think the best thing he can do is, what the philosophers of the Alexandrine school, Plotinus, Porphyry, and the rest of them, did; which was to apply to that sublime philosophy above mentioned, which raised them above all the cares of this world; and, joined with that cathartic diet (as they called it) which they practised, not only prepared them for a better life after this, but exalted them to a communication with superior intelligences even during this life. In this manner were Plotinus and his scholar Porphyry exalted, as I have elsewhere observed*.

As to the *style* of Plato, it is very highly praised by Cicero, who says, that Jupiter, if he were to speak Greek, would speak like Plato†. And I don't wonder, that an

* Vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphys. p. 140.

† Quis enim liberior in dicendo Platone? Jovem sic, ut aiunt philosophi, si Græce loquatur, loqui. Cicero. de Clar. Orat.

author, who is so copious and diffuse himself, should praise the stile of an author who is more so than any I know in Greek. But the Halicarnassian, whom I hold to be a much better critic than Cicero, distinguishes, I think, very properly betwixt the stile of the Socratic dialect in Plato, which he allows to be admirable, and his dithyrambic stile in the Phaedrus, or his oratorical in the Menexenus; and he goes so far as to say, that, in the long periphrases, with which he studies to amplify and adorn his stile, he does not even write Greek, κακῶς ἑλληνίζει. What he commends most in the stile of Plato, is a beauty, which, I am afraid, we have not *ears to hear*; I mean the *numbers* of his composition, in which, he says, he equals Demosthenes, though far inferior to him in the choice of words.

But whatever fault I find with the stile of Plato, and though I do not approve much of any part of his philosophy, except his Theology, yet I am clearly of opinion that he should be read before the philosophy of Aristotle, as the best intro-

duction to that philosophy: For it prepares us for being taught by Aristotle, as it convinces us that we do not know;—a preparation which, as I have observed, is absolutely necessary for learning any thing; and it starts so many doubts, difficulties, and puzzling questions, that, if we have any thing of the philosophical genius in us, our curiosity and desire of learning must be excited; and, if we can find a satisfying answer to those questions in Aristotle, or any other philosopher, we are wonderfully pleased. For example, whoever has studied the *Theaetetes* of Plato, wherein a most important question of philosophy, and indeed the foundation of all philosophy, and of all science of every kind, is treated, viz. What science is, and where so many opinions upon that subject are proposed, and all refuted, must feel the greatest satisfaction in finding it so fully answered in the logical works of Aristotle. Nor will he be surprised that Aristotle has written so much to answer a question of such importance, about which Plato has disputed so much but taught nothing, (according to the distinction made by the

schoolmen betwixt these two philosophers), and a question which Pilate, the Roman Governour, thought proper to ask at our Saviour, and which shows that Pilate was so far advanced in philosophy as to have doubts and difficulties upon a point that very few of this age ever think of.

And here I conclude what I have to say upon the Socratic method of teaching as practised by Xenophon and Plato. In my next chapter I am to speak of a didactic stile quite different; I mean the stile of Aristotle.

C H A P. III.

The philosophy of Aristotle quite complete ; —the several parts of it enumerated,—Observations upon the matter of it, beginning with Logic.—The subject of Logic is to let us know what science is.—The necessity of this.—No man can truly understand any science without knowing what science is.—Mr Locke's account of science, compared with Aristotle's.—It is altogether imperfect and deficient.—Mr Locke says, that the division of things into genus and species is artificial, and has no foundation in nature ;—the consequence of this, that truth has no foundation in nature.—It subverts also the fundamental doctrine of Theology.—Of the Dialectic of Aristotle,—first reduced by him to an art ;—not demonstrative reasoning, such as that taught by his Logic ;—neither is it an art of sophistry, but a way of reasoning that is very useful.—Of the Mo-

als of Aristotle;—he is very full upon that subject;—has written four several treatises upon it.—His system of Morals, much better than that of Plato, in two respects, —first, that he has given us the true principle of moral actions;—and, secondly, that he makes the proper distinction betwixt our intellectual and animal natures. —This distinction serves to explain a fundamental doctrine of Christianity, viz. the Incarnation.—It serves also to explain that paradox of the Stoics, that the pulchrum and the honestum is the only good of men.—Every thing relating to the happiness of human life is treated of in these Morals of Aristotle.—He is particularly full upon the subject of Friendship. —A new edition of these books should be given.—Of the political works of Aristotle. —Morals and Politics among the antients, branches of the same science.—Aristotle's political system not founded upon visionary systems like that of Plato, but upon fact and experience.—Aristotle wrote also two books upon Oeconomy.—The history of these books very singular.

—*Of the Physics of Aristotle.*—*The philosophy of Nature is there to be found — No philosophy of Nature among the moderns ; — nothing but facts of natural history, calculation, and computation.*—*Our attempts to philosophise upon nature have led to very gross errors.*—*Great and important truths established by Aristotle in his books of Physics ; — very justly, therefore, celebrated by the schoolmen on account of his natural philosophy.*—*Of the Metaphysics of Aristotle.*—*The nature of this science.*—*It is the Science of sciences, as it demonstrates the principles of all sciences.*—*Without Metaphysics we cannot be perfectly learned in any science.*—*Example of this in Geometry and Arithmetic.*—*Another example in the case of Logic, — also of natural philosophy.*—*Theology, the highest part of Metaphysics.*—*The Theology of Plato more sublime than that of Aristotle.*—*The Theology of Aristotle, so far as it goes, a pure system of Theism, but defective in two great points ; — first, the Providence of God over all his works not asserted ; — He is represented as passing his whole time in contemplation.*—*This a*

kind of Epicurean God.—Rejects the popular religion of his country.—The other respect in which his Theology is deficient, is, that he does not make God the Author of the material world, but only the Mover of it,—does not derive from him even the minds that animate this world.

THE system of philosophy, which Aristotle has given us, is full and complete. He begins with *logic*, which he has not confounded with Dialectic and Metaphysics, as Plato has done, but has given us a system of Dialectic, as well as of Metaphysics, quite distinct from Logic. *2dly*, He has given us the philosophy of Morals; then he proceeds to the philosophy of Nature, and concludes with his most valuable work upon the *first Philosophy*, or *Metaphysics*, as it is commonly called, which contains the principles of all the other branches of philosophy he had treated of, and indeed of all sciences. Before I come to speak of the *style* of his philosophy, I will make some observations upon the *matter* of each of the branches of it, beginning, as Aristotle be-

gins, with Logic, the subject of which, as Aristotle tells us in the beginning of the *Analytics*, is to let us know what science or demonstration is. How imperfect any man's knowledge of philosophy, or of any science, must be, who does not so much as know what science is, must be evident to every man: And indeed it appears to be absolutely ridiculous to seek after science upon any subject without knowing what science is. It was therefore very proper that Aristotle should begin his philosophy by explaining what science is. This he has done in four books, viz. the *Categories*, his book of *Interpretation*, and his *first* and *second Analytics*: And I will venture to say, that, without the study of these books, no man living can tell what science or demonstration is. He may indeed be convinced by a demonstrative argument; but he cannot render a reason for his conviction. And he is like a child, or any other person who has not learned the grammatical art, yet understands that words put together in such and such a manner express such and such a thing; but by what rules

they are put together, so as to have that meaning and no other, he cannot explain.

To be convinced how great and difficult a work this of Aristotle is, we need only compare what he has said upon the subject, with the account which is given of it by Mr Locke in his book upon the Human Understanding, esteemed by many a standard book of philosophy. All that he has taken the trouble to let us know upon the subject is, that *science*, or what is the same thing, *truth*, is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. But he has not told us in what manner our ideas agree or disagree: Neither has he taken the trouble, as Aristotle has done, to analyse reasoning into *simple terms*, *propositions*, and *syllogisms*, to which all reasoning of every kind is reducible, not knowing, as I suppose, that there can be no science of any kind, without *analysis*. He has not even accurately distinguished in Propositions the Predicate from the Subject, without which there can be no knowledge either of propositions or syllogisms *. Nay he goes

* Of the imperfections and defects of Mr Locke's

so far as to say, that the division into genus and species is an artificial arrangement of things, which we make for our more easy comprehension of them *, and that therefore all *generals* are creatures of our own making, having no foundation in the nature of things †. According to his doctrine, therefore, science or truth has no foundation in the nature of things: For, if there be no general ideas, nor any distinction of genus and species, there is no syllogism or demonstration; because all syllogism is founded upon this proposition, that the genus contains the species, and the more general idea the less general. For the truth of the syllogism hangs upon this proposition, That, if one idea contains the whole of another idea, it contains every part of that other i-

logic, see what I have said, vol. 1. *Metaphys.* lib. 5. cap. 2. p. 382. and following.

* *Essay on Human Understanding*, book 3. cap. 5. sect. 8.

† *Ibid.* book 3. cap. 3. sect. 11. See what I have further said of Mr Locke's philosophy in vol. 2. p. 183. of *Ant. Metaphys.*

dea, which the schoolmen express in this way: *Quod verum est de toto, verum est de omni*. Without knowing this, however much a man may be convinced of the truth of a syllogism, he can give no reason for his conviction. To prove this at more length, and to illustrate it by examples, would be to go too far from my subject. I will therefore only add, that, to deny that there is a progress in Nature from generals to particulars, and from what is more general to what is less general, till at last we come down to individuals where human knowledge begins, and that by a contrary progress proceeding from individual things to generals, and from what is less general to what is more general, we at last ascend to that universal Being, in himself comprehending whatever exists in the universe, is to deny that fundamental principle of Theology—*That all things are in God*,—not actually indeed, (for that cannot be), but virtually, in the same manner that the species is in the genus*, which is contained in the ge-

* See what I have said further upon this subject, vol. 1. Metaphys. lib. 5. cap. 11. p. 480. See also cap.

nus, and cannot be conceived to exist without it. And thus it appears that the principles of Logic lead directly to Theology, and that, if we deny that *generals* have an existence in the nature of things, we must deny also that *Deity* exists.

The next work of Aristotle that I shall mention is his *Dialectic*, which, as I have observed, he first distinguished from Logic, with which Plato had confounded it. It was much practised by the sophists before his time, and likewise both by Plato and Aristotle; but Aristotle made an art of it, reducing it to certain heads or *Topics*, as he calls them, of which he has treated in eight books. It is a species of reasoning that is not scientific, such as the reasoning which is the subject of his books of Logic, not being from axioms or propositions demonstrated, but from propositions generally believed to be true, or admitted to be true by those with whom you

4. of the same book. Who would desire to know more of the syllogism may read what I have written in the preface to vol. 3. of *Metaphys.* p. 45. *et seq.* where he will also find it proved that Aristotle is not the inventor of so wonderful an art.

argue. It is a very useful art, both in common conversation, when those with whom you converse are not learned or instructed in the principles of any art or science, and in speaking to a popular assembly. It is therefore necessarily connected with rhetoric, which must argue not from principles of science, which the hearers cannot be supposed to understand, but from Topics, such as those that Aristotle has treated of. I will say no more upon this subject, as I have spoken of it pretty fully in the first volume of my *Metaphysics* *. I will only add, that Aristotle did certainly not mean in his books of *Dialectic* to teach an art of sophistry, a thing which would have been altogether unworthy of a philosopher, but only to enable us to convince those who do not understand any art or science, but whom, on many occasions, it may be useful and even necessary to convince. To show that he did not mean to teach sophistry, he has added to his work upon dialectic a book *de Sophisticis Elen-*

* P. 405. and following.

chis, in which he has taught us to refute the captious arguments of the sophists.—And thus much for the Logic and Dialectic of Aristotle.

As to the philosophy of morals, Aristotle has bestowed upon it four treatises; the *Nicomacheia*, consisting of ten books; *2do*, What is called the *Magna Moralia*, of two books; *3tio*, The *Eudemia*, of seven books; and, *lastly*, a short treatise, entitled *de Virtutibus et Vitiis*, which contains nothing more than definitions of the several virtues and the opposite vices. It is, however, well worth reading, as it is an abridgement, very short indeed, of what had been explained at great length in the preceding books. Of these, the first mentioned is the fullest and most complete, the others containing little more than explanations, in a style more popular and diffuse, of what had been shortly said in the *Nicomacheia*.

The philosophy of Aristotle is, I think, as complete in Morals as it is in Logic and Dialectic;—so complete, that nothing has

been added to it in modern times, though much has been written upon the subject, but what is either false or trifling, compared with what we have in Aristotle. What differences his system from that of Plato, is, not only that he lays down distinctly the leading principle of morals, viz. the *το καλον*, which is only guided and directed by understanding and science, whereas Plato, following Socrates, has made Virtue to be altogether science; but that he has distinguished, much better than Plato has done, betwixt our animal and intellectual nature;—a distinction, upon which the whole philosophy of man depends. Plato has taken the whole compound together, and considered it as making only one Nature and one Substance, consisting of different parts, of which one is the Intellectual, another the Irascible, and a third the Concupiscent; whereas we are truly composed of two Natures or Substances, perfectly distinct from one another, though intimately connected at least in this life, viz. the *Intellectual* nature and the *Animal*, to which last, and to it only, belong the Irascible and the Concupiscent; but, according to Plato, they are parts

of the whole man, without distinction of the two different substances of which we are composed. Now, Aristotle has made this so necessary distinction : He has told us, that it is the *Nous*, or intellectual principle in us, that makes us men ; that, to live according to it, is to live the life of a man, and our own life, as he expresses it, not the life of another animal *.

And here I cannot help observing, that this system of morals enables us to conceive that great mystery of the Christian Faith, the doctrine of the Incarnation ; for, if we believe, as I think we must do, that the *intellectual nature* may be united, and actually is united in us, to the *animal*, what should hinder us to believe that a third nature may be united to the other two ? namely, the *divine*, and that it was actually so in the person of Jesus Christ. And we will be the more easily disposed to believe this, if we agree with Aristotle, that the human intellect has something divine in it, *θειοτερον τι*, as he has told us in more

* *Nicomach.* lib. 9. cap. 4. et 8. ; lib. 10. cap. 7.

than one place * ; and it is only with respect to this part of our composition that we are said in Scripture to be made *after the image of God*. And here we may observe, that not only the mystery of the Trinity is to be found in the books of ancient philosophy, as I before observed †, but also that the doctrine of the Incarnation is clearly to be deduced from the principles of that philosophy. This shows us how much the study of it must contribute to explain the language of Scripture and the doctrines of the Christian Theology.

It is from Aristotle's system of Morals that I have learned that the only *good* of the intellectual substance in us, and which only entitles us to the appellation of *men*, is *beauty*. So that what is commonly thought to be a violent paradox, that the *pulchrum* and *honestum* is the only *good* of man, is nothing but a plain truth, necessarily re-

* See one passage in lib. *De Anima*, cap. 5. See also what I have further said upon this subject, vol. 1. *Metaphys.* p. 139. *et seq.*

† P. 338. of this vol.

sulting from the right understanding of the composition of man *.

These works of Aristotle upon Morals are so compleat, that we have in them not only every thing relating to the Virtues, but every thing relating to human felicity. And particularly upon Friendship, without which, he thinks, there can be no compleat happiness in human life, he bestows two entire books in his *Nicomacheia*, besides several chapters in his other moral works; and, what must appear very strange at first sight, he makes the principle of it to be self-love. But this naturally results from the division above mentioned of our compound into the intellectual and animal life. For every man, who has worth and goodness in himself, must of necessity love himself, that is, he must love his intellectual part, which is the seat of worth and goodness; and, as his intellect is truly himself, he must therefore love himself: And consequently, as worth and goodness are the objects of love, he must also love

* Vol. 4. p. 378.

them in other men, and that is *Friendship*. But, on the contrary, if he has no worth and goodness at home, where all our feelings and affections must begin, he cannot have so much as an idea of what worth and goodness are, and therefore can love or esteem nobody, not even himself. It is for this reason, as he observes, that such men are constantly flying from themselves, and some of them, he says, go out of life to get free of themselves*. And this reasoning of Aristotle is perfectly agreeable to the common observation, That those, who have no worth or goodness in their nature, are incapable of friendship; so that Aristotle has done no more than give the reason for it.

These books upon Morals appear to me so valuable, and so necessary to be studied by every man who would desire to be instructed, if in no other philosophy, at least in the philosophy of human life, that, I think, a new edition ought to be published

* See all this explained at great length, *Nicom.* lib. 8. cap. 4. et 8.

of them, and in a form which a man may carry about with him. This, I hope, will be done by the gentlemen of Oxford, to whom Greek learning is so much obliged; and in this edition many errors in the text will no doubt be corrected. Some of these, I find, I have corrected myself upon the margin of the edition I use; and several of these corrections I think so certain, that they are worthy to be received into the text, like those of Harry Stephen and Sylburgius upon Dionysius the Halicarnassian*. To these any gentleman, who will take the trouble of the edition, shall be welcome.

As man was destined by God and Nature to live in society, and as no man can be perfectly happy, who does not live in a well constituted society, the antients thought that Morals and Politics were branches of the same science, to which they gave the general name of πολιτεiai, distinguishing the other branch of it by the name of ηθικη, which is what we call mo-

* P. 149. and 150. of this vol.

rals ; and therefore all the antient philosophers, who have written upon Morals, have also treated of Politics. Plato, as we have seen, has written at great length upon the subject ; and Aristotle has begun, but not finished, a most valuable work upon the subject. As Aristotle was not a practical politician or statesman, any more than Plato, he has supplied that defect, as he tells us himself in the end of his *Nicomacheia*, by collecting together examples of different Polities ; so that the first part of his books *de Republica* contains a great deal of valuable antient history : And, had he lived to finish the work, I am persuaded, we should have had from him a system of Polity as valuable as his system of Morals. From what we have of it, we are sure that it would not have been romantic and visionary like that of Plato, being formed, not merely from notions of his own, but from the practice and experience of other states, which Plato does not appear to have attended to.

That Aristotle might leave nothing concerning human life unexamined, we have

from him two books on *Oeconomy*. The fate of these books is singular enough; they were translated into Latin by an Italian of the name of *Arctine*; but the original was lost after it was translated, which has happened, if I am not mistaken, to other Greek books. But what was very singular in this case, the translation of *Arctine* was re-translated by one *Tuscanus*, likewise an Italian, as I suppose, into Greek, and very good Greek, as good as the Greek of Strozza, who has given us a supplement in that language to Aristotle's books of *Polity**;—so well was the Greek language not only understood, but written, at that time in Italy. In Rome, they say, it was spoken even by the ladies, so much it was then in fashion. This translation, *Tuscanus* says, he made, that so valuable a work might not be lost to Greece. Of this he informs us in the advertisement which he has prefixed to his translation.—And thus much for the Moral and Political works of Aristotle.

I come now to speak of Aristotle's *Natural Philosophy*, in which it is commonly

* See what I have said of this work of Strozza, in the preface to the 3d vol. of *Ant. Metaphys.* p. 45.

thought that we moderns excel him out of all degree of comparifon. But, for my part, I am fo dull, that I cannot find in any modern book upon the fubject of Nature any thing that I call Philofophy. I find, indeed, a great collection of facts of Natural Hiftory ;—more, certainly, than were known to Ariftotle or any antient philofopher ; which is the neceffary confequence of the world being fo much older, and of fo much more being difcovered, both of the heavens and the earth, than was known two thoufand years ago. I find alfo a great deal of geometry and mechanics, meafuring, computing, and calculating. But that is not what I call philofophy, which, according to my fense of the word, is the fcience of the caufes and principles of things ; for the explanation of which, it defines, divides, and subdivides, performing what Cicero calls *Rem univerfam tribuere in partes, latentem explicare definiendo*. Now, I cannot fo much as learn from our books of Natural Philofophy what *Nature* is, which I fhould never have known if I had not ftudied Ariftotle : Nor fhould I, without him, have been able to make the diftinction betwixt God and Nature ; fo that I could not have underftood

these words which are in every body's mouth; neither should I have known how to distinguish Nature from Man *. It is by Aristotle that I have been taught the difference betwixt *things divine* and *sub-lunary things*:—That these are constantly changing, but not without rule or certain determination; for the change is always from one certain state to another:—That things exist both *in capacity* and *actuality*; and that the progress from the one to the other, is what we call *motion*, which, therefore, is something more than *capacity* and less than *actuality* †. On the other hand, things divine are eternal and unchangeable, and all the productions of the first Cause are from all eternity as well as their Author; whereas on this earth the causes

* Vol. 2. of Ant. Metaphys. p. 360. in the note.

† See what I have said upon the subject of *Motion* in vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphys. cap. 3. where I have shown that Aristotle's definition is taken from a most comprehensive view of the nature of things, and far from deserving the censure of Mr Locke, who calls it *an exquisite piece of jargon*, knowing no more of it than what is to be learned from a barbarous Latin translation.

producing are always prior in order of time. And here again we have explained to us a fundamental doctrine of Christianity, 'that the Son was begotten from all eternity of the Father ;—a doctrine not to be conceived, and consequently not to be believed, by a man who has not raised his thoughts, by the assistance of antient philosophy, from generation and production of beings temporary here on earth, to the production of causes divine and eternal. Such a production cannot be conceived in things corporeal, which are in a constant vicissitude of generation and corruption, and therefore have no permanent existence. But in things intellectual, such as the Theorems of science, it is easily conceived ; for there what proceeds from the cause is coeval with the cause, and both are eternal. Thus the corollary of any proposition, though derived from the proposition as its cause, is as much an eternal truth as the proposition. *Lastly*, From Aristotle we learn, that, as Nature does nothing in vain, so she leaves nothing undone that is proper to be done. Thus we are taught to look for the final causes of every thing, which

are rejected by our modern Naturalists as improper to be inquired into, but, without the knowledge of which, we cannot have that idea we ought to have of the wisdom and goodness of God ; which to know, is the chief end of philosophy.

And not only have we no philosophy of Nature, but, as often as we have attempted to philosophise upon the subject, we have fallen into gross errors, tending directly to Materialism and Atheism. This, I think, I have shown to be the case of Sir Isaac Newton's philosophy (not to mention any other) concerning *motion*, the grand agent in all the operations of Nature, and which if we suppose to go on without mind, by a *vis insita*, or power essential to *matter*, there is an end of Theism *.

Thus, therefore, it appears that we have no philosophy of Nature ; so that, if we

* See a dissertation on the Newtonian Philosophy, annexed to vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphys.; also the five last chapters of vol. 2. of that work, and the first appendix to vol. 3.

have a mind to be natural philosophers, we must study Aristotle's eight books of *αὑρατεῖς φυσικαί*, or, as they are called in Latin, *auscultationes physicae*, in which all the general principles of physics are laid down and all the proper definitions and divisions are given. We learn there what *body* is, which is the subject of natural philosophy; that it consists of *matter* and *form*, *matter* being that which is not apprehended by the sense, as *body* is, but into which all bodies are ultimately resolvable, not into the four elements only, beyond which our philosophy does not go. He has also informed us in these books what *motion* is, the grand agent in all natural operations, and without the knowledge of which no man can be said to be a natural philosopher. And yet it is surprising, that, in the many volumes that have been written in modern times, there is not so much as a definition given of *motion*: And all, that our philosophers at present seem to know of it, is, that it is *change of place*. But this is only telling us the effect of motion, not what Motion is, which produces that effect; and, besides it is only the ef-

fect of one kind of Motion. This appears to me the more surprising, that the only thing, we have like science in our natural philosophy, is measuring and computing Motion, and demonstrating the laws by which it is carried on. Now it must appear very strange that we should not know what this subject of so much science is. In these books, too, Aristotle examines several curious questions, as, Whether Motion be eternal? or, in other words, Whether the material world is not the eternal production of an eternal cause; also, Whether there be not of necessity a first mover? What time is? Whether there be such a thing as a *vacuum*? and several other questions of great importance and curiosity: And his Physics conclude with some observations upon the nature of the first Mover, which are a proper conclusion of his Physics, and likewise a proper transition to his Metaphysics, which in the order of teaching follow his Physics, and from thence have their name.

All these are questions which cannot be determined by facts or experiments, by

computation and calculation, which make the whole of our present philosophy of nature ; and yet, I think, no man will deny, that they are necessary to be known by every man who pretends to be a natural philosopher.

As to facts of Natural History, neither are these wanting in Aristotle ; for, besides the facts mentioned in different parts of his works upon Nature, which are by far the greater part of his writings, there is a great work of his entirely upon the subject of natural history ; I mean his history of Animals, which, I think, is the most valuable part of natural history, far more valuable than the history of minerals or vegetables, and tending more than any thing here on earth, to show the wisdom and goodness of God, in directing animals, of so many different species, by that principle in them we call instinct, to do unerringly what tends to the preservation of the individual and the continuation of the species. This history he was enabled by his pupil, Alexander, to make very compleat ; and I

doubt whether we have yet, with all our boasted discoveries, any thing of the kind more compleat; and I am sure we have nothing of the kind better arranged and digested. But he has not, like the moderns, confounded the history of Nature with the philosophy of Nature, but treated of them in different works;—of the History, in the work just mentioned, and of the Philosophy, in his *ακροασεις φυσικαι*, where we have only facts mentioned that were necessary for the argument. I think, therefore, that the schoolmen were not mistaken, when they said, that, in natural philosophy, Aristotle was *δαίμωνιος*, that is, *something more than man*. Plato, they said, was *θεϊος*, or *divine*, on account, no doubt, of the Theology which he brought from Egypt with him, and which, as it contains the doctrine of the Trinity, is the reason why St Augustine says, as I have observed, p. 345. that his philosophy is very little different from the Christian Theology, and why Cel-sus, the antagonist of Origen, maintains that Jesus Christ must have read the works of Plato*. And the doctrine of Ideas, which, I am

* St Aug. tom. 1. p. 748. et 750.; tom. 2.

persuaded, came from the same country, and appears to have been the doctrine also of the Pythagoreans, I hold to be also a part of the Theology of Plato, and very much connected with the doctrine of the Trinity, as, I think, I shall be able to show in the proper place.

I come now to speak of the last of Aristotle's philosophical works, that with which he concludes his philosophy,—his *Metaphysics*; upon which I shall be very short here, as I have treated of them so fully in no less than three volumes in quarto.

The science of Metaphysics is the science of Principles, which explains and demonstrates, not only its own principles, but the

p. 58. et 337.; tom. 3. p. 36. of the Benedictine edition; and Origen *contra Celsum* lib. 6. See concerning the Platonic doctrine of the Trinity, preface to the third volume of *Metaphysics*, p. 2. where it is shown, that it was not only the belief of the philosophers of Egypt, but of all the Greek philosophers of later times, and of the Stoics in more ancient times, as appears from a passage of Seneca, quoted in p. 339. of this volume, where I have shown that it is at this day a doctrine of the Bramins in India.

principles of all other sciences. It is therefore very properly called the *first philosophy*, and is dignified by Aristotle with the name of *σοφία*; whereas to the other branches of philosophy he gives only the common name of *Philosophy*.

Every particular science has certain bounds and limits, beyond which it does not go. It can demonstrate every thing belonging to the science from the principles of the science itself: But to demonstrate these principles would be to go out of the science; and all sciences by that means would be run up to a science more general and perfectly different from the particular science. It was therefore very proper that a science should be set apart for demonstrating the principles of all sciences; and that science is *Metaphysics*, which, therefore, may be called *the science of sciences*,

The strongest example of this, geometry affords; which I insist the more upon, that, I think, it is the only thing deserving the name of science now left among us since we have lost the antient philosophy. We have, of the elements of geometry, an ex-

cellent system by an ancient geometer, Euclid. In these elements we should expect to find the very first principles of the science; but so far from that, we do not so much as learn from Euclid what the subject of Geometry is; for he has not told us that it is *magnitude*, neither has he let us know what the higher *genus* is, viz. *quantity*: So that for any thing we learn from him, we are not able to distinguish the subject of geometry, which is *quantity continuous*, or *magnitude* from the subject of Number, which is *quantity discrete*; and, consequently, we are not able to distinguish accurately and scientifically from one another the two sciences of geometry and arithmetic, of both which Euclid has treated. Even where he has defined things, his definitions are not intelligible without the knowledge of the first philosophy; such are his definitions of a Point, a Line, and a Superficies: And some things he has not at all defined, though he speaks of them so much, such as Length, Breadth, and Depth. All this I have explained at more length in the first volume of Antient Metaphysics, book 5. chap. 8. to which I refer. Nor do I blame Euclid for not ex-

plaining these things philosophically, but referring us to common sense and observation. On the contrary, I praise him for not running his science up to Metaphysics, and so confounding it with another science quite different.

The same is the case of the first science which Aristotle treats of, and which may be said to be the foundation of all science, namely, *Logic*, or the Science of what science and demonstration is. That there can be no demonstration or science of any kind without definition, every man, who has learned any science, though it be nothing more than the elements of geometry, must know. Now it is certain, that there can be no compleat definition, unless we can go up to the highest genus, that is, to the Category. As in the example I have given from geometry, though I know that the subject of geometry is *magnitude*, unless I can ascend to the category of *quantity*, and can discover that *magnitude* is a species of *quantity*, I cannot perfectly know what *magnitude* is. The same is the case of the definition of Man; if I know only that he is an animal, and cannot as-

ceed from animal to the category of *substance*, I do not know perfectly what Man is. But these higher genera are not the subject of any particular science; and therefore Aristotle, though he has thought it a necessary preliminary to his Logic, in which he was to treat of Demonstration, to give a short account of the Categories, he has thought proper to explain them more fully in his Metaphysics.

The same is the case of Natural Philosophy. Body is the subject of natural philosophy. But the natural philosopher does not think it necessary to explain to us what body is, any more than Euclid thinks it necessary to tell us what the subject of geometry is, viz. magnitude. Both the philosopher and geometer refer us to common sense and observation for the knowledge of such things. The natural philosopher indeed tells us, that all bodies are composed of matter and form, which are therefore the elements of that science. But we are not much the wiser for that, unless he had informed us what matter and what form was; but for this we are referred to the first philosophy, which, as it follows,

in Aristotle's order of teaching, immediately after Physics, is called Metaphysics, and is very properly placed after all the sciences of which Aristotle treats, and made the conclusion of his whole philosophy.

Of Metaphysics Theology is a part, and the sublimest part, being the summit of all philosophy, which exalts us above all things on this earth and all things visible, and brings us as near, as we can come in this state of our existence, to that Being who is above all Beings, and even Being itself*, and of whom we can have no conception but by his attributes of *all-wise* and *all-powerful*, and particularly *all-good*, by which epithet Plato designs him, calling him the *το αγαθον*, or the *Good*. From him have proceeded all things that exist, and from all eternity; for with him there is no order of time, or first and last; but there is an order of dignity and preference, which must be according to the nature of things, unless we could suppose all things to proceed from the Divinity, indiscriminately

* This is the meaning of *υπερσυνειναιος*, the epithet which Plato gives to the Supreme Being.

and promiscuously, without rank or subordination. There is therefore a regular procession from the Supreme Deity; *first*, of Intelligence, by which all things are made, and without which, as our Scripture tells us, nothing, that is made, was made; *next*, Of the Spirit of Life and Animation, without which Creation would have been altogether an inanimate mass.—From these two principles proceed all the Intelligence, and all the life and action in the universe.

This is the Theology of Plato, so conformable, as I have observed, to the Christian Theology. That Plato learned it in Egypt, I have little doubt; but, whether it was revealed there, as it certainly was to the Apostles, or whether the priests did not discover it as a truth of philosophy, which I think it is, it would be improper here to inquire.

But, though the Theology of Aristotle be not so sublime or so comprehensive as that of Plato, yet, as far as it goes, it is a pure system of Theism; for he has demon-

strated, that there must be a first *mover*, who is the Author of *motion*, by which all the business of Nature and the material world is carried on. This Being is eternal, immaterial, indivisible, immoveable himself, though the cause of all the motion in the universe ;

Stabilisque manens, dat cuncta moveri,

as Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophica*, has well expressed it. He proves also that this Being is one, and not many ; so that we have in Aristotle that most important article of our faith established, that there is but *one God*. This Being he describes as most perfectly happy in himself, and perpetually so, without change, or shadow of change ; for he is pure intelligence, energizing upon objects of intelligence, which are all within himself : Whereas the objects upon which our intelligence, and that of inferior minds, operate, are all from without, and brought into the human mind by a tedious and difficult process, well known to those who have studied the philosophy of the human mind *. In short,

* See *Aristot. Metaph.* lib. 14. cap. 7. ; and the

according to Aristotle, the happiness of the Supreme Being consists in the contemplation of that intellectual world which is within himself. And what, according to this philosophy, makes man the happiest, and brings him the nearest, that is possible in this life, to the Deity, is a life of theory and contemplation, by which he enjoys as much of the contemplation of that intellectual world as his faculties can attain to in this life; and when in another life his faculties are enlarged, so as to be able to comprehend more of that world, then he is said to enjoy the beatific vision *.

Nicomacheia, lib. 10. cap. 8. See also the last chapters of his *Physics*.

* Aristotle, in describing this contemplative or theoretical life, as he calls it, makes a distinction betwixt the *Νοῦς*, or *Intelligence*, the *Νοητὸν*, or *the subject upon which Intelligence operates*, and the *Νοησις*, or *the actual operation or energy of the Νοῦς upon these subjects*. (See the last chapter of his *Metaphysics*.) All these three are at once in the Divine mind; for there is there no *διεσπασίς*; but all is *ενεργησις*. And the subjects of that *ενεργησις* are, as I have said, all within the Divine mind; whereas in the human mind they are all three distinct; for, in the first place, there is

So far, therefore, I think the Theology of Aristotle is irreprehensible ; but it appears to me to be deficient in several capital points : The first is, that I do not find in any of the genuine works of Aristotle (for I hold the treatise *de Mundo* not to be his) the Providence of God, extending both over the natural world and the actions of men, asserted : And all, I can learn

our *Novis*, which is no more than Intelligence or *δυναμις*, or *potentially*. But this power is not, nor cannot be in our present state always actually exerted. The *Νοησις*, therefore, which is the energy of *Novis*, we cannot always enjoy ; and the objects of the *Novis* we have to seek, as I have observed, from abroad ; and when in that way we have brought them into our minds, they are not always present there ; and sometimes cannot be brought to us by recollection, being lost by oblivion. And even when we have them in our minds, we must compare them together by that operation of our mind which is called *Διακρισις*, without which operation we can have no science nor knowledge of any value. It is in this way, and by such distinctions, which to many of my readers will, I know, appear very frivolous, that Aristotle has enabled us to rise as much as our faculties will permit, to the contemplation of the first Being, and to distinguish betwixt his Intelligence and our own, and consequently betwixt the happiness which he enjoys and that which the greatest philosopher, and most perfect man among us, can enjoy.

concerning the Supreme Being, from Aristotle, is, that he has set this machine of the Universe a-going, and continues to move it; for I do not understand that he maintains, as Sir Isaac Newton does, that body once set in motion goes on of itself by a *vis insita*. But I cannot find in Aristotle that he does any thing else besides moving the first sphere, or sphere of the fixed stars, upon which all the other movements in the material world, according to Aristotle, depend. The God, therefore, of Aristotle, as he has described him in the 8th chapter of the 10th book of the *Nicomacheia*, is little better than a theoretic philosopher of the most exalted kind: For he has there said, towards the end of the chapter, in express words, that the Deity does not at all act or operate, so that his whole life consists of Theory and Contemplation *. And there is a passage in his Me-

* After enumerating the several active virtues of men, such as Justice, Bravery, and Temperance, and showing that it is impossible that God can practise any of these, and yet that he does not sleep like Endymion, he adds: Τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τὸν πρῶτον ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἵτα δὲ

taphysics, lib. 14. cap. 7. where he makes the only difference betwixt the Supreme Being and such a Philosopher to be, that the Deity always enjoys such a contemplative life; whereas the Philosopher can only enjoy it at times. He adds, indeed, further in the same chapter, that his enjoyment of this contemplative life is not only more constant than ours, but greater; because, no doubt, the subjects of his contemplation are much higher. The God, therefore, of Aristotle, if we except the business of moving, may be considered as an Epicurean God, who is wrapt up in the enjoyment of himself, without taking any concern about human affairs; for so Lucretius has described the nature of the Deity:

Ipse suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri.

And again,

Semota a rebus nostris, sejunctaque longe.

μαλλον του ποιειν, τι λιπεται πλην θεωριας, 'ωστε 'η του
Θεου ενεργεια, μακροτητι διαφερουσα, διωρητικη κτ ειη.

If Aristotle had supposed, that from the first Being there had proceeded other Beings, who had the care of the natural and moral world, I should have thought his Theism in this respect, as well as in others, an excellent system. But I cannot discover in his writings, that he thought there was any other intelligence in the universe, except the Supreme Intelligence, our Intelligence, and those Intelligences, which he supposes animate the Celestial Bodies, but which do not appear, from any thing he says, to take any concern in the affairs of men, nor indeed in the material world, farther than to communicate Motion to it. And, in the end of the 8th chapter of the 14th book of Metaphysics, he says very plainly, more plainly than I should have supposed, that all the popular Gods, who, appearing in different shapes, were supposed to superintend the operations of Nature and the affairs of men, were no better than mere fictions invented for political purposes *, and that all

* This makes me not wonder, that it was intended to indict him for impiety; which made him leave A-

that has come down to us from antient times upon this subject is, that the first Substances, by which he means the Supreme Being and the Minds inhabiting the stars, are Gods. But these later fictions of Deities he seems to think not even useful for the purpose intended by them; and accordingly in his books of Polity he has said very little of religion, only mentioning it twice, as I remember, but without saying any thing more of it than that there should be priests in a state, and that a tyrant, in order to preserve his authority, ought to appear to be religious. How different in this respect the Polity of

thens, and retire to *Chalcis*, because he said he would not give an opportunity to the Athenians of sinning twice against philosophy, referring to their condemnation of Socrates. But Socrates never professed to disbelieve the popular religion: He, on the contrary, practised all the duties of it, and recommended it to all his followers; nor do I think that any philosopher, whatever his private opinion may be, is entitled to say any thing against the religion of his country, and particularly against that fundamental article of the religion of all countries,—the Providence of God over all his works, and particularly the actions of men.

Ch. III. PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE. 393

Plato is from that of Aristotle, is needless to observe.

Another great defect, I find in the Theology of Aristotle, is, that, though he accounts for the movements of the material world, he gives no account of its production. This it was the more necessary he should have done, that he makes the material world, such as we see it, to be eternal; so that according to his philosophy, it is coeternal with the first Being. That this may be consistently with the principles of genuine Theism, I think, is evident, if we suppose that the material world has an existence dependent upon the first Cause, and is a production from all eternity of that cause, in the same manner as we say that the second person of the Trinity is a Production of the first *. But Aristotle does not say any where, as far as I know, that it has such an existence; and if so, we must consider the Sovereign Artist to be like a

* See what more I have said of this kind of production, p. 384. and 385.

human artist, who is the author of the works he makes, but not of the materials of these works, which are furnished him by Nature: Whereas genuine Theology teaches us, that all things are originally from God, and the Matter as well as the Form of this Universe; so that he is not only the first Mover, but in every respect the first Cause of all things in the Universe. And what surprises me very much is, that Aristotle not only does not derive Body from this first Cause, but not even Mind, neither the Intellectual Mind, nor the Animal, nor the Vegetable, not even that Mind, which, according to his philosophy, animates the substances commonly called inanimate, and is what he calls *Nature*, producing all the movements of those bodies. Now, though there may be difficulty in conceiving how from an incorporeal substance a corporeal should be produced; yet there can be none, I think, in conceiving the emanation or procession of one mind from another; a thing which, I am persuaded, happens daily in the common generation of animals.

Another great defect, I observe in the Theology of Aristotle, is, that, though he

makes God the first Mover, and consequently the Source of all order and beauty in the Universe, yet he gives no account at all, how it is possible to conceive that an immaterial Being should move Matter or Body without mixing with it. The way that Body moves Body is by Pulsion, Trusion, or Drawing. Now it is impossible to conceive that Mind should move Body in that way, nor in any other way, except by animating it, that is, mixing and being incorporated with it; and accordingly it is in that way that we ourselves and all other animals are moved by Mind. Now, if the material world is to be moved by the Supreme Being in that way, he must of necessity mix with it, and be moved along with it, as Aristotle confesses that our Minds are moved along with our Bodies: Whereas he maintains in express terms, that the Supreme Being is entirely separated from all matter. This is a difficulty of which, as Simplicius informs us in his Commentary on the Physics, p. 320. Eudemus, a Peripatetic Philosopher of later times, who is very often quoted by Simplicius with great applause,

was sensible ; for he states it very clearly, but gives no answer to it, except that the first Cause moves, not as Body moves Body, being first moved itself, but is perfectly at rest. But this is no more than repeating the doubt and difficulty without solving it ; for the question recurs, how it is possible to conceive Mind, supreme or subordinate, moving Body, without animating it and being moved along with it. Now Aristotle maintains, that the Supreme Mind is not only immaterial, but immovable and unchangeable in every respect. The only solution, therefore, of the difficulty is, that the Supreme Mind moves Bodies, not immediately, but by the intervention of other Minds, such as the Animal, the Vegetable, and that which I call the *Elemental Mind*, and which Aristotle calls *Nature*.

The last defect I observe in Aristotle's Theology, is, that he makes the Supreme Being to move only the grand sphere of the fixed stars, which, according to Aristotle's philosophy, was the boundary of the Universe, and inclosed every thing

therein contained. Now this sphere, according to Aristotle, is only moved immediately by the first Mover ; and all the other bodies in this Universe, and particularly the planets, have motion communicated to them from this great circle, which by its constant rotation moves them. Now, how is it possible to conceive that this motion should produce all the other motions of Bodies in the Universe, so various and different from one another ? And particularly, how can he from thence account for the motion of the planets in different orbits and different times.

The Theology of Plato and of our Sacred Books is liable to no such objections. According to Plato, the Supreme Being is above all things, even Intelligence and Being itself ; for he is *ὑπερουσιος*, as he expresses it ; and we can conceive nothing of him, but that he is supremely Good. Plato is therefore very far from degrading him to a mechanic, by employing him to move any Body, even that which Aristotle supposes to inclose the Universe. But from this great and incomprehensible Being, he

derives other Beings which we can comprehend, and particularly the two grand principles; *first*, Intelligence, by which all things are made and arranged in the way we see them; and, *secondly*, Life or Animation, by which every thing in Nature is moved: And this is not only the doctrine of Plato, but that of our Sacred Books. These two great principles are not only immaterial, but entirely separated from all matter, as well as the Supreme Being from whom they proceed. But from them are derived all the several Intelligences in the Universe, and all those various minds which give animation and motion to the animals and vegetables, and to all substances of every kind which we see in motion, and by which the business of Nature is carried on.

It is, I think, the more surprising, that Aristotle should not have adopted this philosophy of his master Plato, as he every where, in his Physics, acknowledges that there is a principle of life and animation not only in animals and vegetables, but in all natural substances, and which he holds

to be so essential to the constitution of every natural body, that he calls it, as I have observed *, *Nature itself*, and makes it to be the principle of the motion of all bodies here below. By these principles in the several bodies, guided and conducted by the Supreme Deity, (or rather by the two Divine Beings above mentioned, which I consider as a portion of the Divinity, being of the same nature and substance), is all the business of Nature carried on with that order and regularity, which even to a common observer must appear most wonderful. This order and regularity, by which every thing is conducted in the best manner possible, is every where acknowledged by Aristotle, and particularly in the 7th and 9th chapters of his *Metaphysics*. And it is a maxim of his, that Nature does nothing in vain, nor omits any thing that is necessary to be done: And he says, that, if we can discover what is necessary or proper to be done in any instance, we are sure that Nature has done it. Aristotle, therefore, in this, as well as in other respects, is a

* Page 394.

genuine Theist. And the only fault we can find with his Theology, with regard to the natural world, is, that he does not sufficiently explain how it is produced; and, as to the moral world, I think his philosophy is also defective in this respect, that he does not suppose that the affairs of men are superintended by Intelligences superior to man, but subordinate to the grand principle of Intelligence, who has committed to them the care of particular nations, and even families and individuals, and which therefore were worshipped by the antients as Gods; but in these Gods, it is evident, from the passage above quoted, that Aristotle did not believe. And yet, if the Supreme Being be such a God as Aristotle has described him to be, wholly employed in the contemplation and enjoyment of himself, it is evident that there can be no such thing as Providence with respect to the moral world, but the affairs of men must go on without any superintendence or direction of superior powers.

These are my objections to the Theology of Aristotle, to which I should be

glad to see a good answer by any man more learned in his philosophy than I am, as I have the highest opinion of him as a philosopher, and indeed it is from him chiefly that I have learned what I know of philosophy. I have read a book very rare, and known to very few, written by one who calls himself Fortunius Licetus, a Genoese, printed in the year 1645, entitled, *De Pietate Aristotelis erga Deum et Homines*. But, though he has satisfied me perfectly as to many objections made to the Piety of Aristotle, yet he has not answered, at least to my satisfaction, those I have stated. The rest of the Metaphysics, in which he explains the principles of all things and of all sciences, I approve of extremely; and I maintain that no man can perfectly understand the principles of any science without studying the Metaphysics of Aristotle. His system of Logic is the greatest work of science that ever was performed by one man, if it be the work of one man, and not rather, as I think it is, the work of a succession of men for many ages in the parent country of science,

I mean Egypt. As we cannot, without the study of the Metaphysics, understand the principles of any one science, so we cannot otherwise, than by the study of his Logic, know even what science is. His system of Morals is the best in theory, and at the same time the most practicable that ever was written, and, I think, I may venture to add, that ever will be written. In his books upon Physics, and no where else, as far as I know, are contained the general principles of natural philosophy, which is there made a science of, but not in any modern books upon the subject. And, as to facts of natural history, as far as they were known in his time, they are very fully and accurately recorded, particularly in his history of animals. His writings, too, upon the popular arts of poetry and rhetoric, are as excellent of the kind as what he has written upon philosophy. For my own part, I am not ashamed to acknowledge, that, if I had not read the Poetics of Aristotle, though it be little better than a mutilated fragment, I should not have known what poetry was, but should have confounded it, as most people do, with

versification, splendid diction, and fine sentiments: And, notwithstanding all that has been written upon Rhetoric, both in antient and modern times, I hesitate not to pronounce that Aristotle's three books upon the subject are the best system of the art extant. Whatever defect, therefore, or errors there may be in his Theology, in which he had not an opportunity to be so well informed as Plato was, who, by his travels into Egypt, or by some Pythagorean books that may have fallen into his hands, but which Aristotle never saw, did certainly learn the Christian Theology, I think we may easily pardon, in consideration of the very great merit of the rest of his philosophy, and of his writings upon the Arts. And I am persuaded that he would have been more full and accurate in his Theology, if he had not spent so much time and thought upon his disputations with Plato concerning Ideas, which he says Plato made the principles of Nature, and of all things in this Universe;—with the Pythagoreans concerning Numbers, which, he says, they made the principles of all things;—and with Empedocles, who, he says, made Friendship

and Strife, or in other words, *contraries*, the causes of all things. Aristotle is accused by his own Commentators, as I have elsewhere observed *, of having misrepresented the opinions of the philosophers before him, in order that he might have the pleasure of refuting them. And, indeed, however much I may admire him in other respects, I cannot praise his candour, as there is clear evidence that he made use of a work of Archytas, the Pythagorean, upon the Categories, and did little more than translate it from Doric into Attic, without so much as ever mentioning his name in any part of his works, as far as I remember. As to the opinions he mentions of Plato, Pythagoras, and Empedocles, concerning the principles of things, if they were truly such as he has represented them, they were not worth refuting; for to make such things the principles and first causes of all things, is glaringly absurd. Plato, no doubt, maintained the doctrine of Ideas, which, he said, were incorporeal substances, from whence he derived all the seve-

* Page 45. of the preface to vol. 3. of Ant. Metaph.

ral corporeal substances upon the earth. But he certainly believed that there was a higher principle in Nature, and first Cause, of which all these Ideas were a proceſſion or emanation, as the ſeveral individuals were from them. Now it is impoſſible to imagine that he conceived the firſt Cause, or the two grand principles which he derived from that Cause, to be mere ideas. As to Pythagoras's doctrine of Numbers, it is well known that he ſpoke in parables, as our Saviour choſe to do, or *ſymbols*, as they were called, which were underſtood only by the few initiated in his philoſophy, but by the many were thought abſurd and ridiculous. Number, however, is one of the ſymbols that I think eaſily to be underſtood by thoſe who have ſtudied arithmetic as a ſcience, the firſt ſcience taught in Pythagoras's ſchool, and who, therefore, muſt have known the power of Numbers. Now it is impoſſible that Pythagoras could believe that Numbers were the efficient cauſe of the Univerſe ; far leſs could he believe that they were the material. But they are truly the formal cauſe, as they are of every thing that is framed and conducted by

order and method : And I think Horace very properly applies Numbers to a virtuous and regular life, where he says,

Et verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae.

And they may be said also to be the final cause of the whole system of the Universe, as it was no doubt the intention of Deity, that the whole of the system should be framed, and conducted by Number and Measure. It was therefore not without reason that the Pythagoreans said,

——— *Ἀριθμὸς τε πάντ' ἔχειται.*

and that they used Numbers for the symbols of all things divine ; as they are the Ideas the most abstract of any that we use, denoting nothing more than existence and order ; so that nothing could typify more properly the *τα οὕτως οὕτα*. And as to the opinion of Empedocles, that all things were composed of contrary qualities, there is nothing more certain than that things are compounded in that way, and that the wisdom of the Contriver of this wonderful system appears in nothing more than in joining together opposite qualities of

things, so as to make them all contribute to that wonderful *rerum concordia discors*, which constitutes the system. Nor are these opposite qualities unfitly expressed by the words, Love, and Aversion or Strife; for, besides the common phenomenon of the loadstone and iron, Chemistry exhibits to us many bodies which approach to one another, by what they call Elective Attraction, and others that repel one another. But I cannot suppose that he believed those qualities of substances to be the first causes, or the cause of causes, as Aristotle expresses it, by which every thing in the Universe was produced. They are causes to be sure; but they are only the formal causes, not the efficient, any more than many other formal causes of things.

As to the stile of Aristotle's didactic writings, it must, I think, be evident to every body, that it would have been improper, if not ridiculous, to have put into dialogue his systems of Logic, Morals, Physics, and Metaphysics. The Polity of Plato and his Laws were not, as I have observed, proper subjects for dialogue, though

he has given to each of them a fable, without which dialogue is no better than a catechism. Even what Aristotle has written upon the popular arts of Poetry and Rhetoric is better, I think, as it is, in the plain didactic stile ; which, in my opinion, is only proper for treating some particular points of art or science, but not for a system of either.

But, though Aristotle has not, like Plato, joined the poet with the philosopher, yet he has done what, I think, answers all the purpose of teaching, without introducing conversation, and speakers of different characters and opinions ; for he has stated almost upon every subject the opinions of the philosophers that lived before him : And his method is, as he professes, to state what others have said upon the several subjects before him, and then to try what he can do better. These opinions, as I have said, he is suspected not to have stated fairly. But, be that as it will, he refutes them ; then he delivers his own opinion ; and, lastly, he states and answers the objections to that opinion.

All this he does in a stile very different in his different works. What he has written upon Poetry is in a stile very plain and clear, except where the text is defective or corrupted, which it is in so many places, that I hold it to be little better than a mutilated fragment. The three books upon Rhetoric are in the same stile; and they have come down to us correct and entire: And both they and the Poetics, I think, are perfect models of the didactic stile. I say the same of his treatises upon Morals, and of his books upon Polity. His books upon Logic are, I think, as clear as they could well be upon a subject altogether new, and unknown to his countrymen; and they are written in such a stile, that, I am persuaded, he intended that they should be understood by those who did not attend the Lycaum, nor had not heard his lectures. But his books of Physics and Metaphysics are in a stile perfectly different; and, I think, his letter to his pupil, Alexander, in which he says he has published, and not published them, (for, says he, they will not be understood, except

by those that have heard my lectures), will apply equally to both, though Plutarch, in his life of Alexander, applies it only to the Metaphysics. And, indeed, the stile is such, that, if there had not come down to the philosophers of the Alexandrine school, who have laboured so much, and with such success in commenting upon these writings, some traditional knowledge of his philosophy, and, besides that, some books, now lost, of the successors in his school, such as Theophrastus, whose book upon Physics is often quoted by one of these Commentators, Simplicius, I do not think they could have made them intelligible to us.

The words he uses are all the common words of the language, except terms of art, which he defines; and I cannot recollect any metaphorical expression he uses in his philosophical writings, unless, perhaps, it be some metaphor which is commonly used in the language in place of the proper word. The composition, too, is altogether without figure, unless we will give that name to those ellipses which are so com-

mon in the Attick dialect. But the difficulty in his stile is to find out the sense ; for it all consists of propositions, which, besides being obscurely expressed, are not syllogised so that one can readily form an argument from them. And I observe, that the great business of his commentators, such as Simplicius and Philoponus, is to compleat the syllogisms which he has left imperfect. Thus, in the very beginning of his Physics, Philoponus has observed a syllogism, which is not only imperfect by the want of the minor proposition, (a thing very common in all reasonings, being what they call an enthymema), but it wants also the conclusion, in place of which it has only a proposition following from the conclusion. And this being the case, I dont much wonder, that a Theologian, who calls himself *Cornelius a Lapide*, quoted by an author I mentioned before, *Fortunius Licetus*, calls Aristotle *carnifex ingeniorum, ob affectatam obscuritatem*. And indeed there is nothing but the most diligent study, with the assistance of his commentators of the Alexandrine school, that can make him intelligible even to men

of the best understanding. I do not therefore wonder, that men, who value themselves upon being good Greek and Latin scholars, and, having read some books of modern philosophy, are vain enough to think themselves philosophers, should not apply to the study of his philosophy, concluding that what they do not understand is unintelligible nonsense.

With regard to the stile of his commentators, as the intention of their writings is to explain what is obscure in Aristotle, their stile ought to be very plain, and, I think, it is so, unless where either the MS. is faulty, or the printed edition, which is the only one that ever was published of those commentators; for, since they were printed, there has not been such a curiosity about antient philosophy as to make any demand for a second edition. The punctuation in this edition is generally very bad, and such as will stop the best Greek scholar, and oblige him to read the passage over and over again. And there are sometimes such errors in the words, as make a

riddle of the sense that requires an Œdipus to solve, or a critic, such as a countryman of mine was, of the name of Scrymgeour, who assisted Harry Stephen in collating Greek MSS. and who, he says, showed a sagacity in that business, which looked like divination. But, with all these imperfections, those commentaries must be carefully studied ; and out of them, and of the text of Aristotle, this most valuable philosophy must be dug like diamonds out of a mine.

For this work not only a perfect knowledge of the common Greek language is necessary, but we must know also the language of this philosophy. We must therefore begin with the very elements of it, and learn the meaning of the terms which it uses. Upon this subject there is an admirable work of Porphyry, who was, I think, the greatest philosopher of the age in which he lived, and which he entitles very properly *εἰσαγωγή*, or *introduction*: And indeed it is the best introduction to philosophy that ever was written, though the subject of it may appear very contemptible to those who call themselves philoso-

phers in this age, and even to those who profess only to be scholars; for it is the explanation of five words, viz. *genus*, *species*, *difference*, *proper* or *peculiar*, and *accidental*. But these words express all the several relations which the things in this universe have to one another. For there is nothing that has not to one or more things the relation of *Genus* or of *Species*. Now, there can be no *genus* and *species*, without a *Difference* which distinguishes the *species* from the *genus*. Further, things belonging to different *genuses* and *specieses* have certain qualities which are *Peculiar* to them, and distinguish them from other things of the same *genus* and *species*. And, lastly, they have qualities which they may have or not have, and yet continue of the same *genus* and *species*, and which therefore are common to things of other *genuses* and *specieses*; and these are very properly called *Accidents*, as being appropriated to no particular class of things. These divisions comprehend all the several relations, either of conformity or distinction, in which the things of this universe stand to one another; and, as we think of

nothing but in system, every idea we form being, as I have shown*, a system, there cannot be a more proper introduction to philosophy than a work that exhibits to us, in a short and comprehensive view, all the different relations which the infinite variety of things in the system of the universe have to one another. And it was the more proper for another reason, that, though Aristotle has very accurately defined the terms peculiar to his own philosophy, yet he has no where, as I remember, defined these terms common to all philosophy.

Ammonius Hermias, a great philosopher of the Alexandrine school, who has written an excellent commentary upon Aristotle's book of Categories, has thought it worth his while to write also a commentary upon this *Introduction* of Porphyry, which is undoubtedly very much connected with the doctrine of the Categories: For, as the explanation of the *five words*

* Vol. 2. of Ant. Metaph. p. 107. and following.
—See also p. 85. of the same volume.

informs us of the several relations in which the things of this universe stand to one another, so the Categories let us know what they are absolutely in themselves. Of this work I have spoken at some length elsewhere *, and have shown that, without the knowledge of it, there can be no perfect science, because there can be no perfect definition. It was originally the work of Archytas, a Pythagorean philosopher, from whom Aristotle took it, only changing the title of it, and, I think, not for the better. For Archytas entitled it, *περὶ τοῦ παντός*, or, *Of the whole of things*; and, I think, very properly, as it takes in the whole things of the universe, and is the best introduction that can be imagined to so comprehensive a system of philosophy as that of the Pythagoreans, and which was truly an universal philosophy, because it was the philosophy of the universe; whereas Aristotle has made it only an introduction to his Logic, which by many is thought not to be philosophy at all, but only an organic art, subservient

* Vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphyf. p. 317.

indeed to philosophy, and which must be acknowledged to be highly useful.

If this Introduction of Porphyry, with the commentary of Ammonius, and the Categories of Aristotle, with the commentary both of Ammonius and Simplicius, in which last is preserved to us the original work of Archytas, be diligently studied, they will not only make us masters of the language of antient philosophy, but they will give us an idea of its comprehension and universality, which is not to be got in any modern book, and will prepare us properly for the study of any particular branch of it, to which we may think proper to apply. And what should encourage every young student, who has spirit and resolution enough to venture to philosophise in this unfashionable way, is, that the Introduction of Porphyry, and Ammonius's commentary upon it, are the best printed books, and from the most correct manuscripts, of all that has been written upon Aristotle in Greek; and the text of the Categories is the least obscure of all Ari-

stotle's philosophical writings; and what obscurity may be in it is fully removed by the two commentaries upon it, which are also very correctly printed. A man, therefore, who is qualified for the study of the Greek philosophy, by the knowledge of the Greek language, will have no difficulty to make himself master of the elements of this philosophy, by the diligent study of these works.

As I have it much at heart to revive this antient philosophy in Britain, which would do us so much honour as a learned nation, and in that respect distinguish us from all the other nations of Europe, among whom this philosophy is lost, I have subjoined to what I have here said of it, a chapter of Queries, tending to show, that, without it, we cannot understand the principles of any one art or science, nor comprehend the fundamental doctrines of our holy religion.

C H A P. IV.

Queries concerning Philosophy.

1. **A**S philosophy is the science of Causes, it is, I think, of the greatest importance to know, Whether Aristotle's Doctrine of Causes*, upon which he valued himself so much, be true? for, if it can be shown not to be true, I think it will go near to put down his whole philosophy.

2. As motion is the great agent in all the operations of nature, if it can be shown that his definition of motion is such as Mr Locke has represented it, viz. *the most exquisite piece of jargon that ever was invented by man*, it will, I think, at once

* See upon the doctrine of *Causes*, vol. 2. book 4. chap. 4. of Ant. Metaphys.

put an end to his whole Philosophy of Nature * ?

3. Whether there be not three things concerning motion to be inquired about ; *1mo*, What motion is, considered in itself ? *2do*, What is the cause of it ? *3tio*, What is the effect of it ; and whether those, who define motion by change of place, tell us only what the *effect* of motion is, not what *motion itself* is ?

4. Is it not proper to inquire, whether that great principle of Aristotle, that all natural bodies are composed of *matter* and *form*, be well founded ? For, if it can be shown that there is no truth in that proposition, the antient philosophy of Nature has no foundation upon which it can stand ; but, on the contrary, if it be true, it is evident that the antients have laid down the first principles of all natural knowledge †.

* On the subject of Motion, see vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 3.

† On the subject of *matter* and *form*, see ib. book 2. chap. 2.

5. This naturally leads to inquire, whether there be any truth in the Peripatetic notion of *substantial forms*? and whether there be not in every Natural Body a certain principle, which makes that Body what it is, distinguishes it from every other Body, and produces all its movements and qualities of every kind? and next to inquire, what that thing is, whether Mind or Body, whether Material or Immaterial *?

6. As it is impossible that any man can be a Natural philosopher, without knowing what Nature is, I think it is worth while to inquire whether Aristotle's definition of Nature be a just one, viz. that it is a Principle of Motion, or a kind of Life, in all Natural Bodies †?

7. Whether there be any difference betwixt God and Nature? What that difference

* Vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphys. book 2. chap. 2.

† See on the subject of this Principle, Ib. p. 207. 231. and 232.; and vol. 3. of Ant. Metaphys. p. 324.

rence is ? And how man differs from both * ?

8. Whether Sir Isaac Newton, when he wrote his *Principia*, had any idea at all of Body being moved by Mind ; as he has no where mentioned Mind as the Motive Principle of Body ? Whether this be not evident from the different accounts he gives of the cause of Attraction or Gravitation † ? Whether we can suppose, that the only two Motive powers, which he mentions in the beginning of his *Principia*, viz. the *vis insita* and the *vis impressa*, are, either of them, Mind ? or, whether it be not evident, that, by the one, he meant a power inherent in Matter, and essential to it ; and, by the other, a force external applied to Matter by Bodily impulse ?

9. Whether we be not more certain of the Motion of our own Bodies by Mind,

* Vol. 2. of Ant. Metaphyf. p. 360.

† See vol. 2. of Ant. Metaphyf. p. 324.—where one of the causes he assigns for Gravitation is a *medium*, whether corporeal or incorporeal, impelling the Bodies swimming in it towards one another.

than we can be of the Motion of any Body by Body, as we know the one by the most certain of all knowledge, Consciousness, and the other only by the evidence of sense, which is often fallacious? Whether Sir Isaac, by maintaining that his own Motion, and the Motion of other animals, is produced by a most Subtile Spirit, which pervades gross Bodies, and is latent in them *, does not reject altogether the Motion by Mind, and maintain that all the Bodies in this our System, the terrestrial as well as the celestial, are moved by Æthers, Fluids, or Subtile Spirits, or that they move themselves?

10. Whether it be not a most extraordinary *Pneumatophobia*, (to use an expression of Cudworth †), resembling the disease called *Hydrophobia*, which makes a man deny that his own Body is moved by his Mind?

11. Whether, as all our Ideas, in this state of our existence, arise from Sen-
 sa-

* Ant. Metaphyf. vol. 1. p. 275.

† Ib. vol. 2. p. 40.

tions, and, as Sir Isaac says, that our Sensations, as well as our Voluntary Motions, are produced by Subtile Spirits *, would it not be compleating the System of Materialism to maintain, that our Ideas are produced by a more Subtile Spirit still ; and then there will be in us neither Animal nor Intellectual Mind ?

12. Whether Sir Isaac's first Law of Motion, by which Body once set in Motion is made to go on in a straight line, is not true only of Motion by Bodily impulse ? And whether Motion by Mind may not change its direction in every instant, which Motion by Bodily impulse cannot do ?

13. Whether, to suppose that Body can of itself, and by a power inherent in it, and essential to it, go on in a certain direction, and with an uniform velocity, be not absolute Materialism ?

14. Whether we cannot readily conceive all the Bodies of the universe to be moved by Mind, without having recourse to a *vis insita* in the Bodies, a *vis centripeta*, a *vis*

* Ant. Metaphys. vol. 2. p. 324.

centrifuga, or Æthers and Subtile Fluids, which, supposing them to exist; must be first moved themselves before they can move any other bodies; so that the question still remains, What moves them?

15. Whether it be possible to suppose; that either Mind or Body can act where they are not? and whether, when Body moves Body, it must not be in contact with the Body it moves, either immediately, or by the intervention of other Bodies?

16. Whether it be possible that a man of common sense, not to speak of a philosopher, can believe that it is the Moon which produces the Motion of the Tides? And whether it might not be said, with as much reason, that it is the Motion of the Tides that produces the Motion of the Moon? Whether this way of speaking, so unworthy of a philosopher, does not proceed from confounding two things quite different, viz. one Body moving another, and two Bodies being moved together with a certain sympathy or conformity of

their motions to one another ? Of this last kind is the Motion of the Tides with respect to the Motion of the Moon ; and of this kind there are many Motions to be seen on earth, such as the Motion of the Loadstone and Iron, and the various attractions and repulsions of small Bodies which Chemistry exhibits *.

17. Whether, as Almighty Wisdom does nothing superfluous or in vain, a man can believe in God, and believe at the same time that the motion of the planets is actually compounded of Projection and Gravitation, unless he can demonstrate that it is impossible by the nature of things, that the circular or elliptical Motion can be simple, or that, if it were simple, the *phaenomena* could not be accounted for † ? And whether it would not be more for the honour of Sir Isaac to suppose that the Planetary Motion is a simple and uncompound-

* Ant. Metaphyf. vol. 2. p. 378. & 401. Other examples might be given, as of the strings of musical instruments, which, being tuned in a certain ratio to one another, exhibit wonderful sympathetic motions.

† Vol. 3. of Ant. Metaphyf. p. 304.

ed Motion, as it certainly is, but that he has most ingeniously analysed it into two Motions, in order to demonstrate the laws by which it is governed *?

18. Whether there be not a difference in the nature of things betwixt that science, by which the motions of the Celestial or other Bodies are measured and computed, and that science, by which the moving principle in those Bodies is discovered?—Whether the one science does not belong to Astronomy, Geometry, or Mechanics? And whether the other does not belong to philosophy? And whether a man may not be an excellent astronomer, geometer, or mechanic, and yet not a philosopher, and, consequently, not capable of determining what is the moving principle in Bodies?

19. Whether a man can be said to be truly a man of science, who does not know what science is? And whether a man can

* Vol. 3. of Ant. Metaphyf. p. 312.—where it is shown, that a motion in a straight line, the simplest of all motions, is decomposed and analysed into two other motions, for the purpose of demonstrating certain problems.

learn that from Locke's book upon human understanding, where he tells us, that Truth is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our Ideas, without being informed that all reasoning consists of Syllogisms, Propositions, and Simple Terms; and that, after analysing it in this manner, we must begin the study of it with that into which it is ultimately resolvable, I mean Simple Terms, in the same manner as a man, who studies language, must begin with the elemental sounds of it*.

20. Whether there can be any science without definition? Whether every definition must not be by the *genus* and *specific* difference? Whether to know a thing perfectly, we must know not only the *genus* to which it immediately belongs, but also the remoter *genus*, and so on, till we come up to the highest *genus* of all, under which the thing is to be ranked? And if so, whether the doctrine of those highest *genera*, contained in Aristotle's book of Categories, be not the foundation not only

* Upon this subject, see vol. 1. of Ant. Metaphys. book 5. chap. 2. & 4.

of Logic, but of all science ; as, without the knowledge of the Categories, there can be no perfect definition * ?

21. Whether the human intellect, in forming its ideas, does not apprehend every thing in system, and nothing absolutely and simply by itself, but every thing relatively to other things? And whether this does not lead to very important consequences in philosophy, as it tends to show that we are by nature formed for the contemplation of Order, Regularity, and Beauty † ?

22. Whether a sense of the *pulchrum* and *honestum* does not distinguish a man from a brute, as much, or more, than any thing else ? And whether an author, such as Mr Paley, who denies or doubts that we

* See upon this subject vol. 1. of this work, p. 72. & 520. 2d edit.—See also Ant. Metaphys. vol. 1, p. 317. & 318.

† Ant. Metaphys. vol. 2. p. 107. & 108.—131. & 132. Ibid. vol. 3. p. 342.

have any such sense, does not in effect deny or doubt the existence of Man ?

23. Whether Man differs from a brute, not in kind, but in degree? Whether Locke, not distinguishing betwixt sensations and ideas, does not confound man and brute? And whether he must not be a most wretched philosopher, who cannot distinguish himself accurately and scientifically from a brute * ?

24. Whether it be true, as Mr Locke says, that we can have no perception of any kind without consciousness? And whether, on the contrary, consciousness be not one of the greatest exertions of intellect, by which we are essentially distinguished from the brutes † ?

25. Whether Ideas, abstract Ideas, and general Ideas, be all synonymous terms ; so that there is no such thing as a parti-

* See, upon this subject, Appendix to vol. 3. of Ant. Metaphyf. chap. 3. p. 335.

† Ibid. vol. 2. p. 87. & 88.

cular Idea of any thing? Or whether, on the contrary, it be not impossible to conceive abstracted or general ideas without particular ideas *?

26. What is the nature of that idea which must exist in particular things before it can be abstracted or generalized? Can it be any thing else than an immaterial principle, which animates the substance, gives it its form and motions, and makes it what it is, distinct from every thing else †?

27. Whether there be any difference betwixt God and Nature? And, if there be, what that difference is ‡?

28. Whether there be not such a philosophy, as that which Aristotle calls the *first philosophy*, because it demonstrates not

* Vol. 2. of Ant. Metaphys. p. 70, 71, 72, 75, 76, 79, and 85; and vol. 3. p. 341.

† Ibid. vol. 2. p. 79.

‡ Ibid. p. 360.

only its own principles, but the principles of every other branch of philosophy, and of all sciences? And whether it be true, what both Plato and Aristotle tell us, that even geometry, which is accounted by us to be the most certain of all sciences, is so far from being able to demonstrate its own principles, that it cannot so much as inform us what its subject, viz. *magnitude*, is: And accordingly Euclid has not attempted to define magnitude, nor even the dimensions of it, *length, breadth, and thickness**?

29. Whether it be possible to conceive the mystery of the Trinity, or to believe that there may be three distinct Persons of one and the same substance, and that the Son was begotten from all eternity of the Father, without having studied that philosophy, which, as it is defined by the antients, is the knowledge of things divine as well as human†? Whether, without being taught by the antient philosophy, and

* P. 381. of this volume.

† See what I have said of the Platonic Theology, p. 373, 384, and 385. of this volume:

having there learned to distinguish accurately betwixt the intellectual part of our own composition and the animal, we can conceive the mystery of the Incarnation, and understand, that, as in us the Intellectual Nature is added to the Animal, so in the Person of Jesus Christ, there was no impossibility in the nature of things that the divine should be added to both * † And, lastly, whether it be possible to believe these essential doctrines of Christianity, if we cannot conceive them, or believe the possibility of their existing?

30. Whether the philosophy of the Fine Arts is not also to be learned in the school of antiquity? And whether it be not only from Aristotle that we can learn in what sense they are imitative arts, and how to distinguish a copy of verses, or even the longest and most elaborate didactic work in verse, adorned with the most splendid diction and finest versification, such as the Georgics

* See p. 364. of this volume.

of Virgil, from a poem, and in painting, a portrait from a picture, and in general the ideal beauty from the copy of any thing actually existing.

31. Whether there be not even in Grammar an art and a science, which cannot without philosophy be perfectly understood? And whether it be not philosophy, and antient philosophy only, that can explain distinctly and scientifically the three great arts of grammar, Derivation, Composition, and Flexion, by which millions of words, (they say five millions in Latin), are so connected together as to be comprehended in the memory and readily used *; and how, with articulation Melody

* Of these three arts I have treated at considerable length in the second volume of this work, particularly in chapters 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. & 15. of book 1. Of these three I hold *flexion* to be the greatest art, and which saves more than any other the multiplication of words: For, by the same word, with some variation, it contrives to express Numbers, Persons, Genders, Times, Dispositions of the speaker, and the Relations that things have to one another. But this is not to be understood without the knowledge of antient philosophy; and, accordingly, upon the princi-

and Rhythm are joined in the antient languages, so as to make altogether the most wonderful art that ever was invented by man?

To conclude this philosophical catechism. —If all these questions can be answered from the philosophy of Mr Locke, Mr David Hume, or Dr Priestley, or any others in modern times, such as Des Cartes and Leibnitz, who have philosophised without the assistance of the antients, or if it can be shown that they are trifling, and not worthy of answer, then I will allow that I have spent my time very ill, and before me Mr Harris, in endeavouring to revive the old obsolete philosophy of the antients, which the great discoveries of the

ples of that philosophy, I have explained it. And, particularly, I have given a philosophical account of the Cases of Nouns, (perhaps the most artificial thing in language), which nobody before me has so much as attempted to do. This, I know, makes my second volume but little read, though it contain more of the philosophy of language than any of the other volumes. But it is not to be understood by those who know no more of language than what is taught in our schools, or even in our universities,

moderns have rendered quite useless. But, on the contrary, if the questions I have proposed are of so much importance, as I think they are, and cannot be answered from any books of modern philosophy, it follows of necessary consequence, that, if we will not study the antient philosophy, we cannot be philosophers, not even complete scholars and critics, nor indeed learned in the principles of any one art or science, and not so much as knowing what science is.

C H A P. V.

The Halicarnassian's treatise of Composition is confined to the sound of the Greek language.—In this a great variety.—Of the vowels in Greek.—All the vocal sounds possible, in that language.—That not the case of every language.—How there came to be 7 vowels reckoned by the Greek grammarians.—Of the variety of consonants in Greek ;—the syllables consequently very various.—Of the Greek accents upon syllables ;—these believed by some not to exist ;—proof from fact of their existence.—Of long and short syllables in Greek ;—some long syllables, longer than others, and some short syllables, shorter than others.—The Halicarnassian's account of long and short syl-

lables, that is of the rhythm of language, more distinct than Cicero's account.—Of syllables words are made, and of words sentences, with all the variety of periods and members of periods.—Of the wonderful variety and beauty of the composition in Greek.—That beauty was still greater when Homer wrote, and when greater liberty was used with words.—The variety of arrangement, which the syntax of the Greek language permits, adds wonderfully to the beauty of sound in the Greek composition, and also to the sense.—Of what is called the natural order of words ;—that does not make the beauty of composition.—Of the wonderful beauty of the Orations of Demosthenes pronounced by himself.—Two things required to make a perfect stile ;—that it should be both beautiful and pleasant.—Of the difference betwixt the two.—Four things required to make a stile both beautiful and pleasant, so far as concerns the sound, viz. melody, rhythm, variety, and what is decent and proper.—Of each of these in order.—The Rhythm much insisted upon ;—examples of good and bad rhythm.—

Also much said upon the το πρεπον, and illustrated by examples from Homer.—Of the Melody of speech,—how distinguished from the melody of music,—not reducible to rules.—Of the three different characters, the austere, the florid, and the middle.—Examples of these from different authors.—Two curious problems :—1mo, How prose is to be made like to verse.—2do, How verse is to be made like to prose.—The first a mystery in his time,—yet to be conceived even by us.—Examples from Demosthenes.—This can only be done in a language which has the rhythm of long and short syllables ;—not therefore in English, except the diction be poetical.—Of making prose of verse.—This explained by the Halicarnassian in a passage translated from him.—Milton's verse the perfection of that stile in English.—Next to Milton's is that of Dr Armstrong.—Mr Pope's verses very different.—Objections to Milton's versification answered.—This work of the Halicarnassian, the most elegant composition in the didactic stile.—Many errors in the text to be corrected.

I WILL conclude my observations upon the didactic stile, by giving an account of a work of that kind, which I think admirable ; and it is the more proper that I should enlarge upon it, that the subject of it is the same with the subject of these volumes, namely, Language. The work I mean is that of *Dionysius, the Halicarnassian, upon the composition of words*, an author of whom I have made more use in this work than of any other, as indeed I have been more instructed by him in every thing relating to stile and composition than by all the other authors I have read put together. This work, though it be entitled *Of Composition* only, yet treats likewise of the analysis of language ; and indeed it is impossible to understand perfectly any compound of any kind, without knowing the elements of which it is composed.

To compose and decompose all the words of the Greek language, not only with respect to the sound, but also with respect to the sense, would be to write a whole Greek grammar ; but this was not the intention of the Halicarnassian : He meant

only to consider the sound of it in different kinds of writing, whether verse or prose. And even this is a great work, if we consider what a variety there is in the sound of the Greek language.

And, first, as to the letters, or elemental sounds, (for he carries his analysis that far), there is all the variety that, I believe, is possible. And, in the first place, the Greeks have all the five vowels; and these, I believe, are all the sounds purely vocal, which the human mouth can utter. Now, this is not the case of every language, as I have taken occasion elsewhere to observe *; and even the English wants the sound of one vowel, substituting in place of it a diphthong. The Greek grammarians commonly reckon seven vowels in their language; but two of them, viz. the η and the ω are no more than the ϵ and the \circ marked by different characters when they are long: And I wish, for my own part, as I never made a professed study of short and long syllables, that they had distinguished all the other vowels in the same way; or, what I should have liked betw

* Vol. 4. of this work, p. 177. and following.

ter, though it would have occasioned more writing, that they had distinguished the long vowels as the Latins did of old, by writing them double*. But, as it is, I observe, that, in pronouncing the Greek, I mark the quantity of the vowels much better than in pronouncing the Latin. As the Latin is a very antient dialect of the Greek, I think, it is very likely that the Greeks of old marked the long vowels in the same way that the Latins did, and their long *o* or their *ω* is plainly two *omicrons* joined together. One thing is certain, that the alphabet of 16 letters, which the Greeks got from the Phaenicians, has no different characters for long and short vowels.—As to consonants, the Greeks have all the variety possible of them, *liquid* and *mute*, *labial*, *palatal*, and *guttural*, *aspirated* and *soft*, and a *middle* kind betwixt these two †.

Of this variety of elemental sounds syllables are composed, of which some must, consequently, be of harsher, some of softer,

* Vol. 2. p. 320.

† Vol. 2. p. 232. and following.

found, according to the nature of the letters, which compose them. And there is one distinction of syllables in Greek, which is not to be found in any language of Europe, and that is the distinction which the different *tones*, called by the antient grammarians *accents*, put upon them, make. This is so remote, not only from our practice, but from our ideas of the pronunciation of language, that there are some among us, who do not believe that the Greeks, or any other people, spoke in that way. But, if they have not Greek learning enough to understand what the Hali-carnassian has so distinctly told us in this work upon composition, which, I think, I have made by my translation * intelligible even to a man who does not understand Greek, and if nothing but facts will satisfy them, they should go over to America, and there they will hear the Iroquois speak with all that variety of melody and rhythm with which the antient Greeks spoke †.

* Vol. 2. p. 284.

† This information I had from a very ingenious man, Dr Moyes, who was three years in America, and

Another property of syllables in Greek, is, that some of them are long and some of them are short. A syllable is long in two ways, either by the vowel being long,

being a man of great curiosity, was very much among the Savages, as we call them, as well as among the Provincials. And I could trust more to what he told me of the music of the Iroquois language, that he is blind, and I am persuaded his ear for music is much the better for that reason ; and, besides that, he practises music very much, and is a performer upon several instruments. He told me that their acute accent was, like the Greek, commonly confined within a *psith*. But, he said, they sometimes started to an *ollave*. This, I suppose, happens when they are much agitated by passion, which naturally makes men musical. They have also, he told me, the distinction of long and short syllables, and in the ratio of the long to the short as *two* to *one*, in the same manner as in the learned languages : So that they have rhythm in their languages as well as melody. Of the rhythm of their language, I was informed by another gentleman. And I also heard something of their syllabic tones, but nothing distinctly, as my information came from persons who had not a good ear for music, without which such languages can neither be spoken nor understood. This is the case of the Chinese language, as I was told by Mr Beving, an English gentleman, who had been two and thirty years in China, having been sent thither very young by the East India Company, in order to learn their language, and so qualify himself to be their factor at Canton,

or by two consonants following the vowel, which, necessarily retarding the voice in pronunciation, makes the vowel long, though, by its nature, it be short. A short syllable is that which has a short vowel, and not lengthened in the way above mentioned. One short syllable, as the Halicarnassian has observed, may be longer than another, though it still continue to be reckoned a short syllable; and this is caused by the number of consonants preceding the vowel in the syllable, not following it; for, otherwise, they would make the syllable long. Of this he has given us some examples *. One long syllable may also be longer than another, if the vowel be of itself long, and be followed by two or more consonants: And, if some of these consonants be aspirated, it will still be longer. Syllables of this kind that are either shorter or longer, as the vowel happens to be joined with more or fewer consonants, are said by the Halicarnassian to be *αλογοι*, that is, *without any fixed ratio*, by which they are determined to be long-

er than long syllables, or shorter than short; for so nice were those antient ears, that they perceived even this difference among syllables; and accordingly the Halicarnassian takes notice of it in the examples he has given us of numerous composition both in verse and prose*.

And here I cannot help observing, that, upon the subject of long and short syllables, which form the rhythm of the antient languages, and was a thing of the greatest consequence in their composition both of verse and prose, the Halicarnassian is much more accurate and distinct than Cicero, who has also treated the same subject at considerable length in his *Orator*. He has puzzled, I think, and perplexed the matter by making a distinction betwixt rhythm and feet; whereas the Halicarnassian tells us, that there is no distinction, and that any foot makes by itself rhythm †: And, I think, it is certain, that, wherever the ear perceives a ratio betwixt two syllables, (for

* Cap. 17.

† Cap. 17. *in initio*;

a foot must consist of at least two syllables, and not of more than three, according to the Halicarnassian), whether it be a ratio of equality, or of *two* to *one*, there, of necessity, rhythm must be.

As syllables are composed of letters, so words are composed of syllables; and of words are made periods and members of periods; and thus the composition of writing or speaking is completed. And here the Halicarnassian lets us know, that it is not of the choice of words he speaks, but only of the composition of them; for, as to the choice of words, he promises his pupil, *Rufus Melitus*, another birth-day present upon that subject*. But either he did not keep his word, or the work is lost. And it is further to be observed, that, when he speaks of composition, he does not mean the composition of the words in syntax, but only the composition of them so as to please the ear by giving to them the proper melody and rhythm. It is therefore, as I have observed, neither the sense nor

* Cap. i. *in fine*.

the grammatical construction of the words that is the subject of this very learned and accurate treatise, but merely the sound of them : This may appear to some a very insignificant thing, and unworthy to be made the subject of any work. But we ought to consider that language was made to be spoken. This was the first use of it in all nations ; and in many nations it is no otherwise used at this day. Even where it is written, reading is the best test of the stile and composition, as I have elsewhere observed. And, if the sound be a material part of every language, it is more so of the Greek than of any other, I believe, in the world that either is, or ever has been ; for it has the greatest beauty, and at the same time the greatest variety in its pronunciation that can well be conceived : And, if the Halicarnassian had known any language so barbarous as the modern languages of Europe, he would have shown, by comparing the Greek with those languages, how much superior it was not only in the sense, but in the sound of the words. He would have shown, for example, that the Greek had not only all the

simple vocal sounds, which it is possible for the human mouth to utter, and which many of the barbarous languages have not, and even some of the European languages, which to call barbarous, would be thought an indignity to the nations that speak them, but these vocal sounds the Greeks compound, making what they call Diphthongs, which swell and raise the sound of the language very much; and, besides what are properly called Diphthongs, they had other compounded vocal sounds, which they called Improper Diphthongs; but which we cannot distinguish by our pronunciation from the simple vowels. Then, of consonants, as I have observed, they had all the variety of Liquids and Mutes, of Aspirated and Soft, all formed by different organs of pronunciation, which must have given all the variety, that it is possible to conceive, to the sound of their language, and made it neither too soft and sweet, which is a fault of some modern languages, particularly of the Italian, nor too rough and harsh, which is the case of the English, and of every language where there

are so many monosyllables, and these crouded with consonants, sometimes seven consonants for one vowel, as in the word *strength*, and the last letter not only a mute, which never happens in Greek, but an aspirated mute. In such a language, it is impossible there can be an agreeable flow: Whereas in Greek, by a proper choice and arrangement of the words, there may be as agreeable a flow as articulate sounds are capable of, and at the same time variety enough by the mixture of sounds more austere or even harsh. This could be effected even at the time the Halicarnassian wrote, after the language was formed; and it is the business of this treatise to show how it could be done. But in earlier times, before the language was brought to a fixed standard, which was the case when Homer wrote, there was a wonderful liberty taken with words, not only in forming them so as to express by the sound the nature of the things they represented, of which the Halicarnassian has given us sundry examples, but in adding to them, or taking from them, or otherwise changing them after they were formed, so as to

make them join and run together agreeably in composition. Some of this liberty was preserved in the Attic Greek, even at the time the Halicarnassian wrote ; for they frequently used apostrophes and elided vowels, and in that way run syllables together, or they sometimes added a vowel to the end of the word, and by that means a syllable. Thus, in place of *τὸυτον*, they said *τὸυτονι* ; and in place of *τὸυτου*, they said *τὸυτουι*. What an agreeable variety this must have made in the composition, is easy to imagine*.

But there is one thing that I am sure the Halicarnassian would have insisted much upon, had he known the difference betwixt Greek and the modern languages of Europe, and that is the wonderful variety of arrangement, which the declensions of nouns, and their cases, genders, and numbers, allow to the writer and speaker in Greek, and which, in my opinion, adds to the beauty and variety of

* See in Demosthenes *τὸυτονι* in the beginning of the Oration *De Corona*, and *τὸυτουι* in the beginning of the Oration against Aristocrates.

the composition more than all the other things mentioned by the Halicarnassian put together. It is this wonderful art of the learned languages, which, besides the variety of terminations and flexions that it gives to the words, enables the composers in those languages to arrange the words in sentences, almost in any order they please, setting, sometimes at a considerable distance from one another, words, which, by the syntax, are necessarily joined together. Of this I have given a fine example in an ode of Horace, which Milton by translating into English, and endeavouring to imitate the variety of Horace's arrangement, has shown the great defect, in that respect, of the English language*. I have also shown in the same volume that what is called the Natural Order of words, has truly no foundation in Nature†; and the Halicarnassian has bestowed a chapter to prove that the Natural Order, by which the noun is put before the verb, the verb before the adverb, and what is first in or-

* Vol. 4. p. 130.

† Ibid. p. 131.

der of time before what is last, is not at all more beautiful than any other order or arrangement of words, which the language will permit*.

But, besides the pleasure which this variety of arrangement must necessarily give to the ear, it has a considerable effect upon the sense; for the words of the sentence, placed in a certain order, will convey the meaning more forcibly than in any other order. This, I think, I have shown very clearly in the dissertation annexed to the second volume of this work. But this not only the Halicarnassian has taken no notice of, (nor indeed did it belong to his subject, which relates only to the sound of the language), but no other author antient or modern, as far as I know, who has written upon the subject of language.

When we add to all the things I have mentioned, the melody, which the tones of the Greek language must have produced in speaking, and of which a variety was

required, as the Halicarnassian informs us, as well as of other things belonging to the language;—then the rhythm, which, joined with the melody of their accents, must have made their language as musical as it was possible that a language could be, and which, as the Halicarnassian has observed, distinguished the styles of the different authors very remarkably* ;—when, I say, we join all these things together, I think we may conclude, that there was a beauty in the orations of Demosthenes, when pronounced by himself, of which we men of modern times can hardly form an idea.—But to return to the Halicarnassian.

The tendency of all his rules for composition, he tells us, is to form a style that is both beautiful and pleasant. The distinction betwixt these two he does not much insist upon; and indeed to distinguish them accurately belongs more to philosophy than

* Cap. 11. 13. & 19. See also what I have written upon the antient accents, and the use of them in composition, vol. 2. book 3. chap. 7.; and upon the rhythm of antient prose, ib. chap. 10.

to criticism : And all, I think, that is necessary to be said upon the subject by a critic, is, that the one is perceived by the sense, I mean what is pleasant, the other more by the judgment : And it may be added, that what is pleasant to a man of good taste, is also beautiful ; and again, what is beautiful, is to a man of taste also pleasant. I think, therefore, the Halicarnassian has very properly joined them together, and given us rules by which a stile is to be made both beautiful and pleasant.

There are four things, he says, that make composition both beautiful and pleasant, as far as it can be made by the sound only. The *first* is a noble melody ; the *second*, a dignified rhythm ; the *third*, proper variations and changes ; the *fourth* and *last*, what is decent, proper, and suitable to the subject, without which no composition, nor any work of art can be either beautiful or pleasant ; for, says he, it is of it that Beauty chiefly consists *.

* Cap. 13.

The application of these rules for composition depends upon the nature of letters, syllables, and words. And it is here that he enters into a most minute and accurate dissection of the elements of language, upon which I have taken occasion to make observations in sundry passages of this work, which I will not here repeat. He is very copious upon the subject of change and variety, without which it is evident there can be no beauty in any work of art; and he is still more copious upon the subject of rhythm: And he shows very clearly that it was essential to the beauty of prose composition, though, at the time he wrote, it was quite neglected. And not only so, but many were of opinion that it was ridiculous to measure and number syllables in prose composition. But the Halicarnassian was of a different opinion; and he has scanned and reduced to feet some fine passages in Plato, Demosthenes, and Thucydides, as carefully as he would have scanned any piece of poetry. And not only from them has he given us examples of fine numerous composition, but he has contrasted these with

examples of the worst composition from an author, whom he calls Hegeſias *, and which is indeed ſo bad, that even my ears are offended with it.

Upon the other two of the four things above mentioned he inſiſts at conſiderable length, illuſtrating whatever he ſays by examples from the beſt authors ; and particularly with reſpect to the laſt of the two, namely, the compoſition that is proper and ſuitable to the ſubject, he has given us ſome of the fineſt illuſtrations from Homer that can be imagined.

Before I have done with theſe four things, I muſt obſerve, that, with regard to the firſt of them, viz. the Melody, he has ſaid very little, giving us neither rules nor examples, but only telling us in general, that there muſt be a variety in the Tones, as well as in every other part of the compoſition ; and therefore that there muſt not be many words together

* Cap. 18.

accented in the same manner. The reason of this I take to be, that the melody of common speech was not, nor indeed could well be reduced to exact rules, like the music of singing or of instruments. The acute accent, as the Halicarnassian tells us, rose to about a fifth *, without pretending exactly to determine how much higher or lower it might have been, as that must have depended very much upon the voice and ear of the speaker. The case of the Melody of Music was very different: For, in the *first* place, it was of very much greater compass, and rose very much higher. *2dly*, It did not proceed by Slides as the tones of speech did, but by measured intervals, accurately distinguished one from another. And this was an essential difference betwixt the music of singing and of instruments, which was all *Diastematic*, as they expressed it, that is, distinguished by measured intervals, and the music of speech, which was all *οὐρεχνης*, or *εὐπυρεσι*, that is, *proceeding by slides*. It is therefore not to be wondered, that the

* Cap. 11. The expression is *ἡς ὕψιστη*.

music of the first kind was reduced to a regular system, and a system much more comprehensive than our system; for it was divided into three kinds, the *Diatonic*, which is our only system, but what was no more than the vulgar music among them; *2dly*, the *Chromatic*; and, *3dly*, the *Enharmonic*.

Having finished what he had to say upon the four things which make a stile beautiful and pleasant, he proceeds to give an account of the different characters or distinguishing marks of stile, which he divides into three, the *austere*, the *florid*, and the *middle* betwixt these two, to which he gives the name of *common*, as partaking of each of the other two, but avoiding what is extreme in either*. In treating of these different stiles, he has made excellent observations upon the joining of words together, so as to make the composition rough and austere, pleasant and florid, or a middle betwixt these two, and which will apply to all languages more or less, as well as to the Greek. He compares, I think not un-

* Cap. 21. & 22.

fitly, a man who composes with words, to a mason or builder, who makes his work of materials very different, but these he puts together so as to make rough work, or smooth and polished, or something betwixt the two *. Here, likewise, he illustrates what he says by examples from great authors of these different styles, Pindar as a poet, and Thucydides as an historian, for the austere style. Of the smooth and flowery, he has given us an example in verse from Sappho, and in prose from Isocrates. And to these examples he most accurately and minutely applies the rules he had laid down for each of the styles ; nor do I think that he could have taught his pupil, to whom he addresses the work, with greater exactness and precision. Of the middle style, he tells us, that Homer, the fountain of all fine writing of every kind, is the most perfect model, as well as of the other two. He in the Epic, of the Lyrics Stesichorus and Alcaeus, Sophocles of Tragedians, Herodotus of Historians, Demosthenes of Orators, and of Philosophers Democritus,

* Cap. 6.

Plato, and Aristotle. But he gives us no examples from these authors, as he had given examples from the authors who have written in the two files, betwixt which this middle file lies.

Our author concludes his treatise with two very curious problems: The first is, how prose is to be made like to verse, and yet continue prose: The other is, how verse is to be made like to prose, and yet be still verse. When this can be properly done, our author thinks it is the perfection of writing, as it gives to each of the two compositions all the beauty of the other, as far as the nature of the thing will permit.

He begins with the first of these problems, which was so little known at the time he wrote, that he considered it as a mystery not to be communicated to the profane vulgar; and therefore he bids them keep at a distance, using that form of words, which was used in the initiations into the mysteries of Ceres*. And here

* Cap. 25. The words are to be found in a famous verse of Orpheus.

Φηγεμας τοις θεοις εστι, θυρας δ' ανοιχτας, βαβηλαι.

he tells us, that it is not by using poetical words and figures of speech, that we are to make our prose poetical, with respect to the numbers, of which only he here speaks, but it is by composing common words in such a manner as to give a certain rhythm even to prose, and to make it numerous without being aftricted to certain numbers as verse is. Now, I think, this should not appear so great a mystery even to us of these latter times, if we consider that the same syllables are long or short both in verse and prose; and, therefore, that even in prose these syllables must form feet, and, consequently, produce a rhythm of one kind or another. Now the secret is, says our author, to make that rhythm agreeable to the ear, and yet not so regular, and with such returns at stated intervals as to make verse. That this is possible, I think I can certainly conclude from theory, though my ear is not formed to perceive the rhythm of this kind, and not even the true rhythm of verse, because I have not the practice of reading the antient verse in the antient manner, that is, by quantity. But our author affirms, that it is not only possible to compose prose in that way, but that the

Orations of Demosthenes are actually so composed. And he gives two examples, the one from his oration against Aristocrates, and the other from the famous oration for Ctesiphon. I think it is impossible to deny that his learned ear perceived those numbers, which I do not perceive, though I can say that the composition pleases my ear very much, and appears to me perfectly different from the composition of Hegesias above mentioned.

This way of making verse of prose answered very well in a language where every thing in common discourse was spoken with a rhythm of one kind or another; but it will not answer in a language such as ours, in which there is no rhythm of long or short syllables. If, therefore, we will versify our prose, it must be by accented and unaccented syllables, in the same way as we make our verse. This has been attempted by several; but this alone will not do with common words, as in Greek. The words, therefore, and figures must be poetical; and even in that way, it has not, in my opinion, succeeded with any writer,

except perhaps with my Lord Shaftsbury in his *Rhapsody*, where he puts it only into the mouth of one of his personages, whom he represents as carried by the enthusiasm of philosophy altogether out of the common stile of speech. He has been so judicious, that, in no other part of that fine work, he has attempted this poetical prose. In some other of his works, where he has affected to give numbers to his prose, he has by no means succeeded, at least in my judgment *.

But, if we have not been fortunate in our attempts to make poetry of prose, it is impossible to deny, that Milton has given to his poetry in *Paradise Lost* all the beauty of prose composition; for he has broken and cut his verse into periods and members of periods, finer, I think, than any that are to be found in our prose, unless, perhaps, in his own prose writings: And there is a passage in the last chapter of the *Halicarnassian* upon this kind of stile, so applicable to Milton's verse, that one can-

* See vol. 3. of this work, p. 284. in the note.

not find better words to describe it. 'Whoever,' says he, 'would succeed in this stile, must fit and adjust the words so that the members of the periods shall be properly distinguished from one another, not concluding with the verse, but cutting the measure, and not equal or like to one another. He must sometimes, too, throw into the verse very short sentences, (in Greek *κωμματα*), not so long as the members of periods; and his periods must not be of equal length, nor of the same figure and structure, these at least that are joined together in the composition; for,' says he, 'it is the apparent disorder in the rhythm and measure that makes verse resemble prose *.' To give

* I will give the author's words: Τον δὲ βουλομένον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μέρει κατορθοῦν, τὰ τῆς λέξεως μέρη διὰ πολυειδούς στρεφίῃ τι καὶ συναρμωττίῃ, καὶ τὰ κωλὰ ἐν διαστήμασι ποιῇ ἄσυμμετρον, μὴ συνπαρτίζοντα τοῖς στίχοις, ἀλλὰ διατίμωτα τοῦ μέτρου, αἷμα δὲ ποιῇ αὐτὰ καὶ αἰμοειδῆ. Πολυλακίς δὲ καὶ εἰς κωμματα συνάγει βραχυτέρα κωλῶν, τὰς τε περιόδους μὴτε ἰσομεγέθεις μὴτε ὁμοιοσχημοῦς, τὰς γὰρ παρακρημίας ἀλληλαίς, ἐργαζέσθαι ἔγγιστα γὰρ φαίνεται λόγοις, τοῖς παρὰ τοὺς ῥυθμούς καὶ τὰ μέτρα πεπλατημίων. Here it may be observed, that I have adopted Upton's correction of the text, and read *ἄσυμμετρον* in place of *συμμετρον*.

examples of this from Milton, as the Harlicarnassian has done from Greek authors, would be to transcribe a great part of the *Paradise Lost*: And it would be the more unnecessary, as I have elsewhere * given examples from Milton, such as may suffice to show the beauty of Milton's verse in this respect. I will only add here, that Milton has not only made periods in his verse, but has thrown into these periods parentheses, by which he has most agreeably diversified the stile †. It is also to be observed, that his periods are best marked and

But I reject his translation of the last part of the passage, where he would make Dionysius say, that, in order to make verse like to prose, there must be errors committed in the rhythm and the measure; for then it would cease to be verse, and be prose altogether. But our author's meaning certainly is, that there should only be an apparent disorder, or wandering, as it may be called, in the measure.

* Vol. 4. of this work, p. 269.;—vol. 2. p. 355. and following.

† See, upon the subject of *parenthesis*, and particularly of Milton's parentheses, vol. 2. p. 561. where I have observed a pretty long one, that had not been before observed. See also vol. 3. p. 75.

distinguished where they should be, that is, in the speeches: And I cannot help further observing, how extraordinary it appears to be, to deny that Milton excels in writing prose, when to his poetry he gives the beauty of prose writing.

The author who comes nearest to Milton, in blank verse, is Dr Armstrong in his *Art of preserving Health*. Of this admirable poem the diction is more splendid than even of Milton's *Paradise Lost*; but the versification has not so much the merit of giving the verse the beauties of prose composition. And particularly it has but few of those periods with which Milton has adorned his poetry so much.

How unlike to the verse of Milton is our rhyming verse, and particularly Mr Pope's, so much praised and admired, where the sense is commonly concluded with the verse, or at least with the distich ! Now, I can hardly conceive a composition more tediously uniform than a composition in sentences (for they cannot be called periods) of ten, or at most twenty syllables,

and every two lines tagged with a rhyme. But, besides that, there is almost always a certain pause in the middle of Mr Pope's verse, very like to the pause in the middle of the French long verse ; and this pause, together with the pause at the end of each line, and at the end of every two lines, makes such a disgusting uniformity and sameness, as is not to be found in any antient composition of any kind, and is therefore intolerable, especially in a work of any length, to an ear accustomed to the variety of antient composition.

It may be objected to Milton's versification, that, by his periods and members of periods, he has made his composition so perfectly prosaical, that the verse is lost. But to this I answer, that he has always contrived to terminate his verse with a word upon which the sense requires that some emphasis be laid, even if the composition were altogether prose. Now, where an emphasis is laid upon a word, there is always some stop of the voice more or less, and that stop will mark the verse : But,

as I have elsewhere observed*, it is a matter of delicacy just to mark this stop, but not to make it too long ; for that would destroy the beauty of the composition in periods, and even make the sense obscure. I have observed that in Shakespeare's blank verse, when he runs the verses into one another, which happens but seldom, (for he does not compose verse in periods, as Milton does), and in other blank verse of that age, the poet is not sufficiently attentive to conclude the line with a word of emphasis ; so that there can be no stop at all properly made at the end of the verse ; and therefore either the verse must not be marked, or the sense must be injured.

And here I conclude my observations upon this piece of the Halicarnassian, upon which I have enlarged the more, as I think it the most elegant piece of didactic writing that I know ; for there is in it an elegance and copiousness of stile which I do not find in any other writing of the kind, not even in the works of Aristotle.

* Vol. 4. of this work, p. 241. and following.

There is a variety, too, in the composition, which I think admirable; and particularly he has avoided that tedious sameness, which I have observed * in a great deal of the Latin composition, I mean the concluding the sentence or member of the sentence with a verb. This little work, I am persuaded, cost him more pains than any thing of the same size that he has written; and indeed it was very natural, that, as the subject of it was Composition, he should make the composition of it as perfect as he could make it, so that it might give his pupil not only the precepts of the art, but an example of the practice of it. I hope my friends at Oxford, when they give us that new edition of the Halicarnassian's works, which I have recommended to them †, will bestow particular attention upon this work, so necessary to be studied by every man who desires to form a taste of the beauty of antient composition. Some passages in it have been very well corrected by Sylburgius, Upton, and others: And these corrections are so ob-

* Vol. 4. p. 227. and following.

† P. 148. of this vol.—and p. 288. of vol. 4.


vious and certain, that they ought to be taken into the text, and the common reading degraded to the bottom of the page. But there are other passages that have not been corrected, but which absolutely require it; of which I observe one in the very last sentence of the treatise, where he exhorts his pupil not only to learn the precepts of the art, but to practise them: 'For,' says he, 'it will depend upon your labour in that way, whether the precepts are to be of any use to you or not *.'

* His words are: Οὐ γὰρ ἀνταρκῆ τὰ παραγγέλματα τὰ τῶν ἐστὶ δεινὸν ἀνταγωνιστὰς ποιῆσαι τοὺς βουλευομένους διχῶς μελίστης τε καὶ γυμνασίας· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ποιεῖν καὶ κακοπαθεῖν κίηται, ἢ σπουδαία εἶναι τὰ παραγγέλματα καὶ λόγου ἀξία, ἢ φανὸς καὶ ἀχρηστοῦ. Here I agree with Upton, that the words *τοὺς βουλευομένους* have no sense at all, and therefore ought to be left out; but, in the following member of the sentence, I would make a very slight correction, by reading *τῷ* in place of *τοῖς*, and ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ κακοπαθεῖν κίηται, ἢ σπουδαία, &c. So that I understand *κίηται* impersonally: and the meaning is: 'That it depends upon application and labour whether the precepts shall be of any use or not.' This sense, I think, agrees much better with the words than if we were to retain the *τοῖς*, and read, as Upton would have us do, ἐπὶ τοῖς βουλευομένοις ποιεῖν.

F I N I S.

VA 1
4517355





17X

17X

17X

17X

~~XXXXX~~
~~A~~
73

116

8

123.

